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SUMMARY 
This research project focuses on the use of economic experiments for institutional analysis. 
The dissertation consists of one conceptual and four empirical essays. Specifically, it 
investigates how contextual factors and institutions affect behavior. 
In the first essay, three theoretical perspectives on institutional change are distinguished. 
These are linked to empirical work in Experimental Economics. It becomes apparent that 
three types of economic experiments can be differentiated by the definition of institutions. 
The empirical essays expand on these considerations. In the second essay, commuters’ 
transportation mode choice is analyzed by means of a framed field experiment. It is shown 
that loss aversion and status concerns drive behavior. In the third essay, a public goods 
game is employed to investigate the effect of endowment heterogeneity and leading by 
example on voluntary contributions to a jointly used sanitation facility. It is demonstrated 
that in a structurally similar decision context, choices are driven by experiences from other 
contexts. The fourth essay examines the impact of the so-called status quo bias on pro-
environmental behavior. In a field experiment, it is shown that forcing a decision has a 
positive effect on pro-environmental behavior. The fifth essay investigates whether 
experiments can be used as a tool for environmental awareness building. Even participants 
with negative experiences from taking part in the dilemma experiment show a greater 
likeliness of behaving environmentally friendly in comparison to a control group. 
In a concluding part, the essays are synthesized. One outcome is an analytical framework 
for developing economic experiments on institutional change. Constitutional rules (i.e., 
rules on how to change the rules) are identified as a promising starting point for future 
research. 




Das Kerninteresse der Arbeit gilt den Einsatzmöglichkeiten ökonomischer Experimente in 
der Institutionenanalyse. Die Dissertation setzt sich aus einem konzeptionellen und vier 
empirischen Aufsätzen zusammen. Anhand der Arbeiten wird nachvollzogen, wie sich 
verschiedene Kontextfaktoren und Institutionen auf Verhalten auswirken. 
Im ersten Aufsatz werden drei theoretische Blickwinkel auf institutionellen Wandel 
unterschieden. Diese werden dann mit empirischen Arbeiten in der experimentellen 
Wirtschaftsforschung in Beziehung gesetzt. Es wird deutlich, dass sich drei Arten von 
ökonomischen Experimenten anhand ihres Institutionenbegriffs unterscheiden lassen. Die 
empirischen Aufsätze greifen diese Überlegungen auf. Im zweiten Aufsatz findet für die 
Analyse der Verkehrsmittelwahl von Pendlern unter verschiedenen Politikszenarien ein 
„Framed Field Experiment“ Anwendung. Es wird gezeigt, wie Verlustaversion und 
Statusängste die Entscheidungen der Pendler erklären können. Im dritten Aufsatz kommt 
ein „Public Goods Game“ zum Einsatz, um den Einfluss von ökonomischer Ungleichheit 
und Vorbildverhalten auf Beiträge zu einer gemeinsam genutzten sanitären Einrichtung zu 
untersuchen. Es kann gezeigt werden, dass in einer strukturell ähnlichen 
Entscheidungssituation Teilnehmerinnen sich häufig so verhalten, wie es ihnen aus 
anderen Zusammenhängen bekannt ist. Der vierte Aufsatz untersucht den Einfluss des 
sogenannten Status-Quo-Effekts auf umweltfreundliches Verhalten. In einem 
Feldexperiment wird gezeigt, dass sich ein Zwang zur Entscheidung positiv auf 
umweltfreundliches Verhalten auswirken kann. Der fünfte Aufsatz geht der Frage nach, ob 
sich Experimente als didaktisches Werkzeug zur Schaffung größeren Umweltbewusstseins 
einsetzen lassen. Im Vergleich zu einer Kontrollgruppe zeigen selbst Teilnehmende mit 
negativen Erfahrungen aus dem Experiment einen positiven Effekt auf umweltfreundliches 
Verhalten. 
In einem Fazit findet eine Synthese der Aufsätze statt. Ein Ergebnis ist die Entwicklung 
eines analytischen Rahmens für die Durchführung ökonomischer Experimente zur 
Untersuchung institutionellen Wandels. Konstitutionelle Regeln, also Regeln zur Änderung 
von Regeln, werden als erfolgversprechender Ansatzpunkt für die zukünftige Forschung 
identifiziert. 
Schlagwörter: Verhaltensökonomie; Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung; 
Institutionenökonomie; Methodologie  
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1. RESEARCH AGENDA 
1.1. Problem statement 
Society faces a number of pressing challenges. The benefits of economic and social 
development remain out of reach for many people on the globe. Universal primary 
education, basic health, sanitation and hygiene, food security, or gender equity are only 
some of the issues that must be resolved in the years to come (United Nations, 2000). At 
the same time, global environmental change has reached alarming levels, and in a number 
of domains, planetary boundaries have been passed (Rockström et al., 2009). In many 
important aspects, solving these problems calls for behavioral change (World Bank, 2015). 
For instance, carbon emissions can be substantially reduced by household-level 
interventions aiming at behavioral change (Dietz et al., 2009), and to achieve improved 
sanitation practices, the provision of toilets and pipes – the “hardware” – must be 
complemented by a change in attitudes and habits – the “software” (Mosler, 2012). 
Understanding how people make decisions in complex contexts is crucial to enhance 
policy analysis (World Bank, 2015). Traditionally, economists have regarded this as a 
matter of investigating people’s responses to incentives, and more recently, behavioral 
economists have started to explicitly acknowledge the role of cognition in decision-making 
(e.g., Thaler, 1994; Kahneman, 2011). Individual decisions are embedded in and interact 
with a wider social context. Ultimately, it is the combination of incentives and strategic 
interaction, cognition, and institutions that determine decision-making in practice. In 
empirical work, the complex relationships among the multiple levels and factors involved 
make it difficult to establish causal relationships. In Economics, the use of experiments has 
successfully addressed this methodical challenge. The manipulation of a variable that is 
exogenous to the process of interest allows for the construction of a proper counterfactual 
for the identification of causal effects (Harrison & List, 2004). 
Over the first decades of its existence, the field of Experimental Economics has witnessed 
the application of a number of basic games involving abstract decision tasks, and numerous 
empirical studies have aimed at testing economic theory under controlled laboratory 
conditions. In some respects, the evidence has confirmed theoretical predictions; in others, 
economic theory has been rejected. For example, basic laws of competition and market 
power are fairly accurately reproduced under laboratory conditions with actual human 
subjects (Friedman & Sunder, 1994). By contrast, experimental economists have 
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repeatedly demonstrated that humans behave less selfishly than the homo economicus 
model would normally predict; this has led to the integration of fairness concerns or so-
called other-regarding preferences into mainstream economic theory (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999). Over time, Experimental Economics has become more specialized and dispersed. 
However, two important recent trends can be identified. 
First, there is growing interest in using experiments for the study of institutions (Ostrom, 
Gardner, & Walker, 1994; Ménard, 2001; Robin & Staropoli, 2008; Beckmann & 
Padmanabhan, 2009). In particular, in a recently created branch of Experimental 
Economics, institutions are subject to endogenous change (e.g., Gürerk, Irlenbusch, & 
Rockenbach, 2006; Ertan, Page, & Putterman, 2009; Dal Bó, Foster, & Putterman, 2010; 
Sutter, Haigner, & Kocher, 2010). As part of the experimental game, participants can select 
into groups that differ in their institutions (e.g., Gürerk, Irlenbusch, & Rockenbach, 2006) 
or adopt a different set of institutions as part of a group whose composition is held constant 
over time in repeated interactions (e.g., Sutter, Haigner, & Kocher, 2010). However, the 
link between empirical experimental work and the wide range of theoretical concepts on 
institutions and institutional change (e.g., Bromley, 1989; North, 1990; Knight, 1992; 
Bowles, 1998; van den Bergh & Stagl, 2003; Greif & Laitin, 2004; Hodgson, 2004; Aoki, 
2007; Kingston & Caballero, 2009) is often only weakly established. 
Second, increasingly experimental economists have left the lab, extending their research to 
non-student subjects and more explicitly recognizing context because “it is not the case 
that abstract, context-free experiments provide more general findings if the context itself is 
relevant to the performance of subjects” (Harrison & List, 2004, p. 1022). A quickly 
growing body of empirical literature uses framed field experiments to explore the impact 
of a wide range of contextual factors on cooperation and collective action in natural 
resource management and agriculture (Cárdenas & Ostrom, 2004; Viceisza, 2012). In 
Development Economics, randomized controlled trials have become popular for assessing 
the effectiveness of policy interventions (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). In spite of the growing 
empirical evidence, a vast number of potentially interesting factors remains unexplored. 
For example, the impact of “leading by example” or endowment heterogeneity has been 
studied in the lab (e.g., Levati, Sutter, & van der Heijden, 2007), but it is unstudied in the 
field where these factors exhibit context-specific interactions that are important for 
understanding actual decision-making. Framed field experiments may also complement 
other research methods if assessing the effect of policies would not be viable otherwise. 
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For instance, it is fairly difficult to study coordination and strategic interaction in 
transportation under different policy scenarios. Here, experimental games can complement 
other research methods. 
1.2. Research purpose and scope 
This dissertation contributes to these two strands of research in five essays,. A key 
conceptual contribution lies in establishing links between theoretical work in Institutional 
Economics and empirical work in Experimental Economics. Institutions are at the core of 
many questions in Economics, and it is widely acknowledged that they play a key role in 
the economic system (North, 1990; Acemoglu, Robinson, & Woren, 2012). The overall 
role of human agency in driving institutional change, the mechanisms of such change, and 
actors’ motivations to change an existing institution or create a new one are subject to a 
theoretical debate (Bromley, 1989; North, 1990; Knight, 1992; Hodgson, 2004). However, 
there is only limited empirical evidence on the topic because it is methodically challenging 
to study institutional change (Alston, Eggertsson, & North, 1996; Schlüter, 2010). Thus, an 
additional contribution of the dissertation lies in developing an improved understanding of 
how economic experiments are potentially useful for the empirical analysis of 
dynamically-changing institutions. 
In summary, the overarching research objective is to explicate the multidirectional links 
between behavior, institutions, and the environment. The three guiding questions are: 
1. How are institutions understood in Experimental Economics, and can we 
distinguish between concepts in empirical work? 
2. How does behavior vary under different institutions, and how do institutions 
interact with contextual variables? 
3. Finally, what are the specific conditions under which experiments are a useful 
method for analyzing dynamically changing institutions?  
The empirical part employs framed field and natural field experiments to investigate in 
some detail the pressing challenges described above. The commonality among the 
empirical essays is that they are strongly embedded in a specific field setting that involves 
the complex interaction of contextual variables with institutions. The aim is to highlight the 
role of context in mediating outcomes through the interaction of contextual variables with 
3 
  
existing institutions. For this purpose, it is important to first develop a map of potentially 
influential variables. 
1.3. A framework for analyzing decisions in framed field experiments 
Analytical frameworks are used as heuristics to structure the research process. One aim is 
to assist empirically-working scholars with a set of potentially important variables and 
factors to consider for analysis in a specific empirical setting. In contrast to theories or 
models, analytical frameworks are not explicit on the direction or size of causal effects. 
They usually provide a starting point for empirical analysis, help to delineate boundaries of 
a research project, or highlight particular aspects of a more complex system. 
Cárdenas & Ostrom (2004) have developed a framework for the analysis of decision-
making data gathered from framed field experiments in common pool resource dilemmas. 
The central unit of analysis is the decision of an individual whether or not to cooperate. 
This decision is nested in multiple layers of information (Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Framework for the analysis of the levels of information for deciding to cooperate 
 
Source: Cárdenas & Ostrom, 2004, p. 310 
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The framework posits that participants in an experiment transform the formal game into an 
internal game and that three layers of information are used in deciding whether to 
cooperate or defect. The first layer is the material payoff layer. It consists of the set of 
feasible strategies and the associated payoffs of an outcome for a one-shot decision. It is 
temporally dynamic because it allows the development of reputation and learning from 
previous rounds and reciprocity in subsequent rounds (t±1 in Figure 1). The second layer is 
the group-context layer which is based on a player’s perception of the other players. 
Players may assess whether norms are shared with other players or what the degree of 
inequality and heterogeneity within the group may be. The third layer, the identity layer, 
consists of individual level characteristics that may affect the decision to cooperate. The 
framework is used to indicate the single contributions of the four empirical essays. 
1.4. Contribution of the papers and organization of the thesis  
The first paper establishes the foundation of the thesis by reviewing the experimental 
literature in Ecological Economics. The paper develops a link between existing empirical 
work and the various definitions of institutions and theories of institutional change. It 
shows that three types of experimental practice can be distinguished in a structure–agency 
framework. These practices are mirrored in (1) a structural, (2) an agent-centered, and (3) 
an evolutionary viewpoint on institutions. The paper sets the frame for the thesis and 
contributes to the first and third guiding question by defining which concepts of 
institutions can underlie an empirical project and by asking questions about what we have 
to consider if we are interested in studying institutional change by means of economic 
experiments. 
The second paper demonstrates the structural viewpoint as defined in the first paper and 
contributes to answering the second question. In a coordination game where subjects can 
choose between the bus or the car (i.e., a framed field experiment that focuses on mode 
choice), traffic policy is exogenously varied to study its impact on the behavior of 
participants. 
In a similar approach, the third paper alters the sequence of play by introducing “leading 
by example.” In one treatment of a voluntary contribution mechanism public good game, 
subjects play in parallel; in another treatment, one participant moves first, and then, the 
other players decide, being aware of the first person’s contribution. It extends the approach 
of the second paper by altering an important variable of the group context layer: the 
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distribution of wealth. Participants also receive information on the distribution of wealth. 
The paper also contributes to answering the third question. Specifically, it demonstrates 
that in the absence of a behavioral rule in one context, rules and norms known from other 
contexts can substantially alter behavior. 
The fourth paper is based on a natural field experiment. Participants do not know they are 
part of an experiment and decide in their natural environment (cf. Harrison & List, 2004). 
The study explores the role of what is perceived to be the status quo decision in a specific 
context. In particular, it demonstrates that if subjects are forced to decide either for or 
against a “no junk mail” sticker, their choices differ from a situation in which the status 
quo is not to use a sticker. The paper contributes to answering the second and third 
questions by exploring how higher level rules and norms affect decision-making. 
The fifth paper takes a normative viewpoint by asking whether economic experiments 
could be used as a tool for achieving pro-social behavioral change. Specifically, it 
investigates how the experience of play in a social dilemma game affects subsequent pro-
social behavior as measured by a donation. The paper contributes to answering the second 
question by investigating how experience in one context transfers to another context. Table 
1 displays a summary of the empirical papers, distinguishing between the layers of 
information players assess. 
Table 1: Main topics of empirical papers by information layers 
Paper 
Number 
Material Payoffs Game 
Layer 
Group-Context Layer Identity Layer 
II Coordination problem; no 
dominant strategy; 
dynamics over time and 
interaction with 
alterations in payoff 
Expectations on the 
behavior of others 
Self-image as a car 
driver (upper middle 
class) or bus user (lower 
middle class) 
III Social dilemma with 
dominant strategy but 
possibility to set a positive 
example in the leadership 
treatment 
Heterogeneity in 




Interaction of leadership 
skills and experience 
with leadership 
institution in the game 
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IV Individual benefits depend 
on the interest in receiving 
ads and the benefits from 
saving paper 
Perception of what is 
the social norm 
Self-image with respect 
to environmental 
behavior 
V Main interest in altruism 
(other-regarding 
preferences) by means of 
a dictator game 
Perception of what is 
the social norm 
Self-image with respect 
to environmental 
behavior; learning and 
experience 
Source: own design 
The dissertation culminates in a concluding part. Here, the work is summarized, and the 
lessons learned for institutional analysis are synthesized. A major outcome of this synthesis 
is a research framework for the study of evolutionary institutional change as defined in the 
first paper. The empirical papers contribute to the development of this framework by 
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Abstract: Today, economic experiments are well accepted in mainstream economics. They 
are also widely applied in ecological economics, often focusing on institutions. Yet, many 
empirical studies in this field lack a sound theoretical foundation of institutions and 
institutional change. In this paper, I show that in a structure–agency framework three 
theoretical viewpoints on institutions can be distinguished. They can be viewed as (1) 
structures that shape incentives, (2) cognitive media, embedded in beliefs and cognition of 
agents, or (3) evolving from a process of agents’ choices and structural aspects. Using 
examples from the empirical experimental literature, I argue that all three viewpoints are 
mirrored in experimental practice, and that these can be organized into an institutional 
typology of economic experiments. Placing special emphasis on experiments with 
endogenous institutional choice and their relationship to evolutionary economic theory, I 
discuss under which conditions experiments are a useful method for the analysis of social–
ecological systems, concluding that methodological and methodical innovations are an 
important prerequisite for challenging the dominant paradigm of neoclassical economics. 
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2.1. Introduction 
In the economic literature there are at least three ways in which institutions are 
distinguished in a structure–agency framework. First, institutions can be understood as 
structures that enable or constrain agents’ choices. Second, institutions can be understood 
as embedded in agents, for example through norms, which may be socially or culturally 
determined, eventually being responsible for behavioral differences. Third, institutions 
may evolve as the result of both agents’ choices and the impact of structures on agents’ 
preferences for institutions. This evolutionary viewpoint implies that institutions are 
ontologically inseparable from structures and agents (Hodgson, 2004). 
Implicitly, these three different conceptualizations of institutions are mirrored in the 
empirical practice of experimental economics. For example, classical market experiments 
involve the exogenous variation of trading rules (structures) to test subjects’ behavior 
under different auctioning mechanisms (Ketcham et al., 1984). The much-cited ultimatum 
game experiments, conducted across fifteen small-scale societies, assume that culturally 
determined fairness norms embedded in game participants (agents) are reflected in 
experimental play (Henrich et al., 2004). More recent experiments also allow subjects to 
change the rules of an experiment (within certain limits), while at the same time 
investigating the evolution of participants’ preferences for institutions as the result of their 
past choices, game outcomes, or initial institutions (Botelho et al., 2005). 
The aim of this paper is to spell out more explicitly these relationships between the 
theoretical work on institutions and the empirical practice of experimentalists by means of 
an “institutional typology of economic experimentation,” which allows for the 
classification of economic experiments by their conceptualization of institutions. By 
accentuating these links, it is possible to expatiate on the connection of institutional 
economics to experimental methods. Ultimately, a sound theory–method link will be 
important in attracting more empirical projects in the relatively young field of economic 
experimentation, which would allow for “endogenous institutional choice.” As I will argue, 
this is related to the debate on the endogenous evolution of institutions in the economic 
system (Bowles, 1998; Brousseau and Raynaud, 2011; Field, 1984; Herrmann-Pillath, 
2013; Nelson and Winter, 1982; van Bergh and Stagl, 2003).  
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Although the typology developed here is more generally applicable, my examples are 
drawn mostly from the field of ecological and environmental economics, for at least three 
reasons. First, empirical applications in environmental management have been among the 
first to use experiments with a specific focus on the role of institutions (Ostrom et al., 
1994). This initial study has encouraged a large empirical literature using experimental 
methods in this field (List and Price, 2013). The importance of institutions for governing 
global ecosystems is also of high practical relevance, with humanity facing potentially 
disastrous global environmental change (Young, 2002). Second, experiments in ecological 
economics often combine the interaction of participants’ behavior with temporal and 
spatial dynamics of ecological systems, making them more prone to a dynamic and 
evolutionary perspective than experimental work based on mainstream economic theory. 
Third, the field is currently witnessing a particularly lively debate on methodology and 
methods, including an ongoing debate on the use of qualitative vs. quantitative methods 
and the use of mixed methods, often also explicitly referring to economic experiments 
(Beckmann and Padmanabhan, 2009; Ménard, 2001; Poteete et al., 2010; Robin and 
Staropoli, 2008; Schlüter, 2010). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, starting with a definition of 
social-ecological systems, I briefly review theories of institutions and institutional change 
and organize them into a structure–agency framework. Second, following a short 
introduction to the use of experiments in economics, I present some examples of the 
empirical literature in light of these theories. Next, I discuss how the developed concepts 
may facilitate insights from experimental research on institutional change in social-
ecological systems. Finally, I summarize and conclude. 
2.2. Social-ecological systems and institutions 
In the most general way, a social-ecological system (SES) comprises a social system, an 
ecological system, and the interactions between the two. Traditionally, ecosystem analysis 
has studied the impact of human and geophysical drivers of ecosystem change in isolation. 
The definition of a SES goes beyond this view. SESs are defined as coherent systems with 
multiple (often non-linear) interactions that span across (hierarchically linked) scales, 
which consist of critical resources, whose flows and uses are affected by both social and 
ecological factors, and which are dynamic and adaptive (Redman et al., 2004).  
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According to Ostrom (2009), a SES can also be viewed as comprising four “first-level core 
subsystems,” namely: (1) a resource system, (2) resource units, (3) a governance system, 
and (4) users. A set of “second-level” variables that are useful for SES analysis, and which 
can be sorted by these core sub-systems, has also been identified. Institutions are part of 
both social sub-systems, i.e. the governance systems and users. More specifically, the 
overall property-rights system, operational, collective-choice, and constitutional rules are 
variables of the governance system, while norms are a variable of the user system (Ostrom, 
2009). Focusing on this point, and in the spirit of structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), the 
following sections will focus on understanding the structure–agency dynamics of 
institutions and institutional change.  
2.2.1. Institutions between structure, agency, and evolution 
There is still relatively little agreement on the basic concepts in institutional economics, or 
in the words of Arild Vatn (2005): “Just as there are many theories of what institutions are 
and what they do, there are certainly also many different ways of explaining their 
development and change.” It is not the aim of this paper to present an exhaustive review of 
this ongoing debate; others have already done this (Hodgson, 2006; Hodgson, 1998; 
Schmid, 2004; Vatn, 2005; Zikos and Thiel, 2013). Rather, I would like to show that it is 
useful to distinguish between (1) structural, (2) agent-based, and (3) evolutionary 
approaches of institutions (Hodgson, 2004), with the aim to better understand the concept 
of institution on which particular, empirically grounded economic experiments are based.  
Vatn (2005) distinguishes two ways of defining an institution. Institutions can either be 
viewed as “external reward structures” that constrain (North, 1990) or enable (Bromley, 
1989) agents, or as “internalized motivations” of economic agents (Berger and Luckmann, 
1967). The structural view is most prominently represented by Douglass North, who 
defines institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and 
social interaction” (North, 1991). To the contrary, Berger and Luckmann (1967) view 
institutions as embedded in economic agents, representing a “reciprocal typification of 
habitualized actions by types of actors.” The two viewpoints are sometimes combined, 
resulting in an understanding of institutions as consisting “of cognitive, normative, and 
regulative structures and activities” (Scott, 1995).  
Evolutionary economic theory emphasizes that institutions are endogenous to the economic 
process (Herrmann-Pillath, 2013; Hodgson, 1998; van Bergh and Stagl, 2003) and 
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ontologically not reducible to their structural or agent-based aspects (Hodgson, 2004). 
Both economic agents – with their shared beliefs and (limited) cognition – and structures 
play a role in the establishment and change of institutions. It has been pointed out that 
especially the cognitive aspects have been much neglected in (institutional) economics. A 
psychological or even neurological perspective on context-dependence, framing of 
decisions, habitualization, and their temporal dynamics could shed new light on the 
processes that constitute institutional choice (Herrmann-Pillath, 2013; Hodgson, 2004; 
Schlüter, 2009). Put differently, preferences for institutions are endogenous, dynamically 
changing over time, and domain-specific (Herrmann-Pillath, 2013). 
2.2.2. Institutional change 
By definition, “[i]nstitutional change covers both the process of changing an existing 
institution and the establishment of an institution in a field where no institution has existed 
before” (Vatn, 2005). In an overview on theories of institutional change, Vatn (2005) draws 
a distinction between spontaneous and designed institutional change. This change can 
come from “below,” as the result of deliberative action, or it may result from “pure” 
spontaneous change. Theories of “designed institutional change” can be categorized into 
those “driven by efficiency considerations” and those “driven by the intent to protect 
specific interests or values” (Vatn, 2005).  
More generally, objective institutional design is viewed as exogenous to the affected 
agents; it is principally limited to an alteration of the incentive structure; and it assumes 
stable preferences (Alexander, 2005; Goodin, 1996; Thiel et al., 2014). This perspective is 
equivalent to what I will call the structural perspective on institutional change throughout 
this paper. In contrast, subjective institutional design is assumed to affect actors’ beliefs 
and cognition (Aoki, 2011) and will in the following also be called the agent-based view 
on institutional change. In a third, evolutionary viewpoint, these two are combined in a 
process, with feedback loops existing between agents and structures. Further, it is assumed 
that agents can impact institutions through choice. Institutions governing social-ecological 
systems will also relate to properties of the two systems; they may be affected by the 
framing of the discourse, or the underlying epistemology. Under these conditions, 
institutions may also evolve as outcomes of social learning processes (Ison et al., 2014; 
Ison et al., 2007). 
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A major achievement was made by Hodgson (2004) in singling out the structure and 
agency aspects of institutions in the evolutionary framework: institutions as structures1 
affect the distribution of resources, agents’ preferences, and subsequent institutional choice 
of agents (cf. Hodgson, 2004; van Bergh and Stagl, 2003). In this process, institutions and 
preferences co-evolve. It may thus be difficult to find an (objective) starting point for 
analyzing institutional change. This chicken and egg problem was also stressed by Field 
(1984), who shows the limits of game theoretical reasoning and the efficiency view on 
institutions in neoclassical microeconomics (cf. Vatn, 2005). Likewise, Hodgson (2004) 
emphasizes that in the study of institutional change it:  
“is simply arbitrary to stop at one particular stage in the explanation and say ‘it is all 
reducible to individuals’ just as much as to say it is ‘all social and institutional’. The 
key point is that in this infinite regress, neither individual nor institutional factors 
have legitimate explanatory primacy. The idea that all explanations have ultimately 
be in terms of individuals (or institutions) is thus unfounded. Once we admit that the 
individual is socially determined then we have an explanatory infinite regress, and 
neither individuals nor institutions can be the legitimate final term.” 
Summing up, institutions can be viewed as structures exogenous to the agent, or as 
cognitive media embedded solely in the agent. In contrast, evolutionary institutional 
economics highlights the inseparable co-evolution of institutional structures and agents’ 
cognition, beliefs, behavior, and choice. In the following, I will show that the three 
viewpoints of institutions outlined here are implicitly reflected in the practice of 
experimental economists. 
2.3. An institutional typology of economic experiments  
Different theoretical schools of thought in institutional economic theory can be linked to a 
particular set of accepted methods. The proponents of new institutional economics and its 
offspring, transaction cost economics, use to a large extent the same methodical toolbox as 
neoclassical economics (Beckmann and Padmanabhan, 2009). In contrast, the so-called 
1 Hodgson writes: “A social structure is a set of significant relations between individuals that can lead to 
causal interactions. Social structures can involve rules, norms, meanings, communication and much else. 
These relations can be acknowledged or unacknowledged by the individuals involved. Furthermore, social 
structures can survive the demise of particular individuals that once related to them. Accordingly, the study of 
human social systems is more than the study of human individuals, because society embodies relations and 
properties in addition to those of the individuals themselves. Although structures frame and condition 
behaviours, they are neither reducible nor ontologically equivalent to them” (Hodgson, 2004). 
16 
                                                 
 
classical institutionalism and evolutionary economic theory have availed themselves 
largely to economic history and case study analysis (Schlüter, 2010). To some extent, both 
strands acknowledge the importance of economic experiments. Empirical studies are 
relatively silent, however, about their theoretical understanding of institutions and 
institutional change in specific contexts. After a short introduction, the following sections 
review empirical work in experimental economics with respect to the underlying concept 
of institutions.  
2.3.1. A brief introduction to experimental economics 
With several Nobel laureates having come from the field, experiments are now a well-
accepted method of mainstream economics. Experiments are sometimes employed to study 
individuals’ risk preferences in simplified decision tasks. More commonly, however, the 
focus is on the strategic interaction of multiple players. Typically, experiments in 
economics involve monetary rewards contingent on performance. This helps to overcome 
the incentive problems and social desirability biases of survey research. A key advantage is 
that contextual factors, available information, the framing, rules of the game, or subject 
composition can be exogenously manipulated, allowing the identification of causal effects 
– a challenge in observational studies (Parmeter and Pope, 2013). 
Various classifications of experiments exist in the literature. It is usually helpful to 
distinguish experiments by the type of game played (Viceisza, 2012), which is important 
for making theoretical predictions on participants’ play, using the various equilibrium 
concepts offered by behavioral game theory (Camerer, 2003). Also, the subject pool (e.g. 
students vs. farmers), the level of experimental control (e.g. strict computer-based lab 
experiments vs. field settings with sometimes open communication), and the reward 
medium (monetary vs. non-monetary rewards related to the context of the game) provide 
useful criteria along which a classification of an experiment and an assessment of its 
external validity are possible (Harrison and List, 2004).  
Along these lines, (1) lab experiments, (2) artefactual field experiments, (3) framed field 
experiments, and (4) natural field experiments can be distinguished.2 Lab experiments use 
students as a subject pool and rely on abstract definitions of rules, while artefactual field 
experiments use non-student subjects. Framed field experiments add local context and try 
to reduce the level of abstraction, and in natural field experiments subjects typically do not 
2 A summary of experimental work until the early 1990s can be found in chapter 9 of Friedman and Sunder 
(1994). 
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know that they participate in an experimental study, and researchers observe subjects’ 
actual behavior in context. The following three sections develop a typology that is based on 
the underlying concept of institutions. 
2.3.2. Experiments on institutions as structural alternatives 
Traditionally, economic experiments have been employed to evaluate alternative market 
institutions, for instance in auction design (Ketcham et al., 1984; McCabe et al., 1989). By 
following this approach:  
“experiments allow one to investigate the incentive and performance properties of 
alternative exchange institutions, and, with respect to institutional design, they 
provide a low-cost means of trying, failing, altering, trying etc. This process uses 
theory, loose conjecture, intuitions about procedural matters and, most important, 
repeat testing to understand and improve the features of the institutional rules being 
examined” (McCabe et al., 1993).  
In other words, behavior and “performance” under exogenously determined institutions are 
in the center of interest; the focus is on evaluating objectively designed institutions (cf. 
Thiel et al., 2014). 
Such experiments have also been widely applied in an environmental context, for instance 
to test the effect of alternative policy designs in environmental markets on behavior and 
efficiency in the lab (Tucker et al., 2013). A good example of this approach can be found in 
Chidambaram et al. (forthcoming), who conducted a framed field experiment on a mode 
choice coordination problem, in order to understand the effect of traffic policy on 
commuters’ behavior. Subjects repeatedly choose between using the bus or the car. In 
several treatments, traffic policies are exogenously varied and changes in behavior are 
analyzed.  
From a theoretical perspective, these experiments understand institutions as exogenous 
structures which constrain or enable economic agents and define the choice set. They are, 
thus, most consistent with the theoretical viewpoints of North (1990) or Bromley (1989), 




2.3.3. Experiments with institutions embedded in agents 
A second group of experiments views institutions as embedded in agents’ cognition. Often 
these experiments focus on fairness, or the “emotional costs” of violating rules and norms, 
which are assumed to be socially or culturally acquired by subjects. A common way to 
implement this empirically is to compare behavior across different groups of subjects. 
Henrich et al. (2004) show that playing the same ultimatum game yields very different 
results across fifteen small-scale societies, which they ascribe to culturally determined 
differences in fairness norms. In an honor-based money box experiment, instead of varying 
the subject pool, Schlüter and Vollan (2011) use questionnaire data on religious 
background and other socio-economic variables as proxies for internalized social norms to 
measure delta-parameters, i.e. the “moral costs” of rule violation. 
Another way to study differences in behavior is to expose the same subject pool to 
different framings of an otherwise identical game, implicitly also assuming that it “is not 
the case that abstract, context-free experiments provide more general findings if the 
context itself is relevant to the performance of subjects” (Harrison and List, 2004). Indeed, 
it can be shown that the same game yields fairly different results depending on the 
contextual framing used (Cronk, 2007; Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Rege and Telle, 2004). In 
a similar vein, Rommel et al. (2014) show that priming subjects with either a positive or a 
negative experience affects pro-environmental behavior as measured by a donation to an 
environmental organization. These findings clearly violate preference stability as posited 
by mainstream economic theory, and put into question a purely structural view on 
institutions, since the observed deviations from stable preferences can be explained only by 
cognitive aspects. However, environmental applications of cross-cultural or cross-national 
(within-culture) experiments, and experiments on framing effects are still relatively rare 
(Gerkey, 2013; Prediger et al., 2010; Rege and Telle, 2004; Vollan, 2012).  
In this second group of experiments, institutions are not exogenously varied by the 
researcher. They are assumed to be embedded in agents and evoked by either selecting a 
particular subject pool or by stimulating beliefs in agents through modifications or 
experimental framing. Subjects are asked to perform decision tasks that are in other 
respects comparable. This brings this group of experiments close to an understanding of 
institutions as “shared beliefs” (Bar-Tal, 2000; Berger and Luckmann, 1967). 
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2.3.4. Experiments with endogenous institutional choice and evolutionary 
change 
A third group of experiments substantially differs from the other two. Here, rules are not 
fixed over the course of the experiment, but evolve as the result of participants’ experience, 
behavior, and (aggregate) choice. In one way or another, institutions are endogenously 
varied by participants, most commonly in iterated or multi-step games (e.g. Botelho et al., 
2005; Dal Bó et al., 2010; Decker et al., 2003; Ertan et al., 2009; Guillen et al., 2007; 
Gürerk et al., 2006; Kroll et al., 2007; Reuben and Riedl, 2009; Sutter et al., 2010). 
Subjects make two decisions: (1) they individually decide on what to do in the game (for 
instance how much to extract from a common pool resource), interacting with others under 
a certain set of rules; and (2) they also decide on what the rules of the game shall be (for 
instance whether or not sanctioning systems should be implemented). Institutional 
preferences are then aggregated and put into practice in subsequent rounds. In the SES 
context, some experiments also add temporal or spatial dynamics of ecological systems to 
such games with endogenous institutional choice (e.g. Janssen et al., 2008; Otto and 
Wechsung, 2014). 
The basic rationale of this approach has been perhaps best described by Botelho et al. 
(2005), who state that:  
“inferring preferences from the outcome of play under different institutions is a 
difficult, if not impossible, task. The solution to this problem is to expand the 
experimental design to allow subjects to directly choose which institution they would 
prefer to operate under. There are many possible ways in which subjects could 
choose an institution. There could be a direct referendum vote, some committee or 
public choice process, a bargaining process, or migration to locales that are 
differentiated by institutions” (emphasis in the original).  
This is important, they argue, because “[i]f subjects in the field have mechanisms by which 
they can avoid, lobby or self-select into or out of institutions, we must consider the effects 
of those margins of choice before drawing conclusions about which institutions are best. 
Another way to express this is to consider if the laboratory environment that takes a 
particular institution as fixed is correctly modeling the naturally occurring environment in 
it’s [sic!] salient features, if that environment includes ways in which subjects can 
endogenously opt out of that institution” (Botelho et al., 2005). 
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Sutter et al. (2010) provides a good example of such an experiment. They compare 
contributions with endogenous sanctioning and reward institutions to a reference scenario, 
in which institutions have been enforced exogenously by the researcher. In this study and 
in most other studies, without explicit recognition, two ontologically different viewpoints 
on institutions are taken: in one case, institutions are altered endogenously from bottom-up 
in subjective design; whereas in the other case, institutions are objectively designed. 
Applications in ecological economics typically focus on the self-governed commons and 
the evolution of sanctioning or reward mechanisms (Bischoff, 2007; Carpenter, 2000; 
Walker et al., 2000). The field experiments conducted by Cárdenas (2004), for instance, 
employ a protocol in which local resource users play a CPR game and have the possibility 
to implement endogenous (monitoring) institutions.  
Walker et al. (2000) are also interested in comparing outcomes for different voting schemes 
on allocation rules in a common pool resource dilemma, but they additionally include 
treatments without voting (exogenous variation) in their design. They find that “voting 
substantially increases the efficiency of the outcomes achieved” (Walker et al., 2000). 
These experiments highlight that understanding how and by whom rules are changed, and 
how interactions with ecological systems take place needs more attention in empirical 
work. 
2.4. Synthesis and discussion 
It is notable that virtually none of the experimental applications with endogenous 
institutional change explicitly refer to the structure–agency dynamics outlined above or, for 
that matter, evolutionary concepts in economic theory more generally. Sometimes, 
contradictory theoretical concepts are used in empirical work. Otto and Wechsung (2014), 
for example, vary the subject pool (students vs. farmers vs. administrators), compare 
different monitoring rules, and let subjects choose among these rules. Distinguishing more 
explicitly between a structural, cognitive, and evolutionary perspective on institutions, as 
well as recognizing the impact of ecosystem dynamics on behavior, could increase the 
analytical clarity and precision in behavioral research dealing with the institutional analysis 
of SES. Towards this aim, and drawing on the previous sections, the following figure 
provides a synthesis of the proposed typology.  
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Figure 2: A typology of economic experiments for the institutional analysis of social-ecological systems 
 
Source: own design 
The upper part of the figure summarizes the classification of experiments by the 
underlying concept of institutions, providing also examples of such experiments. The 
lower part of the figure shows a simplified version of a social-ecological system, which 
emphasizes the institutional aspects of the social component and leaves aside ecological 
sub-systems, for didactic reasons (cf. Ostrom, 2009). The focus is on structural aspects, 
such as codified laws (symbolized by the section sign) which constrain or enable agents’ 
choice sets, and on agency aspects (symbolized by the human characters) that may differ 
across agents. The numbered arrows indicate (unidirectional) causal links. These are 
echoed in the brackets of the upper part if the respective experiment type takes into 
account a particular causal link.  
The lower left quadrant is reserved for experiments that do not focus on institutions at all. 
In a general sense, this includes all experiments that vary contextual factors, such as 
income distributions or group sizes, without explicitly relating these to (short-term) 
structural institutional change. In SES research, these experiments include studies focusing 
on the effect of ecosystem change and dynamics on behavior (e.g. Cárdenas et al., 2013; 
Janssen and Ostrom, 2008; Janssen, 2010; Moxnes, 1998). The upper left quadrant shows 
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the class of experiments focusing on differences in agents, and sub-sequent differences in 
behavior affecting the ecological sub-systems (cf. section 2.3.3). The lower right quadrant 
is reserved for experiments that (comparatively) study the effect of exogenously varied 
rules without taking into account ecosystem aspects (cf. section 2.3.2). The upper right 
quadrant includes all other links and also allows for variation in the (structural) rules of the 
game (cf. section 2.3.4). 
Although the upper right quadrant reflects the most realistic and complete viewpoint of 
institutional change in SES, it may practically not always be feasible or even desirable to 
include all possible feedback loops and channels of causation in empirical work. When 
faced with the decision of how to design a particular experiment, the proposed typology 
may be used to pragmatically decide on useful analytical abstractions in the spirit of 
evolutionary economic theory. Evolutionary economics rejects most of the assumptions of 
neoclassical economics, such as utility maximization or methodological individualism 
(Herrmann-Pillath, 2013; Hodgson, 2004). Partly because of this definition ex negativo, it 
has not always been clear what evolutionary economics stands for, or which methods are 
compatible with its approach. Although this has led to some fragmentation of the field, 
including a debate on the ontology of evolutionary economics, and a lack of applied 
empirical work (Herrmann-Pillath, 2001, 2013), the theories and methods used in 
neoclassical economics are not generally rejected. Rather, emphasis is put on the 
justification of why “bits and pieces” are sought to be transferred into a particular 
empirical context.  
If properly legitimated, the pragmatic use of “analytical abstractions” (Hodgson, 2006) 
may lead to the application of all four forms of experiments discussed above.3 A key aspect 
added in the figure above is the interaction of social and ecological systems. Not only do 
agents and structures affect each other, but agents also affect their (physical) environment 
and vice versa. Although, at least since the seminal work of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, 
the thermodynamic foundations of economic systems are well-known in ecological 
3 Geoffrey Hodgson writes on this point: “In some circumstances it is legitimate to take the individual as 
given, as a simplifying abstraction. But individuals nevertheless remain to be explained. The task may be 
postponed, but it does not disappear. Similarly, the origins of the institutional structures that carry transaction 
costs also require an explanation. Furthermore, these deeper questions of explanation become vital once 
issues such as the influence of culture, the mergence and durability of institutions, and long-term economic 
development, become agendas of enquiry. It is important to understand how individual interactions lead to 
new institutional developments. But especially in the long term, it is also important explain – at least in 
principle – how institutions or circumstances can affect individuals and alter their perceptions and goals” 
(Hodgson, 2004). 
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economics (cf. Herrmann-Pillath, 2013), experiments have not been explicitly considered 
as a method in this context.   
Today, experimental protocols are often transferred across contexts, without spending 
much attention on the applicability in new settings. Although this procedure allows for the 
– desirable – comparison of experimental findings across nations or cultures, it is 
somewhat questionable as to how far processes of endogenous institutional choice are 
really taking place within the same meta-framework (cf. Otto and Wechsung, 2014). In 
other words, in future it will also be important to think more seriously about constitutional 
rules, i.e. rules on the change of rules. Considering these aspects opens up new 
opportunities for both conceptual and empirical work, because institutional change driven 
by agents’ choices is highly diverse with respect to the mechanism through which 
consensus is reached and institutions are altered (Levine and Nalebuff, 1995). As noted by 
Botelho et al. (2005), institutions could change through “a direct referendum vote, some 
committee or public choice process, a bargaining process, or migration to locales that are 
differentiated by institutions.”  
In this context, several questions of practical relevance come up. Can institutions be altered 
by majority vote, and should all users be equally powerful in such a vote? Should 
institutional change be induced through an open communication phase and then be 
implemented only if agreed upon unanimously? Should there be a cost involved in 
bringing about institutional change? What are the default rules that are in place if no 
agreement on altering an institution is reached? Answering some of these questions will be 
necessary to better understand the meta-level of constitutional rules. 
On a related note, it will be important to pay due respect to the frequency and way in 
which institutions change. Some of the institutions governing collectively managed 
common pool resources are several hundred years old (Ostrom, 1990). In such settings it 
may be difficult to study the institutional choice of agents experimentally, because 
participants may be unaware of the history of the institutions and their change when these 
are not part of their immediate personal experience. It is also important to evaluate an 
empirical context with respect to the way institutions change. Not in all instances are 
agents the main driver of (local) institutional change. Global market forces may, for 




The potential of experiments on cognition and framing effects in social-ecological systems 
is still poorly developed and could be further explored, also taking into account 
experimental work within environmental psychology. For the most part, environmental 
psychologists and ecological economists have worked in isolation. Questions of increased 
variability in ecosystems may play a role, focusing for example on the perception of 
resource availability uncertainties in social-ecological systems, where relatively little is 
known about drivers of and barriers to institutional change embedded in agents. This also 
allows further exploration of the effect of cultural, religious, ideological contexts, or 
cognitive biases (Liebig and Rommel, 2014) on institutional choice.  
For all of these questions, the typology developed in this paper is of heuristic value, as it 
allows for the grouping and structuring of empirical research in institutional ecological 
economics. In particular, it has been shown that economic experiments can be employed in 
line with the ontology of evolutionary economic theory. 
2.5. Summary and conclusion  
In this paper, I have developed an institutional typology of economic experiments. 
Theories that understand institutions as structures can be linked to classical experiments on 
alternative (market) institutions. Theories that see institutions as shared beliefs are related 
to cross-cultural comparisons, and framing effects in experiments. Evolutionary theories of 
institutional change are mirrored in economic experiments that employ endogenous 
institutional choice, i.e. subjects are allowed to change the rules of the game. Further, I 
have discussed the potential and limitations of such experiments in the analysis of social-
ecological systems, and I have pointed out some unresolved issues with respect to 
constitutional rules, i.e. rules on how to change the rules.  
In the past, experiments on social-ecological systems have sometimes focused on the 
unidirectional impact of humans on ecosystems. Others have looked at the effect of 
exogenous ecosystem change on human behavior. Experiments on institutions have studied 
behavioral change under alternative sets of rules, often focusing on the social system and 
neglecting ecosystem impacts. The typology developed in this paper combines these 
aspects, and allows for interactions among them, promoting a complex, adaptive system 
perspective on SES. It also recognizes the thermodynamic foundations of economic 
systems, and is consistent with evolutionary economics – a field that has suffered from a 
lack of rigid methods.  
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Evolutionary economics differs substantially from the dominant paradigm of neoclassical 
economics and its offspring, new institutional economics. Evolutionary theories embrace a 
more realistic, less autistic, and less formalized way to address questions of economic 
change. For example, the concept of general equilibrium and maximization behavior of 
agents are rejected with the aim to “bring back life back to economics” (Hodgson, 1996). 
These theories provide a better fit for addressing the complex questions of institutional 
change in social-ecological systems. Ultimately, the dominance of the neoclassical school 
can only be challenged with a well-developed methodical tool box, and it will be critical to 
provide policy-relevant knowledge to address the many challenges of global environmental 
change. 
Everyone engaged in research knows how important the use of rigid methods is, especially 
in the science–policy dialogue. I believe that the various forms of economic experiments 
have a lot to contribute to the growing field of (evolutionary) institutional economics. 
Notwithstanding the necessity of a sound theoretical base, I hope that the ideas developed 
in this paper provide a rough guide for an experimental and more empirically oriented 
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Abstract: All major Indian cities face a severe transport crisis, with the number of cars on 
the road increasing every day. Policy makers are trying to keep pace with this growth by 
supplying more roads, largely neglecting demand-side policy measures. We have 
developed an economic experiment to investigate behavioral responses of citizens to such 
measures. Drawing on a sample of 204 white-collar commuters from Hyderabad, India, we 
model mode choice as a coordination problem and analyze how bus subsidies, increased 
parking costs, and public information on preferential car use can affect mode choice. We 
find that pecuniary treatments are effective for shifting behavior towards socially more 
desirable outcomes and increasing total benefits. Mode choice is relatively unaffected by 
socio-economic variables like gender, education or income but is significantly affected by 
actual traffic behavior. We discuss limitations of the applied sampling, conclude with a 
critical evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of economic experiments in 
transportation research, and offer an outlook on how further experimentation could enrich 
the policy debate. 
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3.1. Introduction 
India’s economic growth is being fueled by the development of its cities, as the rapidly 
growing service sector has created many jobs in the urban centers of the sub-continent. 
Rising incomes have led to an expanding middle class and, in combination with population 
growth, to a tremendous increase in the number of cars in Indian cities. Especially in the 
megacities of Mumbai, Delhi, and Kolkata and the emerging megacities of Bangalore, 
Chennai, and Hyderabad, this has led to a “transport crisis.” Authorities face the challenge 
of how to limit the growth of individualized traffic, find adequate ways of promoting 
public transport, and, more generally, develop a sustainable transport system (Pucher et al., 
2005). 
In attempting to confront this crisis, policy makers have largely focused on supply-side 
measures. With limited success, the dominant paradigm has been to increase supply of 
roads (Chidambaram, 2011) or focus on promotion of large-scale infrastructure projects, 
such as metro-rails (Mohan, 2008; Ramachandraiah, 2007). On the other hand, demand-
side measures have not been adequately addressed in the policy debate on this issue 
(Chidambaram, 2011; Pucher et al., 2005). We believe that, to evaluate the scope of such 
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measures, it is important to understand the preferences and actual decision-making 
processes of traffic participants, which can however be difficult and costly to do in 
practice. Stated preferences methods such as choice experiments have been widely applied 
in transport economics (cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Ortúzar and Willumsen, 2011), 
and traffic psychologists have used survey research to investigate the role of attitudes in 
mode choice (Gardner and Abraham, 2007). Yet, these studies have not usually addressed 
the interdependence of individual choices and subsequent dynamics, which game theory 
and experimental economics explicitly do take into account. Furthermore, subjects in such 
settings are motivated by payoffs which, in principle, should largely determine their 
decision-making (Smith, 1976).  
In transport modeling, various theoretical approaches have attempted to address the 
interdependence of travelers in mode or route choice (Hollander and Prashker, 2006). From 
the perspective of game theory, choosing between public and private transport can be 
understood as a coordination problem, because using a car appears to be more attractive 
when the number of cars is small, whereas public transport seems more attractive during 
periods of heavy traffic (Vugt et al., 1995). 
In spite of their great potential, empirical applications building on game theory and using 
the empirical toolkit of experimental economics are still relatively rare in transportation 
research (de Jong, 2012). Also, focus has typically been on market modeling (de Jong, 
2012), with only a few studies analyzing individual choices (e.g. Gabuthy et al., 2006; 
Hartman, 2012; Selten et al., 2007). As far as we are aware, no economic experiment has 
yet used traffic framing to study behavioral effects of demand-side policy measures in a 
developing country. Drawing on middle-class white-collar commuters from Hyderabad as 
a subject pool, we develop here an economic experiment to test behavioral response to 
three popular measures that have been discussed in the policy debate on demand-side 
policies (Wootton, 1999), namely, increasing parking costs, subsidizing bus fares, and 
providing information to enhance coordination. All three of these measures can be 
implemented by urban authorities, as opposed to fuel taxes, for instance, which would 
require policies on the state or central government levels. In the experiment, we investigate 
the effects of these measures on solving the coordination problem while analyzing the 
socio-economic determinants of mode choice and the role interdependence plays for 
individual choices.  
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In the next section, we provide background information on the transport policy debate and 
the neglected role of demand-side measures in urban India, focusing on Hyderabad. The 
third section introduces some key theoretical concepts, describes our empirical approach, 
and lays out the key research hypotheses. Sections four and five present the results and 
discuss our findings with regard to the policy debate. The concluding section assesses our 
approach and offers an outlook on how further experimentation could enrich the policy 
debate. 
3.2. Hyderabad’s transport crisis and the role of demand-side policy 
measures 
According to a recent report on Hyderabad’s traffic challenges, the city faces a severe 
mobility crisis (CSE, 2011). Every day, more than 600 vehicles are being added to the 
existing population of about three million vehicles. In fact, vehicle growth is faster than 
population growth by a factor of four, which is seen as one reason for the steady decline of 
travel speed over the last two decades (CSE, 2011). Frequent violation of traffic rules 
further adds to the problem (Dandona et al., 2005). Air pollution from traffic, especially 
from trucks, regularly reaches unacceptable levels and has contributed to an increase in 
respiratory disease and eye irritation (CSE, 2011; Sharma et al., 2010).  
In spite of the ambitiously set targets for increasing the share of public transport to 80 
percent in the City Development Plan (GHMC, 2006), the actual share of public transport 
has been constantly declining and is projected to drop from the current 35 percent to only 
12 percent by 2031 (CSE, 2011). It will be important for the authorities to embrace more 
realistic planning goals in the future. Currently, the share of car trips is around 20 percent 
(CSE, 2011, p. 24). Under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (GoI, 
2005) – a national funding scheme for urban infrastructure development – Hyderabad has 
received a tremendous amount of funding for investing in infrastructure (HPEC, 2011), the 
vast majority of which has been spent on constructing new roads and flyovers (CSE, 2011). 
However, these major public works have not led to substantial relief of the city’s tense 
traffic situation. One of the key reasons for this is that road expansion has not been 
combined with the promotion of public and non-motorized transport (CSE, 2011). Also, the 
bus transport system has not been improved; instead, a costly and risky large-scale metro-
rail is being planned. In the metro-rail planning process, citizens’ preferences and attitudes 
have been widely neglected (Mohan, 2008; Ramachandraiah, 2007).  
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According to a recent study, more than 90 percent of surveyed citizens in Hyderabad 
perceive frequent congestion as a major problem for the city; there is great discontent with 
the public transport system, which is rated as “good” by only 16 percent of the population, 
as compared to 40 percent which describe it as “poor”; the majority of people believes that 
there is insufficient space for the use of bicycles and walking; and congestion caused by 
illegal parking is seen as a severe problem by about 92 percent (CSE, 2011). It would seem 
to follow from this that, from a citizen’s perspective, parking costs and parking restrictions, 
subsidized and improved public transport, and restricted car use should be the most 
relevant demand-side measures to consider for Hyderabad. It is claimed that 
complementing supply-side measures with policies to manage demand can help in solving 
the problem of traffic congestion in cities (Bull, 2003; Ferguson, 1990). However, the 
question remains concerning what the chances of success for demand-side measures could 
be in an arena dominated by strong desires for technical solutions and monumental 
constructions as symbols of development. 
Generally speaking, reducing the use of cars has not often been achieved voluntarily. 
Instead, demand-side management must use “carrots and sticks” to control travel behavior 
(Meyer, 1999), including measures such as parking costs, parking prohibitions, vehicle use 
restrictions, road pricing, provision of traffic information or subsidies for public transport 
(Bull, 2003; Ison and Rye, 2008). Pricing or coercive restrictions all have their particular 
merits and demerits, which have been extensively discussed in the literature (cf. Gärling 
and Schuitema, 2007; Schade and Schlag, 2003). In the Indian context, both India’s 
National Urban Transport Policy and the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal 
Mission have highlighted the importance of demand-side measures, such as funds for 
subsidized bus fares (GoI, 2006). However, implementation has been slow, with only three 
Indian cities – Jaipur, Delhi and Mumbai – having yet achieved some implementation of 
bus subsidies (Cropper and Bhattacharya, 2007; Tiwari and Jain, 2012). Until now, 
discouraging or restricting the use of cars has not been considered as an option by India’s 
metropolitan authorities. Most likely, such measures are seen as being rather unpopular 
among the newly emerging middle and upper classes, so the underlying urban political 
economy is preventing their effective implementation. 
Based on the policy debate just outlined, we have developed an economic experiment 
aimed at shedding some light on the effects three demand-side measures – bus subsidies, 
parking costs, and externally provided information – might have on individual behavior. 
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More importantly, this experiment allows us to explore the socio-economic determinants of 
behavioral factors and to analyze the interdependence of individual choices. 
3.3. The experiment 
Different methods exist for studying traffic behavior, a variety of which are summarized in 
the following table in terms of some of their particular strengths and weaknesses. It also 
includes examples of recently published studies from this journal. 
Table 2: Schematic Methodical Literature Review with Empirical Examples in Relation to this Study 
Method Strengths Weaknesses Recent TR-
A Example 
Lab experiments Behavioral control 
(Monetary) incentives  
Interaction of agents  
Artificiality 
Design limitations, 
with only a few 







(Monetary) incentives  
Interaction of agents  
Artificiality 
Design limitations, 
with only a few 






Some behavioral control 
Behavior under real world 
incentives 
Design limitations, 
with only a few 
factors which can be 
studied 
Relatively low control, 
survey information 








Study of interaction and 
dynamics in complex 
systems over long periods 
of simulation  
Large combinations of 
factors and their interaction 





















desirability bias”  
Beck et al. 
(2013) 
Participatory 
methods and case 
study research 
Allows complex narratives 




Difficult to establish 
causal relationships 
Difficult to measure 
effects 
Wahl (2013) 
Source: own formulation 
The table shows that various tradeoffs exist when choosing a method, notably between 
different kinds of experiments.4 Controlled lab and framed field experiments and agent-
4 Experiments in which subjects undertake a task in their natural environment and typically do not know that 
they are part of an experimental study are called “natural field experiments” within the taxonomy of Harrison 
and List (2004). An example of such an experiment in the transport realm would be Knockaert et al. (2012). 
In this study, participants were sampled through noting down license plates of frequent commuters on the 
Dutch highway A12 and contacting them by mail. In addition, snowball sampling was used. Participants then 
received rewards for avoiding morning rush-hour traffic. Subjects knew they were part of an experimental 
study, but their behavior was observed in a natural context which is sufficient for qualifying as a “natural 
field experiment” within the Harrison and List (2004) taxonomy. In a developing-country context, such 
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based modeling allow the study of interacting agents and emergent properties in dynamic 
systems. They are well-suited for testing general behavioral hypotheses, but it is sometimes 
difficult to extrapolate their results to the actual world. Survey methods offer a better fit in 
this regard and allow for rich data collection on many different aspects of actual transport 
behavior. However, it is often difficult to understand interaction between respondents. Case 
study research provides in-depth insights which cannot be obtained by any other method. 
However, it is more prone to response bias, and it is more difficult to establish causal 
theoretical links from such studies. In the end, we agree that pluralism and application of 
mixed-method designs will be important for helping us to understand complex phenomena 
from diverse methodological perspectives (see Poteete et al., 2010).  
3.3.1. Behavioral Game Theory in Transportation Research 
A variety of theoretical models exist for studying the interdependent behavior of 
individuals in transport research using game theory (Hollander and Prashker, 2006).5 With 
respect to mode choice, “commuting by car is more attractive” when “fewer individuals 
choose to go by car because of a lower probability of time delays caused by traffic jams 
and/or parking problems. However, when the number of other people commuting by car 
exceeds a certain limit, the choice for public transportation may yield greater outcomes for 
oneself because congestion can be avoided” (Vugt et al., 1995).6 Expectations about the 
behavior of others, hence, become critical for determining choice and subsequent utility 
and payoffs. 
Coordination problems have been widely studied under lab conditions in macroeconomics 
or in so-called market entry games (see, for example, Cooper, 1999 and Erev and 
Rapoport, 1998 for reviews). Lab applications in transportation research are, however, still 
rare (de Jong, 2012). The following table summarizes some key experimental studies in 
relation to our own. 
experiments can be logistically very demanding, however. It is a particular strength of “framed field 
experiments” that they can be carried out more easily. They can also be more directly related to economic 
theory, whereas “natural field experiments” have the great advantage of higher external validity. For a critical 
review on the relationship of the two, see Harrison (2013).  
5 Most empirical experimental applications focus on coordination problems. When the focus is on 
environmental externalities, the underlying game resembles a social dilemma (Vugt et al., 1995). There is an 
emerging literature (Chidambaram, 2011; Frischmann, 2012) which is trying to integrate the economics of 
infrastructure with the literature on common-pool resources, under the assumption that car drivers, by 
“subtracting road space,” may create a “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968), with each car user reducing 
the utility of infrastructure use for everyone else.  
6 Note that this relationship holds only if public transport is unaffected or less affected by congestion. Such 
coordination problems also exist for route choice or the starting time of a journey (Selten et al., 2007).  
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Table 3: Schematic Empirical Literature Review in Relation to this Study 
Reference Description and Results Subject Pool and Mode of 
Conduct 
Gabuthy et al. (2006) Route choice as a 
coordination problem 
Predicted Nash equilibrium 
is not reached; behavior is 
sensitive to tolling regime  
96 management students 
from Lyon, France 
Computer-based lab 
experiment 
Hartman (2012) Route choice as a 
coordination problem under 
an efficient toll (external 
travel cost added to others is 
internalized through the toll) 
Travel time is substantially 
reduced by the toll, and the 
outcome under the toll is 
close to efficiency 




Iida et al. (1992) Route choice as a 
coordination problem 
No equilibrium reached and 
substantial fluctuations until 
the end 
40 civil engineering students 
from Kyoto, Japan 
Computer-based lab 
experiment 
Schneider and Weimann 
(2004) 
Congestion externalities as a 
social dilemma 
Treatment which allows 
subjects to play with more 
than one car increases 
efficiency (externality is 
partly internalized) 




Selten et al. (2007) Route choice behavior as a 
coordination problem 
Fluctuations persist; no 
convergence to Nash 
equilibrium; subjects who 
switch a lot earn less  
216 economics students 
from Bonn, Germany 
Computer-based lab 
experiment 
Sunitiyoso et al. (2011) Mode choice as a social 
dilemma (public good 
game); treatments with 
communication and 
feedback/information on 
15 post-graduate students 
from the University of West 
England, Bristol, UK 
Computer-based lab 
experiment without financial 
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contributions in other groups 
No statistically significant 
effect of the treatments on 
contributions to the public 
good 
incentives 
Vugt et al. (1995) Mode choice between 
coordination problem (travel 
time) and social dilemma 
(environmental concerns) 
with a psychological focus 
on attitudes/social values 
Social-value orientations can 
explain mode choice 
56 citizens of Maastricht, 





Ziegelmeyer et al. (2008) Departure time as a 
coordination problem 
Congestion occurs according 
to prediction; information, 
number of drivers and costs 
of delay have no effect on 
behavior 




This study Mode choice as a 
coordination problem 
Treatments of different 
policy measures  




Source: own formulation 
As the table shows, in spite of their growing popularity, “framed field experiments” have 
not yet been applied in transportation research. According to Harrison and List (2004), 
economic field experiments can be categorized according to the nature of the subject pool, 
available information, the commodity traded, trading rules, the stakes, and the environment 
subjects are placed in. Using a non-student subject pool and a contextual framing, our 
experiment would qualify as a framed field experiment. 
Coordination games are also largely absent from the growing body of “lab-to-the-field” 
experiments (Viceisza, 2012). Thus, our study differs from previous experiments in the 
transport realm in at least three important aspects. Firstly, by altering payoffs and framing, 
we have studied the effect of policy measures on behavior. Secondly, we have conducted 
the first lab-to-the-field experiments with non-student subjects in transportation research. 
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Thirdly, we have conducted the first experiment on traffic behavior in a developing-
country context. 
In addition to context-related framing and nonstandard subject pools, experimental 
research on the collective management of natural resources has often gained additional 
insights from employing post-experimental surveys to gather socio-demographic 
information on experimental subjects and using this data in econometric models (Hayo and 
Vollan, 2012; Vollan, 2008; Werthmann, 2011). We have taken up this approach, as it 
allows us to identify individual characteristics which may affect mode choice in an 
experimental context. 
3.3.2. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
Our experiment was a coordination game with n (= 6) players who each make a choice to 
use a bus (x = 0) or car (x = 1) for commuting. The payoff for the individual player 
depends on their own decisions and those of the other players, as depicted in Table 4.7 
Payoffs are inversely U-shaped and follow Greenshields’ (1935) speed-flow model.8 The 
social optimum is to have one car and five participants riding the bus. Note that the 
individual in the car will have a higher payoff in the social optimum. Therefore, the social 
optimum is unstable. If players are selfish and rational, and expect that others are too, they 
will chose the car if they expect there are zero, one or two other participants choosing it. If 
participants expect three or four other participants to choose the car, choosing the bus leads 
to better earnings. The participant is indifferent if she expects all others to choose the car. 
Hence, there are various Nash equilibria, dependent on the expectations of the participants.  
Participants’ payoffs include operating costs as well as travel time. The latter depends on 
the choices of the other players, since both cars and buses use road space. In spite of low 
car ownership, the streets of Hyderabad are already heavily congested, so already at low 
fractions of car use in the experiment (e.g. when going from one to two car users out of 
six), congestion is taken into account by a reduction in payoffs for both, car users and bus 
users. If more persons will use the car, congestion will get worse and the payoffs for both 
modes will be further reduced.9 
7 The payoffs in the table are presented in “tokens.” One token is equal to one Rupee paid to the subject after 
the game.  
8 For more details on how the payoffs were calculated, see the supplementary material below. 
9 Note that, in another game, one could assume separate bus lanes. This would result in a lower decrease in 
payoffs for choosing the bus. Travel time would stay constant independent of cars, and comfort would be 
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Table 4: Payoffs for Baseline Rounds 
Players’ Aggregate Choices 
(Number of Cars/Number of Bus 
Users) 
0/6  1/5  2/4  3/3  4/2  5/1  6/0  
Individual payoffs if car - 23 18 14 9 4 0 
Individual payoffs if bus  15 14 13 12 9 0 - 
Summed payoffs  90 93 88 78 54 20 0 
Source: own formulation 
The instructions of the experiment were framed as a traffic mode-choice decision situation: 
White-collar participants (n = 204, grouped in 34 experiments) were asked to picture a 
situation where every morning they would decide to take either a bus or car to commute to 
their offices. Individual payoffs depended on the decisions of five other commuters who 
also face the same binary choice. If many participants chose the car, travel times would 
increase and, hence, the expected benefit from car travel would decrease. As in actual 
traffic behavior, the choices of other players are known only after a particular round and 
only in aggregation (i.e. the total number of car drivers and bus passengers). A table 
depicting payoffs, based on each player’s own choices combined with those of the other 
five subjects, was handed out to each participant on paper (see section two in 
supplementary material).  
Based on the policy debate outlined in section 2, the following hypotheses were 
formulated. 
H1: Increasing the attractiveness of taking a bus versus a car by changing the payoff 
structure through a bus subsidy or parking cost will lead to a higher proportion of 
participants choosing the bus.  
H2: Coordination improves when participants do not have to rely solely on self-
coordination. By providing them with a model of how to behave when facing an ill-defined 
problem, the sum of payoffs can be increased.  
slightly reduced (crowding in the bus). The specific design of payoffs will then depend on commuters’ 
preferences for travel time and comfort. 
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To test these hypotheses, we designed the following treatments: A baseline scenario was 
combined with three treatments in a mixed within- and between-subjects design, which is 
summarized in the following table.10  
Table 5: Overview of the Experimental Design 
 Exercise 1  
(6 rounds) 
Exercise 2  
(6 rounds) 
Exercise 3  
(6 rounds) 
Bus subsidy group,  
17 groups of six 
players, 102 subjects 
Baseline treatment Bus subsidy 
treatment (+3 tokens 
for taking the bus) 
Public coordination  
Parking cost group,  
17 groups of six 
players, 102 subjects 
Baseline treatment Parking cost 
treatment (-3 tokens 
for taking the car) 
Public coordination  
Source: own formulation 
Table 5 shows that each of the 204 subjects needed to make 18 binary decisions. Groups 
were randomly assigned to either the bus subsidy or the parking cost group. Both 
treatments modified payoffs by either adding or subtracting three tokens to/from the 
baseline payoffs, providing pecuniary incentives to change behavior.11 The psychological 
effects of the framing might have induced loss aversion in the parking cost treatment, 
whereas the bus subsidy may have been perceived as a gain (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991). 
In the public coordination treatment (testing H 2) players were informed that, to enhance 
coordination and increase social benefits, a “central planner” would announce one player 
who would be allowed to take the car in one particular round and that every player would 
be allowed to do so exactly once.12 There was to be no enforcement or sanctioning 
10 Our rationale for choosing this design was based on several pre-tests run by the authors with German 
graduate students. The results of this testing are not published and were only used to improve the instructions 
and questionnaire. In principle, within-subject designs allow for more powerful statistical testing, as all fixed 
effects such as gender are effectively controlled for within subjects. On the other hand, within-designs are 
more prone to demand, learning, ordering effects and fatigue. A recent discussion on the topic can be found 
in Charness et al. (2012). 
11 Note that there are other important transport policies which are beyond the scope of this paper. These 
include, for instance, the promotion of shorter and fewer trips, higher car-occupancy ratios, and non-
motorized transport. 
12 This was done by announcing the ID Code of the player, which was only known by the respective player, 
not by the others. 
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implemented regarding this restriction – a condition which was also explained to the 
subjects. Thus, each participant was still free in her or his decisions, meaning that it was 
possible to choose the car when it was “someone else’s turn” or to take the bus when one’s 
car-taking turn was announced.  Assuming a “purely economic” approach to rule 
violation13 (Becker, 1968), observed treatment effects would, thus, not result from a change 
in the payoff structure but rather from a change of expectations regarding the behavior of 
others or from “moral discomfort.” 
Aggregate payoffs were maximized if only one subject chose the car. In the two treatments 
which modified payoffs, group payoffs were also maximized if everyone went by bus, 
although with different distributional effects. Individual strategies deviated from the social 
optimum, as Nash best responses depend on subjects’ expectations of what others will do. 
In the baseline and public coordination treatments, it was individually rational to choose 
the car if a player expected two or less other players to also take it. Players were indifferent 
when three other cars were expected. When treatments were implemented, this changed. 
Here subjects were able to increase their payoffs by taking the car only if not more than 
one other player chose it as well. Thus, in all treatments, the Nash best response clashed 
with the social optimum, defined as the combination of choices which maximizes 
aggregate payoffs. 
3.3.3. Sampling and Practical Conduct of the Experiment 
The experiment was run with 204 subjects in 34 groups on 21 days in August and 
September 2012 in Hyderabad. Subjects were recruited according to their familiarity with 
the task, because it is not necessarily the case “that abstract, context-free experiments 
provide more general findings if the context itself is relevant to the performance of 
subjects” (Harrison and List, 2004). In other words, subjects should have experience with 
both car and bus use. In Hyderabad, white-collar workers commuting to their offices fulfill 
these conditions best, and participants were recruited from offices throughout the city, 
including employees from private companies, government bureaucrats and universities. 
Some of the organizations were known to the authors, others were contacted by telephone 
from the telephone directory. Break rooms or conference rooms of respective buildings 
where participants worked were used to run the experiment, and in most cases participants 
knew each other. Results were announced to all players after each round, though 
13 Here we refer to the rule that a player is “allowed” to take the car only in one out of six rounds. However, 
no monetary consequences resulted from violating this rule. 
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maintaining the anonymity of their choices. Subjects were not allowed to talk, and they 
were seated in a way that they could not directly see each other. A short general 
introduction was given by a facilitator. After questions from players were answered, 
subjects then received written instructions for the first exercise. After completion, 
instructions for the next exercise were distributed.  Following the experiment, a brief 
survey was conducted which contained questions on the socio-economic background of 
participants, their everyday traffic behavior and their attitudes regarding different policy 
measures and traffic-related problems. 
A typical session lasted about one and a half hours. Subjects received a show-up fee of 200 
Rupees (about four US Dollars) plus their variable experimental earnings.14 We provide a 
description and summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis in the following 
table.  
Table 6: Description and Summary Statistics of Independent Variables 
Variable Name Description Obs. Mean  SD Min  Max 
MALE  = 1 if subject is male 204 0.71 0.45 0 1 
AGE Age in years 203 31.00 9.95 17 60 
MARRIED = 1 if married 202 0.49 0.50 0 1 
INCOME1 =  1 if income below 
5,000 Rupees per month 
172 0.08 0.27 0 1 
INCOME2 =  1 if income between 
5,000 and 15,000 Rupees 
per month 
172 0.22 0.42 0 1 
INCOME3 =  1 if income between 
15,000 and 50,000 
Rupees per month 
172 0.49 0.50 0 1 
INCOME4 =  1 if income between 
50,000 and 100,000 
Rupees per month 
172 0.16 0.37 0 1 
INCOME5 =  1 if income above 
100,000 Rupees per 
month 
172 0.05 0.21 0 1 
OWNSCAR = 1 if households owns a 
car 
204 0.11 0.32 0 1 
OWNSBIKE = 1 if households owns a 
motorbike 
204 0.50 0.50 0 1 
CARFREQ1 = 1 if respondent is 203 0.50 0.50 0 1 
14 Median, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the variable earnings were 234, 237, 28.55, 
146, and 322 Rupees, respectively. For our sample, the mean earnings are approximately equal to half of a 
daily wage. One survey item asked about the degree of agreement with the statement “I could understand the 
instructions of exercise 1,” to which more than 90 percent of the subjects chose “strongly agree” or “agree” 
on a five-point Likert scale. About half of the sampled subjects were using a car at least once a month. This 
gives us some evidence for claiming that the instructions were clear enough for subjects and that familiarity 
with the task was likely among our selected sample. 
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never using the car 
CARFREQ2 = 1 if respondent is using 
the car up to ten times a 
month 
203 0.33 0.47 0 1 
CARFREQ3 = 1 if respondent is using 
the car up between ten 
and 20 times a month 
203 0.08 0.27 0 1 
CARFREQ4 = 1 if respondent is using 
the car more than 20 
times a month 
203 0.09 0.28 0 1 
BUSFREQ1 = 1 if respondent is 
never using the bus 
202 0.20 0.40 0 1 
BUSFREQ2 
 
= 1 if respondent is using 
the bus up to ten times a 
month 
202 0.31 0.46 0 1 
BUSFREQ3 = 1 if respondent is using 
the bus up between ten 
and 20 times a month 
202 0.17 0.38 0 1 
BUSFREQ4 = 1 if respondent is using 
the bus more than 20 
times a month 
202 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Source: own calculations, based on field data  
The table shows that only eleven percent of the participants actually own a car.15 On the 
other hand, half the participants use a car at least once a month. It should be noted that the 
Indian situation is very different from that in Western countries. Cheap labor allows even 
middle-class people to have drivers. Especially in Hyderabad, “travel agencies” offering 
relatively cheap car rental are prevalent and it is not uncommon to rent cars with drivers on 
a daily basis. Often only professional drivers have licenses; thus, the use of data on driving 
licenses is not very informative regarding people who make the decision to use cars. 
Sampling more “upper class” participants might have resulted in a sample with higher car 
ownership. On the other hand, this subject pool would very likely have problems relating 
to the option of taking a public bus. Indeed, about a fifth of the sample was not using buses 
at all at the time of the experiment. After careful assessment of the pros and cons of 
sampling different subject pools, we decided to look for a target population for whom 
deciding between bus and car was really an option.  
15 Exact figures on car ownership of private households are not available for Hyderabad. There are about 
300,000 cars registered – including all vehicles which are used for commercial purposes – in the city (CSE 
2011, p.25). With a total population of about eight million people, these figures give us some indication that 
car ownership is above the average in our sample. In the game, the situation was described as “using your 
own car.” This may be a small drawback in the framing of the instructions, as there are several ways to use a 
car without owning one in Hyderabad. On the other hand, for most middle class participants owning a car is 
within reach, at least in the medium term. The game abstracted from this point, ownership of driver licenses, 
and having more than one person in a car, which could all be important points to explore in further research. 
48 
                                                 
 
Compared to the general population of Hyderabad, our sample is apparently biased 
towards males with high income. On the other hand, we believe it is more representative of 
the commuting white-collar population, because it includes many subjects who qualify as 
part of the new emerging middle class of India, for whom car ownership is becoming an 
attainable goal. 
3.4.  Results 
3.4.1. Analyzing Treatment Effects 
In the baseline condition, we see an increase of car usage over the rounds. Initially, about 
two of the participants chose a car on average. These figures increase to about three in 
round 6 as can be seen from the following figure.  
Figure 3: Relative Frequency of Choosing the Car by Rounds and Between-subject Treatments 
 
Source: own design, based on field data 
Introduction of the bus subsidy or parking fee initially has a positive effect on the group, 
but over time we see an increase of choosing the car. The same happens when we move to 
the public coordination treatment. It can also be seen that, on average, players choose the 
car “too often.” In all rounds there is more than one car on average, suggesting inferior 
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outcomes for most groups. Recall that in the baseline rounds and in the public coordination 
treatment it is individually rational to choose the car only when two or less other players 
use one. On average, players stayed within the limit of having three or less cars in total in 
these rounds. In the two pecuniary treatments, it is individually rational to choose the car if 
one expects not more than one other player to use one. However, on average, choosing the 
car was fairly above the 33 percent which would have been individually rational.  
Figure 4 depicts the average proportion of subjects choosing the car during the various 
exercises across the two different versions of the game. 
Figure 4: Proportion of Car Users for each Exercise 
 
Source: own design, based on field data 
As can be seen from the figure, introducing the treatments reduces the number of cars 
relative to the baseline. The pecuniary treatments demonstrate a larger decrease in the 
number of cars chosen as compared to the public coordination condition. With the new 
treatment in round seven, we observe a sharp drop in cars chosen (see Figure 3).16 
16 This might be explained by a “restart effect.” In that case, the introduction of a new treatment acts as a new 
opportunity for coordination. What happens later in a particular treatment may also be influenced by results 
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Compared to the first six rounds, the number of cars is slightly lower in rounds 7 to 12, 
but, on average, this effect is not very large (Figure 4). Introduction of the public 
coordination treatment (in round 13) prompts a small difference. Aggregated across all six 
rounds, the bus subsidy treatment reduced the proportion of cars from 47.9% to 39.4% 
compared to the baseline treatment. Formal hypothesis testing by comparing the first round 
of each treatment reveals that the difference is not statistically significant at the five-
percent level (McNemar’s test χ² = 3.10; p = 0.0782). If we compare rounds six and seven, 
however, the difference in the drop – more than 20% – becomes highly significant 
(McNemar’s test χ² = 11.52; p = 0.0007). 
The parking cost treatment reduced the proportion of cars from 41.3% to 37.4%. Testing 
for the difference between subjects’ decisions in rounds one and seven reveals, however, 
that this difference is only a small one and statistically not significant (McNemar’s test χ² = 
0.27; p = 0.6015). The proportion of cars drops from 45% to 30% when comparing rounds 
six and seven, however, and this reduction is statistically significant (McNemar’s test χ² = 
5.44; p = 0.0196). 
Compared to the baseline scenario, introducing public coordination reduces the proportion 
of cars from 44.6% to 41.8% (McNemar’s test for first round decisions χ² = 0.00; p = 
1.0000). The difference between the bus subsidy and the parking cost treatment is small, 
with proportions of 39.4% and 37.4%, respectively. Testing these proportions between 
subjects for the decisions made in round seven reveals that this difference is not 
statistically significant (Two-sample test of proportions z = -0.15; p = 0.8795). The 
difference between rounds 12 and 13, that is, the pecuniary treatments and the public 
coordination treatment, is also not significant (McNemar’s test for the increase in the 
parking cost treatment χ² = 1.60; p = 0.2059 and for the decrease in the bus subsidy 
treatment χ² = 0.11; p = 0.7456). However, aggregated earnings of players are higher in the 
public coordination treatment (79.73 Rupees) as compared to the baseline scenario (75.94 
Rupees). This difference of about five percent is statistically highly significant (Paired t-
test t = -4.0543; p = 0.0001).  
Summing up, the pecuniary treatments moderately reduce the number of cars on average. 
This effect is small, however, and is statistically significant only when comparing rounds 6 
and 7, not when comparing the first rounds of the treatments. Also, the reduction of cars 
of earlier rounds. We have, thus, compared the first rounds of each treatment and neighboring rounds across 
treatments with each other.  
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induced by the public coordination treatment is relatively small. Yet it did help players to 
achieve significantly higher earnings in the public coordination condition. 
Another way to evaluate the monetary demand-side policy measures used is from the 
perspective of total social benefits created and efficiency,17 including for the “transport 
authority.” The table below depicts aggregated earnings and choices by treatments.  
Table 7: Evaluating the Efficiency of Monetary Policy Measures  
 Baseline I  




rounds 7 to 
12) 
Baseline II 





7 to 12) 
Frequency of 
choosing the bus 
319 (52.12%) 371 (60.62%) 359 (58.66%) 383 (62.58%) 
Frequency of 
choosing the car 
293 (47.88%) 241 (39.38%) 253 (41.34%) 229 (37.42%) 
Earnings of all 
players in tokens 
7,920 9,085 7,572 7,506 
Total costs/income of 
the “transport 
authority” in tokens 
None Costs for 
subsidizing 
371 bus rides 
x 3  
= 1,113 
None Income from 
229 times the 
parking fee x 
3 
 = 687 
Net benefits, 
including “transport 
authority” in tokens 
7,920 7,972 7,572 8,193 
Source: own calculations, based on field data 
This table presents calculations taking into account the costs and benefits of the policy 
treatments. As can be seen, both policies increase total benefits over the particular rounds. 
But the parking cost policy generating earnings for the transport authority in the game and 
the bus subsidy introducing a cost are factors that should also be carefully considered. The 
17 This is also very often done in social dilemma experiments with punishment or communication. Typically, 
subjects – when given a choice – opt for sanctioning institutions (Gürerk et al., 2006). Cooperation typically 
increases with communication (Sally, 1995) and (costly) punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). However, it 
has also been shown that efficiency is not always increased when punishment is costly. Gains from increased 
cooperation are sometimes outweighed by punishment costs (Ohtsuki et al., 2009; Bochet et al., 2006).  
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net benefit increases by 52 Rupees in the bus subsidy condition (from the second to the 
third column in the last row of the table) and by 621 Rupees in the parking cost condition 
(from column 4 to column 5 in the last row of the table). Under the bus subsidy condition, 
players’ earnings are raised by 1,165 Rupees in total. However, this comes at a high cost of 
almost the same size for subsidizing bus rides (1,113 Rupees). Note that in the parking cost 
condition player earnings are reduced by only 66 Rupees while, at the same time, the 
parking fees generate an income of 687 Rupees for the transport authority. It can thus be 
said that, in our game, the parking cost measure appears to have been more efficient. 
3.4.2. Analyzing the Socio-economic Determinants of Mode Choice 
Table 8 presents six specifications of binary logistic regression models on subjects’ mode 
choices in the experiment (0 = bus, 1 = car). The first five columns pool the data. The sixth 
column presents coefficient and standard error estimates of a random effects model. To 
study the effect of socio-economic characteristics on mode choice, we have included the 
independent variables described in Table 6 to models (3) to (6). The first model uses only 
the dummy variables on the treatment. The second model includes other variables from the 
game. The third model (3) tests for learning effects by including the round as an 
independent variable.18 In model (4), we have included dummy variables on the treatments 
(PARKCOST, BUSSUB, and PUBCOORD), and in the fifth column (5) we have also 
included variables for the number of cars in the previous round (of a treatment) to test for 
changes in expectations based on what others have done in the previous round.19 We use 
dummy variables to capture expected non-linearity in the effect (from the game design and 
the underlying coordination problem). Models (2), (4), and (5) also include the variable 
CARPREVROUND, indicating whether a player has chosen the car in the previous round, 
and the variable ALLOWED, a dummy variable indicating whether a particular player was 
the one who was “allowed” to take the car in a particular round of the public coordination 
18 Due to multicollinearity – with the highest estimated variance inflation factors (VIF) being 12.30 in a 
linear probability model – specifications including both the round and the treatment dummy variables are not 
presented here. Estimation results of the respective linear probability models are presented in the 
supplementary material. A VIF indicates the degree of uncertainty with respect to a coefficient’s standard 
error estimate in a linear regression. The square root of a VIF indicates how much larger a standard error 
estimate is due to correlation of the independent variables. Such bias in standard error estimates will also 
affect test statistics and p-values which ultimately may result in erroneous conclusions. Note that coefficient 
estimates are not affected by collinearity. 
19 In these two dynamic models, observations of the first round of a treatment (i.e. rounds 1, 7, and 13) have 
been excluded, which explains the smaller number of observations. In these models (columns 2, 5, and 6 in 
the table), 1CAR is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for round t if there has been in total one player in 
round t – 1 choosing the car; 2CARS takes the value of 1 if two players in the previous round have chosen 
the car, and so on. The reference category for this variable is “no cars,” i.e. all players have chosen the bus.  
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treatment. Model (6) uses the same data as (5), but with a random effects model for 
estimation to address the serial correlation of the 18 choices observed per subject. 
Table 8: Binary Logistic Regressions on Mode Choice in the Games  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooled 
data 
Pooled data Pooled 
data 
Pooled data Pooled data Random effects 
















































































































































































































































































N 3672 3060 2988 2490 2490 2340 
Pseudo R2  0.002 0.048 0.023 0.058 0.060  




σu2      1.1321   
(0.0994) 
ρ      0.2803   
(0.0354) 
Log likelihood -2487.8615 -1989.9046 -1975.2767 -1599.3429 -1595.2083 -1463.6772 
χ² 10.36** 104.3256*** 23.9937*** 104.7039*** 114.8549*** 68.4975*** 
Standard errors (clustered for individuals in models 1 – 3) in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: own calculations 
In all models, coefficients for the MALE variable are negative, indicating that women are 
more likely to choose the car. This is in line with our expectations, as women in India are 
usually more sensitive to security issues on public transport, such as harassment in buses. 
However, the coefficients are not very large and also not statistically significant at the five 
percent level. Coefficients of age and marital status are also relatively small and not 
statistically significant.  
The effects of income are fairly small in the estimations. Especially respondents in the 
second-lowest income category are somewhat less likely to choose the car, when compared 
to the lowest income category. All other income categories are very similar to the lowest, 
as indicated by the coefficient estimates, which are close to zero. Our interpretation here is 
that the poorest participants in our sample may want to demonstrate their ambition for 
“upward mobility” by choosing the car more often, whereas the rich are more used to 
choosing the car. Overall these effects are fairly small, however.   
It is a bit surprising that owning a car does not increase the propensity to choose one in the 
experiment. Three out of four estimated coefficients even have a negative sign, indicating a 
possible opposite effect. However, as pointed out earlier, owning a car may not be critical 
for the decision to use one. Looking at the coefficient estimates of the CARFREQ variables 
reveals that actually using a car has the expected positive effect on choices in the game. 
However, both the OWNSCAR and the CARFREQ variables are statistically not 
significant. The same applies to the coefficient of OWNSBIKE, which is small and 
statistically not significant. 
The frequency of using the bus has the expected negative sign, and coefficients are 
comparatively large and statistically significant. It is notable that the effect can largely be 
attributed to the step from “not using the bus at all” (BUSFREQ1, the reference category) 
to one of the other categories, as coefficients of BUSFREQ2, BUSFREQ3, and 
BUSFREQ4 are fairly close to each other. The treatment dummy variables are jointly 
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significant, with the two pecuniary treatments being a little less effective than the public 
coordination treatment.20 The effect of ROUND is virtually zero in model (3), indicating 
no substantial change of choices over time. 
The coefficients of the variables added in models (3) to (5) show that the players change 
their behavior – only to a limited extent, however – depending on what others do in the 
game and depending on the particular treatment. The high and significant coefficient of 
CARPREVROUND in models (2), (4), and (5) suggests that players tend to repeat their 
choices, but the random effects model which addresses the serial correlation within 
subjects almost eliminates this effect. Thus, the overall effect can be assumed to be zero. 
Coefficients of the ALLOWED variable are large and statistically significant in all three 
models. This indicates that, when subjects are encouraged to choose the car in a particular 
round of the public coordination treatment, they are relatively likely to use this 
opportunity. The high coefficient estimates of the dummy variables of the number of cars 
in the previous round suggest that, even when many others choose the car, the likeliness of 
a particular player choosing the car remains relatively high. Taken together, the increase in 
the χ²-value from (4) to (5) is relatively small, however. A likelihood ratio test shows that 
the two models are equivalents.21 Coefficients of the included dummies are relatively close 
to each other. This indicates that most of the increase in explanatory power can be 
attributed to the large difference between those cases where there are no cars (the reference 
category) to any other scenario. In other words, when no one chooses the bus in round t, 
the likeliness of a player choosing the car in round t + 1 is substantially higher. If one or 
more players choose the car in round t, the effect on choices in round t +1 was relatively 
small. 
3.5. Discussion 
Our results show that the introduced treatments induce a modest increase in choosing the 
bus in the game. Increasing the parking costs or subsidizing the bus in the game has a 
positive effect, although in some cases these changes are statistically not significant. When 
also taking into account the costs and benefits for the “transport authority,” our results 
show that both policies produce net benefits, although with a substantially higher degree of 
20 Likelihood ratio tests for the categorical variables with more than one category are presented in the 
supplementary material.  
21 The fairly stable Akaike Information Criterion shows that not much additional explanatory power is 
achieved by controlling for socio-economic heterogeneity. Choices are to a large extent the result of 
introduced treatments. 
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efficiency under the parking-cost condition. In this treatment, players’ total earnings are 
reduced by less than 1%, whereas the raised income from parking fees represents more 
than 9% of all players’ earnings in the baseline condition. 
The non-pecuniary treatment is a little less effective in reducing the number of cars, yet 
significantly increases participants’ earnings because of enhanced coordination. A larger 
sample and playing for more rounds – perhaps in a computerized version of the game – 
would certainly allow more reliable statistical tests. Previous work on coordination has 
shown that, after playing 50 rounds and more of a coordination game, no equilibrium 
emerges, even if additional information on others’ behavior is provided to participants (cf. 
Schneider and Weimann, 2004; Selten et al., 2007; Ziegelmeyer et al., 2008). 
Our experiment also shows that people tend to choose the car, even if such behavior is to 
their own disadvantage. One reason may be that boundedly rational subjects use diverse 
and imperfect models to predict what others will do. In some instances, this may result in 
socially inferior outcomes and impede the quick emergence of stable equilibria. Another 
interpretation could be that participants get the impression that other players take the car 
“too often,” thereby benefitting from their own “bus choice.” By also choosing the car, 
they may give up some of their payoff, but also reduce the payoff of others, as a form of 
strategic behavior – similar to costly punishment often observed in social dilemma 
experiments (Fehr and Gächter, 2000) – to influence other players’ choices in subsequent 
rounds. Anecdotal evidence from the pretests with university students supports this 
interpretation. In those tests, choosing the car was very often motivated by a feeling of 
envy, the desire to punish and the objective of making others choose the bus in the game. It 
may be that in real life people support policies aimed at reducing the number of cars 
without necessarily feeling that this should have real consequences for their own behavior. 
Economic experiments are well-suited for detecting and exploring such cases where stated 
preferences and actual behavior diverge, because they link behavior to monetary 
incentives. 
Controlling for observed socio-economic characteristics, the regression models have 
shown that age, gender, or income are rather unimportant for explaining the experimental 
behavior observed, whereas the introduced treatments had significant behavioral effects. 
The low level of statistical significance of observed socio-economic heterogeneity may be 
explained by the relatively homogeneous sample. The importance of treatment effects is 
indicated by the increase in explanatory power in the respective likelihood ratio test. 
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Further, some unobserved characteristics, such as political and environmental attitudes or 
perceived comfort and social status of cars and buses, may have influenced decision-
making in the game. In the end, it is very important to understand how participants form 
expectations regarding the behavior of others, as this is critical for their payoffs and thus 
for mode choice in the game. Future research could pick up on these points to take a more 
detailed examination of these relationships by extending the sample to other target 
populations, gathering more data on attitudes, perceptions, and the formation of 
expectations about others’ behavior, with regard to mode choice. Specifically, it will be 
important to take into account the low level of car use and ownership of private vehicles in 
our data. Few people in our sample own a car and only about half of the respondents 
regularly use one. This may have introduced bias in favor of the bus choice. 
More interestingly from our perspective, the regressions suggest that some of participants’ 
actual traffic behavior is – to some extent – “carried over” to the game. For instance, we 
found that participants who use buses in real life also have a higher propensity to choose 
this option in the game. Differences are particularly clear between the category of people 
who never use the bus and all remaining categories. Traffic measures affecting the use of 
either option may start virtuous or vicious feedback cycles. Impeding the use of cars can 
break the vicious cycle of having more cars on the road in our game. It is notable that the 
frequency of using the car has smaller coefficients in the regressions than the coefficients 
of bus frequency. Of course, the number of bus and car trips is not independent of each 
other. Yet, our experimental results give some indication that, ceteris paribus, encouraging 
people to use the bus may be a better strategy than decreasing the number of car trips.  
The high coefficients of the ALLOWED variable indicate that people may take up a 
suggested model for coordination. The treatment effects show that this does not lead to an 
increase in the use of cars in the game. This finding indicates that the roles of policy and 
the public are important. Authorities of some cities, such as Shanghai, have experimented 
with an odd-even number license plates system during periods of heavy congestion, with 
drivers only being allowed to use certain main roads on alternate days, depending on their 
plates. The mechanism in our game works in a similar way, without monitoring or 
enforcement. It just provides players with a model to better predict what others may do. 
How such policies can actually work in practice and what the roles of monitoring and 





In this paper we have presented a framed field experiment on mode choice, run with 
commuters in Hyderabad, India. The results show that participants made their own 
decisions based on the expected decisions of others. In a given round, the more participants 
in an experimental group chose the car, the more likely it became that even more 
participants would choose the car in the following round. Subjects also became habituated, 
as indicated by a positive probability to stick with a choice from a previous round. We find 
that participants chose the car less frequently when we introduced monetary incentives for 
using public transport or avoiding the car. We have also shown that providing information 
to facilitate coordination helped subjects to improve their earnings. This effect works in 
two ways. Firstly, as shown in the regression analysis, when it is “their turn,” players were 
more likely to choose the car. Secondly, as indicated by the higher average payoffs, players 
exhibited a greater willingness not to take the car when it was “someone else’s turn.” 
We acknowledge that generalization of the results to directly dictate traffic policies is 
neither possible nor desirable. The main goal of such experiments is rather to test more 
general hypotheses and advance our theoretical understanding of human decisions (Guala, 
1999; Guala and Mittone, 2005; Schram, 2005). In addition, games like the one discussed 
in this paper might be particularly useful for participatory traffic planning that moves 
beyond one-dimensional surveys or qualitative methods (cf. Bickerstaff and Walker, 2001; 
Fouracre et al., 2006). It might be very costly to disentangle complex causal relationships 
by testing traffic policies in the field under controlled conditions. It might also be very 
difficult to quantitatively assess and understand interactions and subsequent dynamics of 
traffic behavior. In such a situation, framed field experiments like the one presented in this 
paper can provide rich sources of information on behavioral factors under different policy 
options, which may also guide further research such as surveys (cf. Mahmassani and Jou, 
2000), although the limited sample may be a drawback, as only half of the people use the 
car on a regular base. 
Experimental research in transportation economics could generate further interesting 
insights for demand-side measure policy debates and enrich the current discourses therein. 
For example, it would seem particularly relevant to combine policy measures and test 
whether the resulting change is more or less than the sum of its parts. The research 
presented in this paper was developed following such a logic and can hopefully lead the 
way towards experimenting with such an approach. Moreover, the possibility of oft policy 
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measures, such as awareness-raising campaigns, could be further explored in experimental 
settings so as to assess their potential contributions to achieving more sustainable transport 
systems. Just how far attitudes affect behavior and how these attitudes interact with 
experience and learning in a game constitute additional challenging questions for further 
research. Economic experiments on transport could also be useful in exploring the models 
people use for predicting the behavior of others and using such models for simulation. 
Another important issue to take up in the future is the number of motorbikes, which is 
growing at an even faster rate than the number of cars, in Indian cities. The positive – 
albeit small and statistically not significant – effect of OWNSBIKE may be a first indicator 
of a negative effect. In this context, it will also be important to look at policies which 
promote non-motorized transport (walking and bicycles) or which aim at reducing 
distances or frequency of motorized trips.  
At this stage, our results suggest that soft policies alone might not be very effective. This 
finding, however, does not rule out the reasonable possibility of such policies functioning 
as multipliers in conjunction with other demand- or supply-side measures. Developing 
context-dependent games for different economic strata of the Indian society, e.g. a mode 
choice game on walking vs. taking the bus for the poor or games on using the car 
individually vs. using it jointly with others for the affluent, are promising extensions of the 
game developed in this paper. Sampling participants who can relate to the particular task at 
hand will be critical for the successful conduct of such experiments in the future. Again, 
investigating combinations of policy measures in games and then using these games as a 
starting point for discussion and gaining deeper insights into behavioral factors can be seen 
as a promising way ahead for a sector that, especially in the developing world, appears to 
be largely trapped in a vicious circle: more roads lead to more traffic which, in turn, fuels 
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Abstract: Interdependencies at the neighborhood level create a collective action problem 
for the provision of sanitation-related public goods. We study the effect of heterogeneity 
and leadership on cooperation in a framed economic field experiment. The game was 
conducted with 120 slum-dwellers from Hyderabad, India. We find that endowment 
heterogeneity has a negative effect on contributions in the game. Contrary to previous 
studies, “leading by example” decreases average contributions. However, the effect of 
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4.1. Introduction 
Adequate sanitation facilities are crucial for human health and well-being. In fact, child 
mortality and infectious diseases are substantially reduced by improved hygiene practices 
(Curtis et al., 2011). However, access to toilets and clean water sources remain beyond 
reach for many people throughout the world. Progress in this area has been slow, and the 
millennium development goal of improved sanitation for 75 percent of the world’s 
population is likely to be unfulfilled. Sanitation is also intertwined with other challenges 
such as gender equality, hunger, and education (United Nations, 2012b). Governments and 
municipalities insufficiently invest in public infrastructures for sanitation. Furthermore, 
technical, cultural, behavioral, and political barriers to improved sanitation exist at various 
levels (Andres et al., 2014; Mosler, 2012; Chaplin, 1999; Engel & Susilo, 2014; Baruah, 
2007; McFarlane, 2012; Kutter, 2014), and only recently have scholars and practitioners 
started to systematically investigate these issues (Black & Fawcett, 2008). 
Although private in-house toilets are a preferred option for households in today’s modern 
society, public or otherwise shared toilets are widespread in the informal settlements of 
cities in the global south. In some instances, private toilets are too costly to construct, and 
in other cases, especially in crowded urban communities, private toilets are not in use due 
to high housing density (Black & Fawcett, 2008). For many poor urban dwellers, shared 
toilets remain a reality with which they must live. Consequently, research in development 
studies has recently started to focus on understanding sanitation behavior of urban dwellers 
when using public toilets (Mosler, 2012; Günther et al., 2012; Sonego & Mosler, 2014). 
These studies have found that the number of users and perceived cleanliness of a toilet are 
strongly correlated, and toilets which are used by four or less people are perceived as clean 
in the majority of cases (Günther et al., 2012). In this line of argument, maintenance of 
shared toilets can be understood as a collective action problem for public good provision. 
Besides recognizing individual behavior and perceptions, it is also important to understand 
social interactions of multiple users, and economic experiments are a useful method for 




In this paper, we study maintenance of sanitation facilities as a collective action problem 
by means of an experimental public good game, conducted in the field with 120 – mostly 
female – slum-dwellers from Hyderabad, a large and fast growing city in south India. To 
our knowledge, this is the first lab-in-the-field experiment focusing on the provision of 
shared sanitation as a collective action problem. From the literature, we identified two 
important factors that contribute to success or failure of collective action. First, we 
investigated economic inequality as a potential barrier to successful collective action. 
Secondly, we examined the effect organization of collective action and “leading by 
example” have on the provision of public goods. In addition, we used questionnaire data 
collected from game participants to understand the extent to which socio-economic 
characteristics affect decision-making in the game. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the study context and derives the 
two factors under investigation from the literature. Section 3 describes the game design and 
explains the sampling procedures and practical conduct of the experiment. Sections 4 and 5 
present and discuss the results. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the paper and makes broader 
conclusions. 
4.2. Sanitation in India as a Collective Action Problem 
4.2.1. Study Context 
South Asia is plagued by unavailability of toilets. Approximately 40 percent of the region’s 
population lacks access to sanitation facilities, which is more than any other region in the 
world (United Nations, 2012b). Of the 1.1 billion people of the world’s population without 
access to sanitation, more than half of these affected individuals live in India (United 
Nations, 2012b). Even worse, the situation is hardly improving, and South Asia is 
projected to miss the sanitation targets set by the Millennium Development Goals (United 
Nations, 2012a).  
The costs of inadequate sanitation in India – including impacts on health, school and work 
attendance, water quality, and international tourism – are estimated to exceed $50 billion 
USD per year (World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, 2011). Social benefits from one 
dollar invested in sanitation yield a social return on investment of up to five dollars, and 
with public spending of only 0.2 percent of GDP, India is investing insufficient financial 
resources into sanitation (World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, 2011). Funds for 
(mega-) urban development are largely directed at the needs of the middle classes (e.g., the 
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Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission) and have predominately focused on 
large-scale infrastructure development of sewage systems or effluent treatment plants 
(Government of India, 2005). Women suffer disproportionally from this lack of sanitation. 
They are often compelled to defecate in public which makes them vulnerable to sexual 
harassment and assaults. In addition, women carry the main burden of poor child health 
(Truelove, 2011). 
The manifold problems are most pronounced in poor neighborhoods. Knowledge and 
awareness on hygiene practices are low; child mortality and disease prevail in India’s 
urban slums (Jalan & Somanathan, 2008). At the neighborhood level, powerful actors – so-
called resident welfare associations in the affluent neighborhoods and “slum leaders” in the 
poor parts – act as political brokers who negotiate access to basic public services, including 
water, sanitation, or sewage for several hundred people (Zérah, 2009, 2007). 
On a smaller scale, adjacent households often rely on informal practices of mutual self-
help. Water and toilets are frequently shared among smaller groups of neighbors. Mal-
practiced hygiene and inadequate sanitation facilities affect the immediate environment 
and adjacent households. Examples include the contamination of water or the provision of 
breeding grounds for flies and mosquitoes (Clasen et al., 2007; Black & Fawcett, 2008). In 
crowded urban environments, individual incentives to invest in hygiene and sanitation are 
low and create a “collective action problem” (Olson, 1965). 
4.2.2. Heterogeneity and Leadership in the Voluntary Provision of Public 
Goods 
Mainstream economic theory predicts that unless “selective incentives” (i.e., private goods 
that are easily excludable from the use of others) are attached to public goods, free-riding 
on the contribution of others prevails. The voluntary provision of public goods will then 
occur at levels below social efficiency (Olson, 1965). In the same manner, unless 
privatized or centrally controlled by the government, open access common pool resources 
are said to become over-exploited, and users are projected to end up in a “tragedy of the 
commons” (Hardin, 1968).  
This view of a collectively unsolvable social dilemma has been prominently challenged by 
Ostrom (1990), who has identified a number of institutional factors (e.g., the presence of 
monitoring and sanctioning systems or recognition by higher-level authorities) that enable 
communities to manage common pool resources collectively. In addition, a larger set of 
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“second level variables” that affect the likeliness of successful collective action have been 
proposed (Ostrom, 2009). Such approaches have also been extended to community 
development and collective action problems in development and public good provision 
(e.g., for accessing markets for agricultural produce or for organizing mutual self-help in 
rural finance) (Markelova et al., 2009; Bharamappanavara et al., in press). Heterogeneity 
and the presence of leadership are among the “second level variables” that can dictate 
success or failure of collective action.  
The effect of community heterogeneity on successful collective action and cooperation is 
theoretically ambiguous and empirically contested (Baland et al., 2007; Baland & Platteau, 
1997; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Bharamappanavara et al., in 
press; Habyarimana et al., 2009). Heterogeneity can concern various dimensions (Baland et 
al., 2007), and it is difficult to operationalize in empirical work (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). 
Heterogeneity may affect collective action through a diverse set of mechanisms. For 
instance, people who identify with a particular social group may prefer collaboration 
within this group, or they may more easily know how to punish and reward each other 
(Habyarimana et al., 2009). At the same time, these mechanisms are mediated by their 
structural institutional context (Bharamappanavara et al., in press; Varughese & Ostrom, 
2001; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). 
Collective action may also be facilitated by the presence of leadership as “group formation 
often needs a catalyst, and the nature of the catalyst is crucial” (Thorp et al., 2005). Such 
leadership can emerge from individuals within the community or from outsiders who may 
also provide trainings, critical inputs, or social networks (Nkonya et al., 2008; Markelova 
et al., 2009). Leaders can enhance coordination and may be able to mobilize “critical 
masses” necessary for starting collective action processes (Calvert, 1992). More 
importantly, leaders may set an example for others to follow if followers do not know 
which actions are deemed appropriate (Hermalin, 1998). Especially in the experimental 
work on public good provision, obtaining information on what a first mover does is 
strongly correlated with the behavior of those who follow (Sutter & Rivas, 2014).  
4.3. The Experiment 
4.3.1. The Public Good Game 
Our study is based on a standard linear voluntary contribution mechanism public good 
game (Isaac et al., 1984) with n (= 5) players. In the game, each player decides how much 
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to contribute from initial endowments of size eir (= 5, 10, or 15 Indian Rupees, contingent 
on treatment in our study). The game is played repeatedly for r (= 8) rounds. In each round, 
a player i decides how much he or she wants to contribute to a common fund, and his or 
her profits 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in round r are calculated as follows  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑎𝑎(∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛−1𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 )
𝑛𝑛
+ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where xir is player i’s contribution, xjr are the other (n – 1) players’ contributions in round r, 
and a (= 2) is a constant which satisfies 1 < a < n (the dilemma condition). In a finitely 
repeated game, free-riding (i.e., contributing zero) is a dominant strategy. The social 
optimum, which is defined as the strategy that maximizes aggregate payoffs ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 , is 
to contribute everything. Typically, in a linear VCM public good game, players start 
contributing half of their initial endowment on average, and contributions decrease over 
time (Chaudhuri, 2011). 
4.3.2. Hypotheses and Treatments 
Several economic experiments have investigated the effect of asymmetric endowments on 
contributions in public good games. Most studies in the lab find that absolute contributions 
increase and relative contributions decrease with increasing endowments (Chan et al., 
1996; Cherry et al., 2005; van Dijk & Wilke, 1995; Chan et al., 1999; Aquino et al., 1992). 
Buckley & Croson (2006) find that endowment heterogeneity has no impact on individual 
contributions. Van Dijk & Grodzka (1992) study endowment heterogeneity and manipulate 
the information available to subjects. Participants are either aware or unaware of other 
players’ endowments (and hence heterogeneity). However, information on heterogeneity 
does not strongly affect actual contributions. In a meta-analysis of public good games, 
Zelmer (2003) concludes that in the typical case, endowment heterogeneity reduces 
contributions. Few experiments though struggle with investigating endowment 
heterogeneity in actual field settings with non-student participants.  
Cárdenas et al. (2002) studied income inequality for natural resource use – framed as 
firewood extraction – in rural Colombia. They find that those who have lower opportunity 
costs in alternative income opportunities (as induced by the experimental treatments) 
harvest more of a common resource. Notably, with asymmetry in alternative incomes, total 
harvesting of firewood decreases, therewith reducing the pressure on ecosystems. Hayo & 
Vollan (2012) demonstrate that socio-demographic heterogeneity, which is calculated at the 
70 
 
group level from questionnaire data, leads to less cooperative play in a “grazing game” 
conducted with farmers in Namibia and South Africa.  
There is a relatively large empirical experimental literature on “leading by example” 
(Andreoni, 2006) in the lab. In experimental games, leadership in public good games is 
typically introduced through sequential contributions. In a first step, one or more leaders 
decide on their contributions; in the next step, leaders’ contributions are announced, and 
others follow with their decisions. It is assumed that leaders are inclined to set a positive 
example by contributing large amounts and that followers will also contribute more 
contingent on their leaders’ contributions (Sutter & Rivas, 2014). 
Empirically, these presumptions have been repeatedly demonstrated. The experimental 
literature on leadership typically finds a positive effect on outcomes in both coordination 
(Foss, 2001; Wilson & Rhodes, 1997) and social dilemma games (Potters et al., 2007; 
Gächter & Renner, 2003; Güth et al., 2007; Moxnes & van der Heijden, 2003). Sutter & 
Rivas (2014) summarize the recent experimental literature from the lab, and in almost all 
cases, leadership increases average contributions, and followers’ contributions are 
positively correlated with their leaders’ contributions. Our experiment is closely related to 
the work of Levati et al. (2007) who ran a similar experiment in the lab. For India, it has 
also been shown that religious heterogeneity – comparing mixed Hindu or Muslim groups 
with homogeneous groups – can undermine the positive effects of leadership in the lab 
(Keuschnigg & Schikora, 2014). To our knowledge, there is no research studying 
leadership in a framed field experiment. 
Based on this literature, the following two hypotheses are formulated: 
H1: Endowment heterogeneity has a negative effect on average contributions to the 
public good.    
H2: Leading by example has a positive effect on average contributions to the public 
good. 
4.3.3. Experimental Design 
To test the hypotheses, two factors – distribution of endowments and leadership – were 
varied in a full factorial within-subjects design. The order of treatments was randomized in 
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four blocks.22 The random order within-subjects design was chosen to avoid confounding 
of treatments with communities, group dynamics, or learning (Charness et al., 2012; 
Friedman & Sunder, 1994). Table 9 summarizes the experimental design. 
Table 9: Overview of Experimental Design 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 
Name of treatment 
throughout the rest of the 
paper 
Baseline  HetNoLead HomoLead HetLead 
Heterogeneity No Yes No Yes 
Leader No No Yes Yes 
Endowments in Indian 
Rupees (Players 1 to 5) 
10, 10, 10, 
10, 10 
5, 5, 10, 15, 
15 
10, 10, 10, 
10, 10 
5, 5, 10, 15, 
15 
Number of players per group 5 
Sum of group endowments 
per round 
50 
Total endowments per player 
over all eight rounds 
80 
Number of subjects  120 
Number of decisions per 
subject 
2 
Number of distinct decisions 
in sample 
240 
Order of Treatment Randomized in Blocks 
Source: Self-design  
Each subject was required to decide eight times how much to contribute from an initial 
endowment. In all four treatments, endowments of other players were known to everyone. 
Yet, the identity of these players was kept secret. Anonymity was ensured, and neither 
endowments nor contributions could be related to a particular player (cf. supplementary 
material/experimental instructions).  
22 The order of treatments in these four blocks and additional information on ordering effects are provided as 
part of the supplementary material. 
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The game framing referred to sanitation-related public goods. A session started with a 
general introduction to the problem of sanitation, and the rules of the game were then read 
to all 20 participants of a session. Participants were asked to picture a scenario in which 
they would share a toilet with four other neighbors. For maintenance, cleaning, and small 
repairs, some money would have to be collected. This money would be collected 
anonymously in a box, and an opaque box was presented to participants in the game 
instructions. Some Rupee coins were placed in the box to demonstrate this in practice. In 
the next step, another box, which was transparent this time, was shown to the participants. 
Again, the game facilitator added some coins to the box. Now, participants could see how 
much money was in the box. It was then highlighted that with this type of box, the 
participants could easily recognize how much money previous contributors have added to 
the total fund.  
It was pointed out that such differences in boxes/organizational set-up would also exist in 
the game. More specifically, participants were told that in half of the games, one 
participant would be randomly and anonymously selected to be the “first mover,”23 and the 
remaining four participants could make their contributions knowing how much money had 
been added to the box by the first person. The first mover was not the same person during 
the entire game, and in each of the four rounds, the person to contribute first was newly 
selected. Furthermore, it was explained that, as in real life, some people have more money 
than others, and such heterogeneity would also be part of the game.24 For both conditions – 
heterogeneity and leading by example – paper sheets on which subjects would later 
indicate their decisions were used in the demonstration phase to explain the game’s tasks. 
In order to ensure an accurate understanding of the rules, the game facilitator posed several 
questions of understanding to randomly selected participants at the end of the 
demonstration phase. During all stages, participants were free to ask questions. 
By drawing lots from a box, subjects were then randomly assigned to one of four groups 
per session, each of which consisted of five participants. A group of two or three research 
assistants was randomly assigned to each group for organizing the game. Disposers with 
printed sheets were distributed to participants. These sheets involved visualization, and 
following pre-testing in the field, these sheets were designed in a way that they could also 
23 We strictly avoided the word “leader” because it has a strong connotation in Indian society. We wanted to 
study the basic principles of “leading by example” in an anonymous setting. Additional information on the 
practical implementation of the “leading by example” treatments is provided in the supplementary material.  
24 We ensured and explained to participants that total endowments over all rounds of the game would always 
add up to 80 Rupees though. 
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be easily accessed by illiterate subjects (cf. supplementary material). All decisions were 
made in private, and communication was not permitted during the game. Following 
players’ decisions in a particular round, the results were verbally announced and noted on a 
white board in English as well as the local language, Telugu. Research assistants received 
training to always announce these results in the same way. After eight rounds of play and 
with the help of trained field staff, a short survey was conducted. Finally, subjects were 
paid on the basis of their decisions in all eight rounds. 
4.3.4. Community and Participant Selection 
Based on knowledge gathered from 2010 to 2012 during three field visits to Hyderabad, 
five slum communities were selected for conducting the game. These communities were 
chosen in close consultation with local partners. Locations were considered with respect to 
their sanitation situations. Subjects were recruited only when they could relate to the 
game’s framing. In other words, problems with sanitation and water access were prevalent 
within each subject’s community. This requirement was important because it “is not the 
case that abstract, context-free experiments provide more general findings if the context 
itself is relevant to the performance of subjects” (Harrison & List, 2004). Hyderabad’s 
slums are very diverse, and communities were also selected to reflect some of this 
diversity, especially with respect to population (Muslim vs. Hindu), location (urban vs. 
peri-urban), or tenure status (recognized and semi-formal vs. unrecognized and temporary). 
In each community, subjects were selected in collaboration with local partners and NGOs 
working on the ground. These partners also provided spaces for conducting the 
experiments (e.g., schools, community halls, yards, or temple compounds). The game was 
played in five communities. Based on our own assessments and knowledge as well as those 
of our partners, Table 10 summarizes some selected characteristics of these communities.   
Table 10: Characteristics of Selected Communities 
Name of 
Community 




Location Peri-urban Urban Urban Urban Urban 
Population 
density 
Low Medium High High Medium 
Tenure status Partly Notified Notified Not Notified 
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notified notified   
Poverty 
incidence 





















































Medium Medium Low None Medium 
Drainage/ 
storm water 
Medium Medium Medium None Low 
Source: Self-design  
The game was played with 24 groups of five individuals which led to 120, mostly female, 
slum dwellers in six experimental sessions. A typical experimental session lasted 
approximately two and a half hours. Subjects received a participation fee of INR 100. In 
addition, they earned money depending on their own and their group’s decisions in the 
game. The median and mean earnings from the game (excluding the INR 100 participant 
fee) were INR 117.8 and INR 121.2 (SD = 17.517), respectively, with a minimum and 
maximum of INR 69.4 and INR 175.2, respectively. Thus, participants earned INR 221.2 
on average, which was approximately four USD at the time of the experiment or equal to 
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slightly more than a daily wage for slum-dwellers in Hyderabad. Table 11 describes and 
presents summary statistics for some key variables of participants that were collected in the 
post-experimental survey and used in the regression analysis. 
Table 11: Characteristics of Participants 
Variable Name  Description  N Mean SD Min Max 
FEMALE = 1 if participant is female 120 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 
AGE = age in years 118 33.29 10.94 15.00 65.00 
MARRIED = 1 if married 120 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 
DAILYWAGE = daily wage in Indian 
Rupees 
120 72.23 116.22 0.00 600.00 
WEALTH PCA Wealth Index25  120 0.00 1.50 -4.56 2.40 
READANDWRITE = 1 if participant can read 
and write 
120 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
YEARSINSCHOOL = years of formal 
schooling 
120 5.06 4.76 0.00 15.00 
YEARSINAREA = years participant lives in 
the neighborhood  
116 13.66 8.41 0.00 40.00 
SHGMEMBER = 1 if participant is 
member in a self-help 
group 
120 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
SHGLEADER = 1 has leadership position 
in a self-help group 
120 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
HINDU = 1 if participant states 
Hinduism as religion 
120 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Source: Self-design  
Clearly, the vast majority of participants were female. Sanitation and its related problems 
affect women more than men, thus the focus on recruiting females. Also, the level of 
education in the sample is rather low with an average of only five years spent in school and 
almost half of the participants being illiterate. About half of the participants were members 
in a self-help group, and approximately one fifth of the participants had a leadership 
25 The index has been constructed from a list of household assets based on the method developed by Filmer & 
Pritchett (2001). It includes seven variables: possession of color TV (1), mobile phone (2), motorbike (3), 
electric fan (4), water filter (5), LPG cylinder for cooking (6), and private water tap in the house (7). 
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position in one of these groups. Three quarters of all participants were practicing Hindus, 
which is relatively close to the census figures for Hyderabad with its large Muslim, 
considerable Christian, and prevalence of other minority populations.  
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Treatment Effects 
Table 12 displays summary statistics for contributions in the public good game. Data are 
pooled across all eight rounds and 120 participants.  
Table 12: Contributions by Treatments 






Pooled Data (Full 
Sample) 
960 5.15 3.143 0 15 
Treatment 1 
(Baseline) 
240 5.458 2.855     0 10  
Treatment 2 
(HetNoLead) 
240 5.275 3.587   0     15  
Treatment 3 
(HomoLead) 
240 5.004 2.730     0 10  
Treatment 4 
(HetLead) 
240 4.863 3.311          0 15  
Source: Self-design  
Participants contributed approximately half of their endowments on average. This rate is 
similar to rates typically found in such experiments and close to what has been found in 
rural India (Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011; Chakravarty et al., 2010; Bouma et al., 
2014).  
Differences between treatments are statistically significant at the five percent level 
(Kruskal-Wallis-Test, χ² (3) = 9.040, p = 0.0288). Pair-wise differences between treatments 
are relatively small yet statistically significant. Under heterogeneous endowments 
participants contribute slightly less (M = 5.068, SD = 3.455) than under homogeneous 
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endowments (M = 5.231, SD = 2.799). This difference is statistically significant (Mann-
Whitney U-test, z = 2.310, p = 0.0209). A larger difference exists between the leadership 
(M = 4.933, SD = 3.032) and non-leadership conditions (M = 5.367, SD = 3.240). This 
difference is statistically significant at the ten percent level (Mann-Whitney U-test, z = 
1.926, p = 0.0542). Here, contrary to literature, “leading by example” decreases 
contributions. We will explore possible explanations for this behavior below.  
4.4.2. Socio-Economic Heterogeneity: Regressions on Contributions 
Table 13 presents three specifications of multilevel regressions on contributions in the 
game. Three-level models are used with decisions (level 3) nested in players (level 2), 
nested in groups of five subjects (level 1).26 
Table 13: Multilevel Models on Contributions 
 (1) (2) (3) 



















































































26 Further model specifications and robustness checks are presented in the supplementary material. 
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N 960 840 798 
χ² 291.1926 243.6627 258.2344 
p > χ² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -2197.6137 -1941.7962 -1852.2193 
Source: Own calculations; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
The first model includes only static game data, namely dummy variables for the respective 
treatments with BASELINE as the reference category and participants’ endowments in 
Indian Rupees (5, 10, or 15). The variable 2ROUNDTREAT is a dummy variable 
indicating whether a treatment is applied the second time in the game.  ROUND is a 
continuous variable indicating the round from 1 to 8 to test for a decay effect.  
The second model extends the first model by adding two dynamic variables, namely lagged 
contribution and lagged contribution of others in the previous round (t – 1).27 The third 
model adds socio-demographic variables to control for heterogeneity. The large χ² statistics 
indicate that the overall explanatory capacity of the models is high. The estimates show 
relatively large effects on contributions of the treatment variables. Also, ENDOWMENT, 
27 There are no lagged variables available for the first round, hence the lower number of observations and 
differences in coefficients in the second column. Adding socio-economic variables further reduces the 
number of observations due to missing observations in the questionnaire. Specifically, the model in the third 
column is based on 114 out of 120 participants. 
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2ROUNDTREAT, AGE, MARRIED, READANDWRITE, YEARSINSCHOOL, the SHG 
variables, and HINDU are important factors affecting contributions in the game. 
The effect of ROUND is negative, indicating decay in contributions over time. However, 
similar to what is typically found in related field experiments (Chakravarty et al., 2010; 
Werthmann, 2011; Bouma et al., 2014), this effect is relatively small. It is also partly 
outweighed by the relatively large effect of 2NDROUNDTREAT. Both lagged variables 
show only small effects. Participants’ choices in t – 1 are relatively independent of 
contributions in round t. The same applies to the contribution of others. Each Rupee the 
others contribute in t – 1 is, on average, matched with about -0.03 Rupees in t, indicating 
no strong evidence of conditional cooperation (cf. Fischbacher et al., 2001). 
4.4.3. The Role of Leadership 
Analyzing the effect of leadership reveals that, contrary to what is typically found in the 
literature, leading by example reduces contributions in our experiment. Table 14 presents 
summary statistics for all 480 leadership decisions by leadership status in the game and 
being an actual leader in a self-help group.  
Table 14: Contributions by Leadership Status in Game and Actual Life 
Participant is 
leader in the 
game 
Participant is in 
leadership position in a 






SD of mean 
contribution 
No No 312 5.074 3.074 
Yes No 76 4.5 3.031 
No Yes 72 4.514 2.907 
Yes  Yes 20 5.9 2.553 
Source: Self-design 
It is easy to see that leadership decisions differ strongly by experience with a leadership 
position in actual life. When selected as a leader, SHG leaders contribute 5.9 Rupees as 
compared to 4.5 Rupees for non-SHG leaders. These relationships also hold when 
controlling for other characteristics by regression analysis as shown in Table 15. 
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Table 15: Multilevel Regression on Leaders’ and Followers’ Contributions in the Game 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
















































































































































































































































































N 90 78 78 366 315 
χ² 45.5379 96.9355 91.1925 106.7929 101.6673 
p > χ² 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -214.0202 -172.7603 -174.6926 -860.7163 -744.0824 
Source: Own calculations; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
It is seen that SHG leaders contribute substantially more when leading in the game (2.29 
Rupees in Model 1) while there is hardly an effect of being an SHG leader when following 
(Models 4 and 5). Analogous to the regression table above, Models (2) and (3) include the 
dynamic variables. Of note, the effect of one’s own previous choices and the contribution 
of others becomes much larger in the leadership decisions, and the overall effect of actual 
leadership (variable SHGLEADER) becomes smaller, although with 1.37 Rupees, it is still 
relatively large (cf. Model 2). It seems plausible that actual leaders know how to lead 
whereas inexperienced participants, in a situation that is new to them, look for orientation 
and anchors in past choices.  
To investigate this idea, Model (3) introduces two interaction terms: OWN 
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CONTRIBUTION T-1 x SHGLEADER and CONTRIBUTIONSOTHERS T-1 x 
SHGLEADER. It is now possible to distinguish between the effects of previous choices of 
leaders and non-leaders directly. Although the effects are not statistically significant 
different from zero, we find that the effect of previous contributions becomes even larger 
for non-leaders and smaller for leaders, which is indicated by the negative signs of the 
coefficient estimates for the newly introduced interaction terms. In other words, there is 
strong heterogeneity of the leadership treatment on experimental subjects contingent on 
their own experiences with leading in the game. Participants who are SHG leaders in actual 
life contribute larger amounts if they are leading; non-leaders – more than in other 
treatments – use previous decisions as an orientation when asked for a choice in a 
seemingly unfamiliar task.  
Models (4) and (5) show that leaders’ decisions encourage followers to contribute more. 
Each Rupee is matched by about 0.08 Rupees on average. Note that this effect is at the 
individual level. Thus, an increase in the leader’s contribution stimulates four times this 
amount in total contributions of followers. In other words, the negative impact of the 
leadership condition in the game must be attributed to low contributions of first movers 
rather than to followers. 
4.5. Discussion 
In our experiment, heterogeneity has led to a small reduction of roughly two percent of 
total endowments in contributions to the public good.  Thus, we fail to reject the first 
hypothesis and find some support for a negative effect of endowment heterogeneity on 
contributions. Although this effect is smaller than the 14.51 percent found on average in 
studies conducted in the lab, it is within the 95 percent confidence interval reported in the 
respective meta-analysis (Zelmer, 2003, p. 307). 
In the daily practice of shared sanitation facilities, it may be more difficult to organize 
contributions to a public good in the presence of economic inequality. For wealthier users, 
access to private toilets may be within reach; however, the poorest individuals may find it 
difficult to contribute anything at all. In the relatively homogeneous – albeit extremely 
poor – communities we have studied, this factor seems to be less of a problem. This is not 
to say that other dimensions of heterogeneity may not matter for organizing collective 
action. The fast growing city of Hyderabad attracts migrants from all over India with 
diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds. A lack of communication possibilities between 
83 
 
community members may at times be a greater barrier to cooperation than wealth 
inequality. Also, heterogeneity is embedded in the broader context of a particular 
community, and perceptions on what is a fair contribution may differ between cases. 
In our game, we did not find much support for conditional cooperation. With the exception 
of leaders in the game, most participants did not condition their contributions on other 
participants’ decisions. If these findings would mirror actual behavior, virtuous cycles of 
cooperation may be difficult to start. On the other hand, a complete break-down of 
cooperation is also less likely to occur, and we did not observe a strong decay effect in our 
game. From discussions with game participants, we know that small charitable 
contributions to festival expenses in the community follow individual considerations rather 
than beliefs and perceptions about others’ behaviors. Contributions are typically not varied 
much, and often suggestions on the size of contributions serve as anchors, used by money 
collectors when raising funds for various communal activities. 
Contrary to what is typically found in the experimental literature, leading by example does 
not increase contributions in our experiment. Thus, we reject the second hypothesis. In the 
experiment, leaders, on average, fail to contribute more and to set a positive example. 
Interestingly, there is strong heterogeneity in leaders’ decisions. In particular, we found that 
those participants who have leading roles in actual life are well aware of the importance of 
setting a positive example. For this group, the second hypothesis cannot be rejected. Actual 
leaders’ contributions, when randomly selected to lead in the game, were substantially 
higher. Regression analysis has also shown that followers condition their contributions on 
leaders’ decisions, thereby further aggravating the positive effect on aggregate 
contributions. Hence, if actual leaders accept a leadership role in contributing to the public 
good, overall cooperation may increase. 
These findings have implications for the practical organization of voluntary contributions 
to public goods. Increasing transparency and publicly announcing contributions seems 
useful, especially if leaders are not random. With an awareness of this phenomenon, 
communities may organize collections in a way that experienced leaders are the first to 
contribute, ensuring that these contributions become known to followers. Alternatively, 
leaders themselves may find ways to set a positive example and to communicate their 
decisions. It also follows from our results that with random leadership, inexperience makes 
things worse. In this case, anonymous collections are better than a sequential organization.      
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In our game, contributions of leaders were anonymous. It is an open question how people’s 
behavior would have changed if contributions were known and could be linked to faces, 
social status, and information on caste or religion. Although experimental ethics forbid the 
conduct of experiments that link decisions and identities, other methods may be used to 
explore these factors. In small communities, information on social status, the possibility to 
build up a reputation, and the potential threat of peer punishment are further important 
issues to investigate.  
4.6. Summary and Conclusions 
Around the globe, a lack of access to adequate sanitation exposes the poor to serious health 
risks. Significant associated costs must be borne, especially by women and children in 
urban slums. In the absence of private toilets, neighbors often share toilets. In this paper, 
we have demonstrated that maintenance of such shared toilets can be viewed as a collective 
action problem, and we have used an economic experiment to study the impact of leading 
by example and economic heterogeneity on contributions to a public good. In our study, 
both factors exhibit a negative effect on cooperation, although leadership is positive if 
participants are experienced in this role. 
In our experiment, experienced leaders came from the ubiquitous Indian self-help group 
system. Leaders were not different from non-leaders in our data, which suggests that 
experience with leadership matters more than personal characteristics. Thus, a careful 
rotation of leadership roles might have the potential to create substantive co-benefits in 
other domains such as sanitation. The ability to set a positive example is not necessarily an 
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Abstract: Consumers around the world are burdened by large amounts of unaddressed 
junk mail. Attaching “No junk mail” stickers to mailboxes offers a simple solution for 
protecting against unwanted ads. Presumably, the use of such stickers can be increased if 
consumers deliberately decide either for or against receiving junk mail. This conjecture of 
status quo bias was tested in a field experiment, run with more than 900 households in 
Berlin, Germany. In one treatment, stickers were put into mailboxes, facilitating active 
choice. In a second treatment, stickers were attached halfway onto the outsides of 
mailboxes, forcing consumers to either remove or fully attach them. It was found that 
roughly a fifth of the sample attached a sticker after treatment. With uptake of more than 
21, as compared to 16 percent, the forced choice was more effective than the active choice 
treatment. The findings highlight the importance of green nudges and defaults for 
promoting pro-environmental behaviour. Implications for landlords of the presented 
interventions are discussed. The field of social norms is identified as a promising area for 
extending the scope of the present study. 
Keywords: Active Choice; Behavioural Economics; Green Nudge; Junk Mail; Status Quo 
Bias 
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5.1. Introduction 
On a global scale, every year one million trees are cut to produce junk mail (McKenzie-
Mohr, p. 28), and it is estimated that each household in Germany receives about 30 kg of 
unaddressed ads per year in its mailbox (WWF 2011, p. 4). Often these papers are thrown 
away unread, with more than a quarter of the German population reading junk mail only 
occasionally or not at all (Ifak Institut 2013). But consumers can protect themselves against 
junk mail by attaching a sticker stating “No junk mail, please!” to their mailboxes. It is 
common knowledge in Germany that these stickers can easily be fabricated at home or can 
be bought at low cost from stationary shops. They have been reported to be effective in 
stopping delivery of junk mail, are well known, and about one quarter of German 
households uses them (IfD 2013). Yet, large differences exist in the proportion of stickers 
across houses. Specifically, in some houses one can observe that landlords force tenants to 
actively decide either for or against junk mail by attaching a two-sided printed sign to their 
mailboxes: One side reads “Ads, yes please,” the other “No ads, please.” This way, tenants 
are constantly reminded of their choice either for or against junk mail, and, typically, if 
forced to decide, more people will opt against junk mail. The low cost of attaching such a 
sticker gives rise to the presumption that adoption in houses where there is no such forced 
choice is low due to status quo bias. 
In this paper, we report results from a field experiment conducted with more than 900 
households in Berlin, Germany, focused on the role of status quo bias in the adoption of 
mailbox stickers. We analyze here a single, simple outcome variable: whether or not people 
have actually attached to their mailboxes a “No junk mail, please!” sticker provided to 
them as part of this study. In one treatment of our experiment, consumers receive a sticker 
in their mailboxes, meaning that they need to actively decide either for or against using it. 
In another treatment, consumers are forced to decide: The sticker is halfway attached on 
the outside of their mailboxes, prompting them either to remove or fully attach it.  
This study seeks to contribute to the small but growing empirical literature on green 
nudges and status quo bias in behavioural consumer research (Allcott 2011; Garner 2005; 
Kallbekken and Sælen 2013; Kallbekken et al. 2013; Ölander and Thøgersen in press; 
Pichert and Katsikopoulos 2008; Sunstein and Reisch 2013). Here we focus especially on 
92 
 
the role of active and forced choices as a means to achieve consumer sovereignty, a topic 
that has received relatively little attention in the literature so far (Sunstein 2013a). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide some 
background regarding the context of our experiment, review the literature on status quo 
bias in consumer research, and develop two hypotheses. In succeeding sections, we 
describe the study and present its results, which are then discussed in light of the literature. 
In a concluding section, we summarize our findings and present an outlook on future 
research. 
5.2. Background, Literature, and Hypotheses 
5.2.1. Environmental Context and Study Area 
Global environmental change has reached alarming levels. In some domains, planetary 
boundaries – safe limits within which humans can act without major and irreversible 
distortions of the earth system – have been passed (Rockström et al. 2009a; Rockström et 
al. 2009b). The resulting task, to transform societies towards sustainability, is a key policy 
challenge for the 21st century (WBGU 2011). It has been suggested that, by focusing on a 
few simple non-coercive interventions to stipulate behavioural change at the household 
level, much can be achieved (Schultz, in press). For example, it is estimated that the United 
States could at low cost eliminate up to 20 percent of its households’ direct greenhouse gas 
emissions through such means (Dietz et al. 2009). It has also been shown that defaults and 
the (social) marketing of sustainable products as “normal” can facilitate environmentally 
friendly consumption behaviour (Rettie et al. 2014; Sunstein and Reisch 2013; Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008). 
Here, we focus on consumer willingness to avoid paper waste by attaching “No junk mail” 
stickers to their mailboxes. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that the paper and pulp 
industry is highly energy-intensive and, with an increase in output of more than 75 percent 
over the past twenty years, has experienced tremendous growth (Fleiter et al. 2012). 
According to its national umbrella organization (VdP 2013), in Germany the sector 
processes more than 10,000 cubic meters of solid pulpwood (p. 56) and uses more than 
18,000 gigawatts of electricity (p. 57), which is equivalent to roughly three percent of the 
country’s overall electric energy use. The major share of these resources is used for 
producing printed paper (p. 57), most of which are consumed by private households. In 
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2010, the mean per capita consumption of paper in Germany was about 250 kg, as 
compared to a world average of 57 kg.  
With one million trees cut globally, junk mail has a huge environmental impact and makes 
up large proportions of consumed paper and household paper waste (McKenzie-Mohr 
2012; Resse 2005; WWF 2011). A study in North Shore City, New Zealand, has found that, 
by using a simple sticker, the amount of junk mail dropped by more than 70 percent, from 
3.65 kg to 1.1 kg per month (Gregory and Roberts 2005, p. 209). In Germany such stickers 
are potentially even more effective, as in the past courts have decided in favour of 
consumers when stickers were ignored by deliverers (n.a. 2014). There are differing 
estimates on the adoption rate of stickers in Germany, ranging from about 15 percent (Ifak 
Institut 2012) to about 25 percent (IfD 2013). The following tables show the adoption of 
stickers disaggregated by age, income, and city size.  
Table 16: Adoption of “No junk mail”-stickers by age for the years 2009 to 2013 











2013 25.50% 24.00% 26.80% 25.50% 25.50% 24,543 
2012 25.10% 22.80% 26.10% 25.30% 25.80% 26,063 
2011 25.20% 21.90% 26.90% 25.00% 26.30% 20,271 
2010 24.30% 21.30% 25.80% 24.90% 24.70% 21,062 
2009 23.60% 21.40% 24.70% 24.10% 23.90% 21,068 
Source: IfD 2013 
Table 17: Adoption of “No junk mail”-stickers by income groups for the years 2009 to 2013 
 Year Below 1,500 € 1,500 to 2,500 € 2,500 to 3,500 € Above 3,500 € 
2013 23.6% 25.9%  25.3%  26.6%  
2012 24.2% 25.3%  24.5%  26.3%  
2011 23.8%  24.8%  25.9%  26.2%  
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2010 22.6%  23.9%  25.7%  25%  
2009 22.2%  23%  23.5%  26.3% 
Source: IfD 2013 








2013 20.1%  25.3%  33.3%  
2012 19.6%  25.2%  33%  
2011 20%  25.3%  32.6%  
2010 18.9%  24%  32.4%  
2009 17.9%  23.3%  32.2% 
Source: IfD 2013 
As can be seen, no large differences exist between age and income groups. However, 
stickers are used more in large cities than in small towns. It is also noteworthy that many 
people are not interested in reading junk mail, and large amounts of papers are thrown 
away unread. One survey found that more than 20 million Germans – or more than a 
quarter of the population – read junk mail only about once a month or less (Ifak Institut 
2013). Given annual expenditures of about 2.5 billion Euros for unaddressed junk mail in 
Germany (TNS Infratest 2013), there is even a large savings potential for the advertisement 
industry via more precise targeting of consumers, with additional benefits for consumers 
and positive environmental side effects for society as a whole. 
The experiment being reported in this paper was run in Berlin: Germany’s largest city, with 
a population of about 3.4 million people, as well as being the country’s capital and its 
political and cultural centre. Environmentalism, vegetarianism, and sustainable 
consumption, evident through for instance the purchase of organic and fair trade products 
from local food cooperatives, are relatively wide-spread, especially among the young 
possessing a high level of education in the inner city. The city is divided into twelve 
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administrative districts (Bezirke), which are similar in population size: ranging from about 
220,000 in Spandau to about 370,000 in Pankow. These districts strongly differ in size, 
from about 20 km² for Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg to almost 170 km² for Treptow-Köpenick. 
During the cold war, from 1961 to 1989, the city was divided by the Berlin wall. Some of 
the differences between the former Eastern and Western parts stemming from this 
separation have remained, especially in the city’s outskirts. 
5.2.2. Consumer Choice and Status Quo Bias 
It is now widely accepted that conventional economic theory and its homo oeconomicus 
model fail to provide an adequate representation of human behaviour, which is sometimes 
characterized by anomalies and biases rather than utility maximization and (calculative) 
rationality. A large body of research in cognitive psychology and behavioural economics 
over several decades has shown that humans do reciprocate cooperative behaviour even 
when non-cooperation would yield them larger benefits; losses are valued higher than 
gains; and decisions are influenced by framing and priming (Ariely 2009; Kahneman 2011; 
Thaler 1992). Several scholars have called for the use of such findings in public policy and 
for the design of choices more generally (Camerer et al. 2003; Sunstein and Thaler 2003; 
Thaler and Sunstein 2003, 2008). In the United States (Sunstein 2013b) and the United 
Kingdom (Dolan et al. 2010), behavioural economics approaches are now being explicitly 
considered in public policy and administrative processes. Behavioural economics findings 
have also entered the OECD Consumer Policy Toolkit (Lissowska 2011) and are 
considered useful for facilitating pro-environmental behaviour at the national level in 
France (Oullier and Saunero 2011) or the supra-national level in the European Union 
(European Commission, DG Environment 2012). In a widely cited definition, the so-called 
nudge approach of “libertarian paternalism”, which seeks to actively influence the context 
of consumer choice, is described as follows: “A nudge, as we will use the term, is any 
aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a 
mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 
p. 6). 
Nudges point towards the importance of social norms. People follow the behaviour of 
others, a finding that has been exploited in social marketing (Allcott 2011; Burchell et al. 
2013; McKenzie-Mohr 2012; Rettie et al. 2014). A particularly strong phenomenon, which 
is also the focus of this paper, is people’s tendency to avoid change by sticking with the 
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status quo or default options, termed status quo bias in the literature (Anderson 2003; 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). Defaults can become effective through three principal 
mechanisms: (1) implied endorsement, where the default option may be perceived as a 
recommendation; (2) cognitive bias, where deviating from a default may be felt as a loss; 
and (3) inertia or “going with the flow”, where deviating from a default requires additional 
effort (Smith et al. 2013). Consequently, changing defaults can have tremendous effects 
also on pro-environmental behaviour of consumers, as demonstrated by the application of 
green defaults in many domains (Pichert and Katsikopoulos 2008; Sunstein and Reisch 
2013, in press). 
With respect to status quo bias, it has been pointed out that many choices require a default 
option, and default options are often inevitable. For instance, it has been shown that the 
legislative default is a powerful predictor of consent regarding organ donation (Abadie and 
Gay 2006). Yet, there is no simple way to avoid a default in national legislation. Either 
citizens have to opt out or have to opt in from a default. An alternative, over reaching 
societal consensus on all issues involving defaults is to “force people to make their choices 
explicit” (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p. 178). In the organ donation example, one option 
could be forcing people to make a decision regarding donor status when receiving a 
driver’s license, or, more moderately, reminding them of the default option and potential 
benefits from behavioural change in this situation. Along these lines, the green nudge 
presented in this paper uses prompts to facilitate more deliberation in consumer choice. It 
aims at reducing status quo bias and improving consumer sovereignty by (1) reducing the 
effort to reach an active decision and (2) confronting consumers with a forced choice.  
5.2.3. Hypotheses and Treatments 
Three groups of consumers can be distinguished regarding their attitudes towards “No junk 
mail” stickers: People in the first group are not interested in stickers at all, either because 
they want to receive ads, they do not believe in the effectiveness of stickers, or they do not 
want to use a sticker for some other reason. People in the second group do not want to 
receive ads and they are already using a sticker. Meanwhile, those in the third group do not 
want to receive ads and are interested in using a sticker, but they do not yet use one for 
some reason. During the experiment, groups one and three – all consumers not using a 
sticker – were treated, although the intervention was targeted at group three. Our 
presumption was that, for this third group, the adoption rate of stickers would increase if 
they were made available in the right place at the right time, prompting a decision. 
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Otherwise, this group, adhering to the status quo, would not adopt stickers. We reasoned 
that a good place and time to think about stickers would be when checking for new mail in 
front of the mailbox. Hence, as part of our study, households received stickers to test the 
first, more general, hypothesis:  
H1: People will attach stickers to their mailboxes if these are easily available and it 
requires little effort to do so.  
The second hypothesis asks about the importance of a forced choice option: 
H2: Forcing consumers to decide either for or against receiving ads increases uptake as 
compared to a scenario in which choices can be more easily avoided or postponed. 
To test the first hypothesis, in two different treatments, all households not already using a 
sticker received a short note with some background information on the initiative and a 
sticker. In the first treatment, henceforth called ACTIVE, stickers and notes were put into 
the mailboxes. People had to attach stickers themselves, thus allowing postponement of the 
decision, for instance by taking the sticker into their apartment. In the second treatment, 
henceforth called FORCED, stickers and notes were placed on the outside of the mailbox. 
Stickers were attached to mailboxes in a way that would allow people to either easily 
remove or permanently attach them to their mailboxes, thus forcing them to decide on an 
option. In the following section, the method and experimental procedure are explained in 
greater detail. 
5.3. Method and Experimental Design 
It is often difficult to identify causal relationships in observational data, especially if these 
are cross-sectional. Particularly in the environmental domain, survey data are also prone to 
all kinds of misreporting, such as with social desirability bias. Economic experiments or 
quasi-experimental data can help overcoming these challenges by observing people’s 
actions under actual incentives, and causality can then be established through the 
exogenous manipulation of factors of interest under controlled conditions (Parmeter and 
Pope 2013). It may be useful here to distinguish between four types of experiments in 
economics: (1) conventional lab, (2) artefactual field, (3) framed field, and (4) natural field 
(Harrison and List 2004). In natural field experiments, sometimes just termed ‘field 
experiments’, participant behaviour is observed in a context that is not artificially created 
or manipulated by the researcher. Typically, subjects also do not know that they are part of 
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an experimental study. When moving from the lab to the field or vice versa, researchers 
face trade-offs of control and external validity. Lab experiments allow for control of many 
factors that influence decision-making, whereas field experiments allow potentially greater 
external validity and obtaining of observational data in specific contexts. Under this 
typology, the experiment reported in this paper qualifies as a (natural) field experiment.  
The experiment was run in September and October 2012 in Berlin. Sampling covered all 
twelve districts of the city, with the number of mailboxes roughly proportional to a 
district’s population size and, wherever possible, also proportional to size within sub-
divisions (Stadtteile) of these districts. Data on population size were taken from official 
statistics (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2012). It was not possible to obtain a full 
random sample of households or houses due to the unavailability of population data at this 
level. Within a district, a couple of arbitrarily selected streets were covered by the study. 
Although this has resulted in some spatial clustering, we believe it is fair to say that the 
sample represents the population of Berlin relatively well. More importantly, using a 
between-subjects design, assignment to each treatment was randomized at the house level, 
thus ensuring an optimal experimental design. 
As part of the study, households were supplied with a small sticker in coloured print that 
was 35 mm by 70 mm in size (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Sticker used in the study 
 
Stickers did not display any brand or logo and avoided identification with any 
organization. However, they did have an environmental framing to trigger pro-
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environmental preferences and to highlight the relationship between avoiding junk mail 
and reducing negative environmental impacts. To increase salience and uptake, stickers 
were distributed in combination with small flyers stating “Attach the sticker – Save paper – 
Protect the environment” in German (Figure 6).   
Figure 6: Flyer used in the study 
These flyers, printed on black and white paper and 75 mm by 105 mm in size, also served 
as additional reminders, which have been found to be effective for achieving behavioural 
change in other studies (Cadena and Schoar 2011; Garner 2005; Karlan et al. 2010). 
In the distribution phase, data were collected at the level of each house, including the total 
number of mailboxes and the number of mailboxes already equipped with a sticker. After 
twelve to sixteen days, houses were revisited to note down the main outcome variable: the 
number of households that had fully attached the sticker to their mailboxes. The study 
covered 125 houses with a total of 1,327 mailboxes. Out of these, 386, or 29.09 percent, 
were already equipped with a sticker. In total, then, 941 mailboxes did not have a sticker, 
and only these received one as part of our study in one of the treatments. In 57 houses the 
sticker was put into the mailbox (ACTIVE condition), while in 68 houses stickers were 
attached outside (FORCED condition). 
5.4. Results 
As a first step, it seems useful to compare the proportion of stickers in our sample with 
other samples. The 2012 figures from a large national survey on the adoption of “No junk 
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mail” stickers (IfD 2013) show that, at that time, from a sample of 26,063 people, 25.1 
percent used a sticker. Although there is a statistically significant difference to our figure of 
29.09 percent (Two-tailed two-sample test of proportions; z = -3.2602; p = 0.0011), it 
should also be pointed out that the same 2012 survey found 33 percent of respondents to 
use a sticker in cities with a population of more than 100,000 (Table 18). Taken together, it 
is fair to say that no substantial difference is to be found between the two figures and that 
the baseline adoption rate is similar to what others have found in survey-based research.  
Looking at treatment effects and analyzing the data at the mailbox level reveals that 81 out 
of 507 (15.98 percent) of subjects attached the sticker in the ACTIVE condition, as 
compared to 94 out of 434 (21.66 percent) in the FORCED condition. The difference in 
proportions between treatments is statistically significant at the five percent level (One-
tailed two-sample test of proportions; z = 2.2334; p = 0.0128), suggesting higher 
effectiveness of the FORCED treatment. 
The following table displays selected variables of the collected data, disaggregated by 
neighbourhoods. 
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Mitte 104 22 82 45 37 20 10 10 42 21.15% 24.39% 22.22% 27.03% 40.38% 
Pankow 178 68 110 51 59 32 11 21 100 38.20% 29.09% 21.57% 35.59% 56.18% 
Reinickendorf 72 24 48 23 25 6 3 3 30 33.33% 12.50% 13.04% 12.00% 41.67% 
Spandau 91 26 65 28 37 12 3 9 38 28.57% 18.46% 10.71% 24.32% 41.76% 
Charlottenbur
g-
Wilmersdorf 182 82 100 78 22 11 8 3 93 45.05% 11.00% 10.26% 13.64% 51.10% 
Friedrichshain
-Kreuzberg 82 11 71 50 21 25 14 11 36 13.41% 35.21% 28.00% 52.38% 43.90% 
Schöneberg-
Tempelhof 122 31 91 47 44 18 8 10 49 25.41% 19.78% 17.02% 22.73% 40.16% 
Marzahn-
Hellersdorf 68 0 68 38 30 6 6 0 6 0.00% 8.82% 15.79% 0.00% 8.82% 
Neukölln 124 38 86 43 43 13 6 7 51 30.65% 15.12% 13.95% 16.28% 41.13% 
Treptow-
Köpenick 113 44 69 31 38 10 8 2 54 38.94% 14.49% 25.81% 5.26% 47.79% 
Steglitz-
Zehlendorf 81 0 81 37 44 16 3 13 16 0.00% 19.75% 8.11% 29.55% 19.75% 
Lichtenberg 110 40 70 36 34 6 1 5 46 36.36% 8.57% 2.78% 14.71% 41.82% 
TOTAL 1,327 386 941 507 434 175 81 94 561 29.09% 18.60% 15.98% 21.66% 42.28% 
Source: own calculations 
 
The columns on the relative frequencies of uptake refer to the number of mailboxes 
treated. It can be seen that uptake was particularly high in the inner city, headed by 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, Germany’s stronghold of the Green Party28, with about 35 
percent of subjects attaching the stickers provided for them by the study. With the 
exception of Marzahn-Hellersdorf and Steglitz-Zehlendorf, at the end of the study more 
than 40 percent of sampled consumers were using a sticker in all districts. These figures 
indicate a substantial increase – in most cases of more than ten percent – in the use of 
stickers, compared to both our baseline of 29 percent or the large-scale survey baseline 
(IfD 2013) of 33 percent. 
To better understand differences at the district level, Table 20 shows the lower and upper 
bounds of 95 percent confidence-level intervals (exact binomial distribution) of the 
proportion of stickers before and after treatment.  














Mitte .1375726 .3025688 .3087472 .5045677 
Pankow .3103478 .4576965 .4855874 .6359152 
Reinickendorf .2265634 .4542961 .3015212 .5388867 
Spandau .1958658 .3899882 .31501 .5256721 
Charlottenburg-
Wilmersdorf .3768553 .5258808 .4359604 .5856539 
Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg .0689121 .2273606 .3295502 .5530336 
Schöneberg-
Tempelhof .179633 .3408757 .3139321 .4942378 
Marzahn-
Hellersdorf 0 .052803 .0330725 .1822232 
Neukölln .2268317 .3955711 .3237369 .5031819 
28 In the 2013 general elections, Hans-Christian Ströbele, running in this district, received roughly 40 percent 
of the first vote, being Germany’s only candidate of the Green Party to gain a direct mandate for parliament. 
In comparison, on average the Green Party received 8.4 percent of the second votes in Germany in the same 
elections.  
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Treptow-
Köpenick .2990672 .4856416 .3830371 .5739031 
Steglitz-
Zehlendorf 0 .0445203 .1173315 .3008627 
Lichtenberg .2740242 .4607895 .3248276 .5160541 
Source: own calculations 
Statistically significant differences at the 5 percent level between districts exist when there 
is no overlap between confidence intervals. It can be seen that, before treatment, especially 
Steglitz-Zehlendorf and Marzahn-Hellersdorf have substantially lower proportions of 
stickers that are also statistically significant from all other districts. Also Friedrichshain-
Kreuzberg has a low ratio of stickers, which is statistically significantly different from 
proportions in Pankow, Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, and Treptow-Köpenick. Further, 
Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, the district with the highest proportion of mailboxes with 
stickers before treatment, is statistically different from Mitte, which has a comparatively 
low proportion.  
After treatment, Steglitz-Zehlendorf and Marzahn-Hellersdorf are still statistically 
significantly different from all other districts and have a much lower proportion of stickers. 
Yet the differences between all other districts have evened out following the treatment, 
with no further statistically significant differences remaining at the five percent level.     
The data can also be analyzed at the house level, which could be important with respect to 
evaluating the treatment’s up-scaling potential, as landlords would appear to have an 
interest in reducing junk mail. In the following table, we present summary statistics and 
compare the proportion of stickers at the house level between treatments. 
Table 21: Summary statistics of proportions at the house level by treatments 
Variable    N Median Mean SD Min Max 
Proportion of stickers per house 
ACTIVE 
68 .0732323 .1437085 .1784171 0 .6666667 




       
Source: own calculations 
Due to the high number of zeros in the sample – indicating houses where nobody attached 
a sticker – there is no statistical difference in medians between treatments (Rows 2 and 3 in 
Table 21; Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test; z = 0.595; p = 0.5517).  
5.5. Discussion 
First and foremost, the results demonstrate that people can be motivated to reduce paper 
waste from junk mail, flyers, and menus by a simple intervention – making stickers easily 
available. From the 1,327 mailboxes in our sample, 386 (29.09 percent) had a sticker 
attached before our intervention. After we distributed the stickers, this figure increased 
substantially by 175 to 561 stickers, meaning 42.28 percent of all mailboxes. This is 
equivalent to an absolute increase of 13.19 percent and a relative increase of 45.34 percent. 
Clearly, this leads to acceptance of the first, more general, hypothesis H1.  
The two treatments differed in terms of their uptake. With a difference in proportions of 
more than five percent – which is also statistically significant at the five percent level – we 
accept H2. In line with the literature on status quo bias, going with the forced choice is 
more effective as an intervention than simply distributing stickers for free. Our example of 
forcing consumers to decide either for or against a sticker is a relatively harmless choice 
that is easily reversible and reversible at low cost. Further, the consequences of the 
decision, at least on an individual level, are not very substantial. In our view, these criteria 
will also be useful when evaluating forced choice interventions in other contexts. If 
decisions can be made at low cost and they are easily reversible, making a deliberate 
choice by being forced to decide seems to be a preferable option, especially when the costs 
of the intervention are small (a simple sticker in our example) and the consequences of 
sticking with a default are large (30 kg of paper waste per household each year in our 
example). 
Based on this estimate of 30 kg of junk mail per German household each year (WWF 
2011), we calculate that about 5,250 kg – 175 new stickers x 30 kg – less junk mail will be 
distributed annually due to our intervention. Projecting these figures for all 1.9 million 
households in Berlin, reveals a large saving potential. Up-scaling the intervention for the 
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whole city, assuming that 13.19 percent, or roughly 250,000 households more, would adopt 
stickers, could reduce paper waste by up to 7,500 tons per year. This could also help 
consumers to save time and money on waste disposal. Handled properly, the advertisement 
industry could save costs on junk mail that is thrown away unread without having an effect 
on potential customers. In addition, society as a whole could enjoy environmental benefits, 
assuming that the production of ads is adjusted accordingly.  
In this context, it is important to consider who could have an interest in applying the 
“green nudge” presented in this paper. In Germany, landlords would perhaps have a great 
interest in preventing waste, with the aim of saving costs for cleaning up and disposal of 
discarded junk mail. In many instances, tenants receive “No junk mail” stickers along with 
their rental contracts. A key problem, however, is that the decision to attach the sticker can 
be postponed or the sticker can get lost somewhere among their files. It directly follows 
from our study that landlords should rather attach a sticker half-way to their new tenants’ 
mailboxes. They may even change the default status by attaching a sticker or using two-
way signs. It would also be interesting to see how uptake of stickers would change if these 
were to be distributed under the landlord’s authority. Further, it would be important to look 
at variations of the interventions we have presented here. In particular, it could be 
interesting to develop an (experimental) test of interaction among neighbours. Clearly, in 
the way our intervention was designed, observations are not fully independent from each 
other. If many neighbours attach stickers to their mailboxes, this may motivate others to 
follow. Attaching stickers could then be perceived as a social norm. Ultimately, our design 
cannot control for such spillover effects and interactions among neighbours. With more 
resources available, one could treat only one mailbox per house to rule out such effects.  
5.6. Summary and Conclusion  
In this paper we have reported results from a field experiment on the adoption of “No junk 
mail” stickers. We have found that people are more likely to use stickers when they are 
forced to make a fairly simple and reversible decision about using them. It has also been 
pointed out that forced choice is a preferable option if (1) the intervention is cheap, (2) 
potential benefits for society are large, (3) potential negative consequences for individual 
consumers are low, and (4) choices are easily reversible. If all four conditions are met, little 
can be said against forcing consumers to become explicit about their choices. 
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It seems an open question, and an interesting task for future research, to develop a test for a 
finer-grained separation of the status quo bias effect found in our study. It could be useful 
to differentiate between implied endorsement, social norms, loss aversion, or inertia as 
distinct mechanisms that might be responsible for consumers’ decisions. Here, we were not 
able to separate these. In future research, a promising modification could be to change the 
framing of stickers. Here, we have used an environmentally framed sticker which may not 
have been appealing for everyone in our sample. Indeed, the low uptake of stickers in some 
areas of the city whose populations are rather reluctant regarding environmentalism (e.g., 
Marzahn-Hellersdorf) indicates that framing may be an important factor contributing to 
success or failure. Research in this direction could provide further insights on personalized 
defaults. There is a strong notion that social norms and implied endorsement may matter in 
such instances. Also, it could be helpful to extend the methods employed in this paper for 
exploring the motivations of consumers in greater detail. Experiments may be combined 
with qualitative interviews or surveys to learn more about the diverse possible drivers for 
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investigating how participation in a two person prisoner’s dilemma game affects pro-
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6.1. Introduction 
Over the last two and a half decades, our understanding of self-governed common pool 
resource management has improved substantially. The use of multiple methods has played 
an important role in this process (Poteete et al. 2010). Case study analysis has led the way 
to develop new theory (Ostrom 1990), showing that a “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 
1968) is not an inevitable outcome of common pool resource settings. Lab experiments 
have advanced our understanding of the role communication, punishment, or rewards play 
in shaping behaviour in social dilemma games (e.g., Ostrom et al. 1994; Fehr and Gächter 
2000).  
For the last fifteen years, economic experiments on common pool resource management 
have been brought to the field to understand cross-cultural differences in fairness norms 
and to reduce bias from so-called WEIRD (Western Educated Industrialized Rich 
Democratic) subjects or abstract decision-situations (Henrich et al. 2004; Henrich et al. 
2010). As pointed out by scholars, adding local context to the game is important because it 
“is not the case that abstract, context-free experiments provide more general findings if the 
context itself is relevant to the performance of subjects” (Harrison and List 2004).  
Today, field experiments are widely applied, and increasingly used to inform policy-
making (Viceisza 2012). Many experimentalists, especially from the “Colombian school” 
around Juan-Camilo Cárdenas, notice positive effects of game playing on collective 
management of common pool resources (Cardenas and Carpenter 2005; Lopez 2008). On a 
related note, the effect of playing games in teaching is widely studied – with mixed 
evidence (Randel et al. 1992). In Economics, class room games have a long history 
(Dimand 2005) and can improve teaching effectiveness, for instance in Environmental 
Economics classes (Frank 1997). For the field settings described above, such type of 
evidence is absent. It is an open question whether economic games have any short and/or 
long term effect on behaviour in environmental management. If such effects exist, one 




A key practical challenge to test the effect of game playing in the field is to find and to 
measure an adequate outcome variable. A recent large-scale research project, implemented 
in several Indian villages, studies the effect of playing “water management games” on geo-
physical variables such as the water table (Meinzen-Dick 2013; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2014). 
At a smaller scale and in a different context, our paper follows a similar approach. In a 
simple experiment, we investigate how being paired with a “cooperator” or “defector” in a 
two person prisoner’s dilemma game affects cooperative behaviour in the short term, as 
measured by a post-game anonymous donation to an environmental foundation. According 
to our general hypothesis, the existence and direction of effects promoted by game playing 
depends on whether such an experience is positive or negative, i.e., whether it is an 
experience of cooperation or defection, respectively. The two types of players in the 
prisoner’s dilemma game, i.e., cooperator vs. defector, serve us as treatments which we 
compare to a control group of participants who do not play the game. This allows us to (1) 
test whether social dilemma game playing can have a short term effect on environmentally 
cooperative behaviour by itself and (2) the direction of such potential change.  
The paper sheds light on the merits and demerits of conducting social dilemma games in 
the field for inducing behavioural change. Also from personal experience, we know that 
conducting experiments in difficult contexts may evoke or aggravate conflicts in a 
particular community. Such effects could potentially violate ethical principles in 
experimental research (cf. Teele 2014). With the aim to develop adequate field tools built 
on economic games, it is, thus, important to develop these carefully. This paper can be seen 
as an attempt to shed some light in that direction.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce the 
experiment, develop the hypotheses, and describe the sample. Then, we present and discuss 
the results of the game. Finally, we summarize and conclude.  
6.2. The study 
Conflicts over natural resources are the norm rather than the exception. Rarely will one 
encounter empirical settings where, in one way or the other, distributional conflicts over 
common pool resources do not prevail. When extraction cannot be monitored and 
agreements cannot be enforced, resource users may find themselves trapped in a situation 
where individually rational behaviour makes everybody worse off, i.e., a social dilemma. 
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In the behavioural sciences a large literature is concerned with the question of how pro-
environmental behaviour can be advanced. One approach promotes the use of “green 
nudges” – small changes in the choice architecture that maintain freedom of decision 
makers – with the aim to make the socially desirable choice easier (Lucas et al. 2008; 
Osbaldiston and Schott 2012; Sunstein and Reisch 2013, 2014; Croson and Treich 2014). 
There is also a large experimental literature on charitable donations (e.g., Shang and 
Croson 2005, Landry et al. 2006) that seeks to identify social factors that determine the 
size of contributions. Our study is related to this literature as it seeks to identify factors that 
influence environmental behaviour and uses a charitable donation as an outcome variable. 
Yet, the broader aim is to develop experimental games into educational tools for 
application in field settings.  
Experimental Economics try to reproduce these real-life dilemma settings in framed field 
experiments to study cause, effect, and solution mechanisms with greater external validity 
(Harrison and List 2004). One of the most replicated findings in Experimental Economics 
is that people participating in repeated social dilemma games start with initially high levels 
of cooperation; however, in the absence of sanctioning, rewards, or communication, 
cooperation typically breaks down over time (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Balliet 2010).29 The 
simplest version of a social dilemma game is the two person prisoner’s dilemma. In this 
game, independent of the other player’s strategy, it is individually rational to choose the 
non-cooperative strategy. This behaviour leads to a Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium; both 
players would be better off if they could make binding agreements on cooperation. 
In our experiment, we let a group of participants engage in such a prisoner’s dilemma 
game. Rather than in the outcomes of the game itself, we are interested in understanding 
how different experience of participation affects subsequent behaviour. If positive effects 
could be demonstrated, such games may, indeed, be helpful in the field. We formulate the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: Positive experience – being paired with a cooperative player – in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game results in positive behavioural change, as measured by a donation, 
after the game. 
29 There is a large and converging literature on pro-social behaviour in Economics and Social Psychology. 
For a recent review and comparison of these two branches focusing specifically on pro-environmental 
behaviour see Turaga et al. (2010). 
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H2: Negative experience – being paired with a non-cooperative player – in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game results in negative behavioural change, as measured by a donation, 
after the game. 
To test these hypotheses we have developed the following experiment. In a first step, 
subjects play a prisoner’s dilemma game which, for easier understanding, is framed as a 
decision to invest in a common project. In a second step, subjects play a framed dictator 
game which generates the main variable of interest. Monetary payoffs of the prisoner’s 
dilemma are depicted in Table 22.  
Table 22: Payoff Table Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 Player 1 
Invest  Don’t invest 
Player 2 
Invest 2 Euro, 2 Euro 3 Euro, 0 Euro 
Don’t invest 0 Euro, 3 Euro 1 Euro, 1 Euro 
Source: own elaboration 
In each cell, the first number denotes Player 1’s payoff, and the second number denotes 
Player 2’s payoff. The social optimum is that both players invest, and in (Nash) 
equilibrium none of the players invests. Participants in this game are compared to a group 
of people who has not played the prisoner’s dilemma game, but are still asked to donate. 
For all groups, the outcome variable we study is the amount of an anonymous donation to 
an environmental foundation, which can also be understood as a dictator game (Blanco et 
al. 2012). The environmental foundation chosen is the “Deutsche Bundesstiftung Umwelt” 
(DBU), a foundation active in promoting research and project implementation concerned 
with environmental protection.30  
We played the game with 45 participants whom we recruited during an open door event at 
a German university. Every year, on a Saturday in late spring or early summer, the city of 
Berlin organizes the so-called “Lange Nacht der Wissenschaften” (long night of sciences), 
during which several university and other research institutes open their doors and present 
30 We have selected this foundation to add environmental context to the game. At the same time we were 
interested in choosing an organization that does not evoke strong emotions in subjects. If we would have 
chosen a large and well-known organization such as Greenpeace, a participant’s attitude towards this 
organization may have dominated the donation decision. Ultimately, this would have resulted in more 
variation in the data and less statistical power. Every participant has received a handout describing the work 
of DBU. It was made clear to participants that none of the involved researchers was affiliated with DBU or 
would in any way benefit from the donation. The handout is available from the authors on request. 
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their research and teaching program to the interested public. Typically, the event starts in 
the afternoon and lasts until midnight. Our experiment took place at a small stall presenting 
research on social-ecological systems, including posters and further information on the use 
of framed field experiments for their analysis.31 Visitors of the event were approached with 
a small standardized text presenting the idea of the game and asking for participation.32 It 
was explained to them that, as a compensation for participation, everybody would receive 
five Euros. Everybody was also told that the reward, or parts of it, could be donated, and a 
“voting booth” was prepared and visible to visitors for this purpose. Donations were only 
matched to questionnaire data and assigned treatment using a code, making it impossible to 
link size of the donations to names. If visitors agreed to participate, they were presented 
with further instructions, printed out on paper. These instructions explained that with a 16 
out of 45 probability, they would have to fill a small questionnaire; with a 29 out of 45 
probability they would play a game – the prisoner’s dilemma game explained above. To 
maintain anonymity and to reduce logistical demands, visitors playing the prisoner’s 
dilemma game were paired with student players with whom we played the game in two 
lectures in the week before the event.  
The students were told that we would play the game with visitors at the open door event 
and that they would receive payoffs from the game in the week after the event. They 
received written instructions depicting the payoffs, similar to those of the visitors.33 Out of 
the 29 students who participated, 17 played cooperatively, i.e., “Invest,” and 12 played 
uncooperatively, i.e., “Don’t invest.” Note that students were also paid, but their decisions 
are not part of the analysis of this study. The sole purpose of students’ decisions was to 
assign visitors in the event to the “cooperation experience” vs. “defection experience” 
treatments in a meaningful and random way. Also note that beside the 29 visitors paired 
31 A recent overview and a typology of such experiments can be found in Rommel (2014). Note that in the 
classification of Harrison and List (2004) our (donation) experiment can be regarded as a (natural) field 
experiment. In the donation part, subjects – although they play a game as part of our study – do not know that 
they are participating in an experiment on the effect of playing or not playing a game. Arguably, the context 
is rather artificial though. The prisoner’s dilemma game played by subjects qualifies as an artefactual field 
experiment, however. 
32 An English translation of the text reads as follows: “We are a group of resource economists from this 
university and we frequently conduct experiments to study behaviour in environmental decision-making. 
Today, we would like to give you the chance to participate in such an experiment to give you the opportunity 
to learn about our work. If you are interested, we will play – with some probability – a small game with you. 
It will not take more than 15 minutes. For your participation you will get compensated with five Euros. If you 
want or if feel for some reason uncomfortable taking this money you may anonymously donate this sum or 
parts of it to an environmental foundation.” All additional materials and texts are available from the authors 
on request.  
33 Students received English instructions, whereas visitors received everything in German. We have spent 
great care, however, that, apart from language, instructions of the prisoner’s dilemma game are the same for 
both parties. 
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with student players, a control group of 16 visitors complemented the experimental design 
which is summarized in Table 23. 
Table 23: Experimental Design and Procedure 
In total 45 visitors participate, everybody receives 5 Euro 
After a short general introduction, participants are randomly assigned to one of three 













 Rules of the game are read out and handed over in written 
form (Step 2) 
Decision in Prisoners’ dilemma game (Step 3) 
Receive information on game outcome; get paid; put 
payments to your pocket (Step 4) 
Receive envelope with five Euros; possibility to donate (Step 5) 
Sign receipt (Step 6) 
Short one-page questionnaire 
(Step 7) 
Short two-page questionnaire (with three additional questions 
for those who played the game) (Step 7) 
Source: own elaboration 
It can be seen that steps 1 and steps 5 to 7 were common to all 45 participants: everyone 
was approached with the same text, everyone received an envelope with five Euros34; 
everyone signed a receipt for the money; and everyone filled a small self-administered 
questionnaire. Participants in the CONTROL group went only through these stages. 
Participants in the other two treatments played the game in between those stages. The rules 
of the prisoner’s dilemma game were explained to them, and they were informed that, to 
calculate their payoffs after their decisions, they would be paired with a student whose 
34 In all cases the envelope contained one 10 Cent coin, two 20 Cent coins, one 50 Cent coin, two 1 Euro 
coins, and one 2 Euro coin (= 5 Euro in total). This allowed participants to choose any amount between 0 and 
5.00 Euro in steps of 10 Cents. Like all other decisions, donations were made fully in private and a voting 
booth was provided for this purpose. In this booth we placed a box into which subjects should put the 
envelopes, even when these are empty, i.e. when all money was taken home. 
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monetary payoff would also depend on the decision made in the game. Participants did not 
know anything about the distribution of cooperators or defectors among students. They 
were informed about what participants were paid according to the payoffs presented in 
Table 22 above, depending on the decision of the student with whom they were matched, 
as well as their own decision. After this, they were informed about the game outcome, they 
received payments in cash (if any), and they were asked to put away the money they 
received (if any). Table 24 describes the sample and the variables used in the results part of 
the paper and presents some summary statistics on the participants. 
Table 24: Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
Variable Name Description  N Mean SD Min Max 
PLAYSGAME = 1 if either COOPGAME or 
DEFECTGAME treatment 
(participant plays the game) 
45 0.64 0.48 0 1 
COOPPARTNER = 1 if COOPGAME treatment 
(paired with cooperator in the 
game) 
45 0.38 0.49 0 1 
FEMALE = 1 if participant is female 45 0.51 0.51 0 1 
YEAROFBIRTH = year of birth 44 1977.25 12.52 1947 1994 
UNIVDEGREE = 1 if participant holds 
university degree 
45 0.69 0.47 0 1 
INCOME = 1 if monthly household 
income is 2,000 Euros or more 
43 0.56 0.50 0 1 
ENVPROBLEMS 5-point Likert scale agreement 
with statement “I am interested 
in environmental issues.”  
(1 = high agreement; 5 = low 
agreement) 
45 1.36 0.61 1 3 
ENVEVERYDAY 5-point Likert scale agreement 
with statement “In my daily 
decision-making, I consider the 
environmental impact.”  
(1 = high agreement; 5 = low 




DONBEHAV 5-point Likert scale agreement 
with statement “I regularly 
donate money.”  
(1 = high agreement; 5 = low 
agreement) 
44 2.68 1.34 1 5 
KNOWDBU = 1 if participant knows 
“Deutsche Bundesstiftung 
Umwelt” (DBU) 
44 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Source: own calculation 
It can be seen that from the 45 subjects participating, 22 were male and 23 female. On 
average, subjects were highly educated with more than two thirds holding a university 
degree. The average year of birth was about 1977, which is approximately equal to an 
average age of 36 years. Participants’ households are rather well off, with more than half of 
the sample having a monthly income of 2,000 Euros of more. Most people agree with the 
statements “I am interested in environmental issues” and “In my daily decision-making, I 
consider the environmental impact.” Most people do not regularly donate money. The 
environmental foundation, we have selected for the donation part, was known by about a 
quarter of participants.  
6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Game results and treatment effects 
The vast majority of participants in the experiment – 22 out of 29 – cooperated in the 
prisoners’ dilemma game. Matching them with the student sample resulted in the following 
outcomes (Table 25). 
Table 25: Frequency Table Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
 Visitor at open door event 
Invest Don’t invest Total 
Student 
Invest 13 4 17 
Don’t invest 9 3 12 
Total 22 7 29 
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Source: own elaboration 
It can be seen that most of the students and visitor do not behave rational and selfish. 
Roughly half of the matched pairs (13) achieve the socially optimal outcome and only 
three matches result in the Nash equilibrium.35 Table 26 describes the main treatment 
effects on the key outcome variable and some useful binary transformations – the incidence 
of zero donations, of full donations, and of donations of more than five Euros.36 
Table 26: Outcomes by Treatments 






Mean Donation in 
Euro (SD) 








7 subjects; 43.75%  6 subjects; 50.00%  10 subjects; 58.83%  
Donations of more 
than five Euro 
(Absolute; relative 
frequency) 
0 subjects; 0.00 %  0 subjects; 0.00 %  3 subjects; 7.65% 
(all of them 
cooperators 
themselves)  
Source: own calculations 
35 There are various possibilities for explaining the larger proportion of cooperators in the visitor sample. For 
instance, visitors may care less about rewards because they are wealthier; they may also have lower 
opportunity costs of time in the context of the exhibition and self-select into a study which they may find 
interesting for other reasons. Note that we are not interested in this difference, however. The student sample 
serves us just as a source of exogenous cooperative and uncooperative decisions to be matched with visitors 
for practical reasons. 
36 When we opened the box containing the envelopes with donations, we have found three envelopes 
containing more money than the five Euros everyone was equipped with. Subjects were asked to put away 
the money they earned in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Because the donation was anonymous and took place 
in the voting booth we could not control how much people actually put into the envelopes. We could, thus, 
also not rule that somebody was adding more than the five Euros to the envelope. In fact, all those three 
envelopes contained seven Euros. In all three cases participants have played the game and in all three cases 
the outcome was C, C (Invest, Invest), i.e. subjects have received two Euros from the game. We thus believe 
that these three participants have added the two Euros gained in the game to the donation. 
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It can be seen from the table that compared to the CONTROL treatment, donations 
increase by 47 Cents in the DEFECTGAME treatment. Compared to DEFECTGAME, 
another 86 Cents more are donated in the COOPGAME treatment. Comparing the 
CONTROL to the COOPGAME treatment, we observe a difference of 1.14 Euros. Owed 
to the small sample size, differences in medians between the three treatments are 
statistically not significant at the five percent level (Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations 
test; d. f. = 2; χ² = 2.654; p = 0.2653).  
Similarly, the proportion of zero donations steadily decreases from the CONTROL to the 
COOPGAME treatment. Formal testing of the differences of approximately 20 percent 
between CONTROL and COOPGAME reveals that the difference is statistically significant 
at the ten percent level (One-sided two-sample test of proportion; z = 1.5308; p = 
0.0629).37 In line with these results, the proportion of full donations (of five Euros and 
more) increases in the experiment.38 Three participants donated more than the five Euros 
they were endowed with. This difference is statistically significant at the five percent level 
(One-sided two-sample test of proportion; z = -1.7624; p = 0.0390) between the 
CONTROL and COOPGAME treatments and statistically significant on the ten percent 
level between the DEFECTGAME and COOPGAME treatments (z = -1.5369; p = 0.0622).  
Summing up, independently from the particular measure, participating in the prisoner’s 
dilemma game had a positive effect on altruistic behaviour in the dictator’s game. The 
positive effect was larger for participants who had a positive cooperative experience than 
for participants who were confronted with a negative cooperative experience. In the next 
section we will challenge these findings by controlling for socio-demographic 
heterogeneity, which is of particular importance due to the fairly small sample and the 
absence of pre-game cooperation tests. 
6.3.2. Game decisions and socio-economic heterogeneity  
Table 27 presents three different specifications of OLS regression models where the 
amount donated is the dependent variable. The independent variables are presented in 
Table 24 above. 
37 The test statistics and p-values for the difference between CONTROL and DEFECTGAME are z = 0.5318 
and p = 0.2974 and z = 0.9392 with p = 0.1738 for the difference between DEFECTGAME and 
COOPGAME.   
38 The test results are z = -0.3282, p = 0.3714 when comparing CONROL and DEFECTGAME; z = -0.4706, 
p = 0.3190 when comparing DEFECTGAME and COOPGAME; and z = -0.8659, p = 0.1933 when 
comparing CONTROL and COOPGAME.  
121 
                                                 
 
Table 27: OLS Regression Models on Donations 



































































N 45 41 42 
adj. R2 0.029 0.371 0.343 
F 1.6541 3.3611*** 5.2836*** 
Source: own calculations; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
The first model includes only the randomized treatment variables as independent variables. 
Hence, the constant term is equal to the average donation in the CONTROL treatment (cf. 
Table 26). The coefficient of PLAYSGAME can be interpreted as the effect of playing the 
game, i.e., the joint effect of COOPGAME and DEFECTGAME. The coefficient of 
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COOPGAME is the additional amount donated as an effect of being paired with a student 
playing cooperatively. Columns two and three also control for socio-economic 
heterogeneity from the survey data. While model 2 includes the full set of independent 
variables, model 3 is a more parsimonious specification.  
Model 1 performs rather poorly in terms of F-statistic and R² value. The models in the last 
two columns, however, show relatively high and statistically significant F-statistics, 
indicating a good overall explanatory power. The same applies to the relatively high R² 
values which show that more than one third of the variance in donations can be explained 
by assignment to treatment and observed socio-economic heterogeneity.  
It can be seen that in all columns, treatment effects are positive and relatively large. Owed 
to the small sample, they are not statistically significant, however. In all models, the effects 
of PLAYSGAME and COOPGAME add up to more than 90 Cent. In other words, in all 
three specifications, players who make a positive experience donate substantially more 
than those who do not play the game. More than 65 Cent of this sum can be attributed to 
the difference between the positive and negative experience.   
The second column shows that a relatively large gender gap exists in donations: women 
donate about 90 Cents less. Models (2) and (3) show that the younger a participant, the 
more she donates. This effect is quite substantial. An increase in YEAROFBIRTH from 
1960 to 1990 would, ceteris paribus, result in an increase in donation of about 2.75 Euros 
in model (3). Participants holding a university degree donate about one Euro less in the 
game. Very large, and statistically significant, effects can be observed for the income 
variable. Subjects with monthly incomes of more than 2,000 also donate substantially 
higher amounts – more than 2.50 Euros on average. Large and statistical significant effects 
can also be found for the coefficient of ENVPROBLEMS. A one level increase in 
disagreement reduces donations by more than 1.50 Euros. People concerned with the 
environment in their daily lives, donate smaller amounts. The effect of regular donations 
on donations in the game is rather small: as one would expect participants who typically 
donate also donate somewhat more in our experiment. We have also controlled whether 
subjects are affected by their knowledge of DBU, the environmental foundation the money 




Earlier in this paper, we have formulated two hypotheses. First, we were interested in 
testing whether making a “positive experience” from being paired with a cooperative 
player, raises donations in the second phase of our experiment (H1). Second, we expected 
that a “negative experience” would decrease donations when compared to a control group 
(H2). The results just presented tend to support H1, but reject H2. Playing the game has a 
positive net effect, regardless of the absence of external intervention to steer learning. The 
effect is larger when subjects are paired with a cooperative partner. These results also hold 
when we control for observed socio-economic heterogeneity using regression analysis. The 
effect is rather small and statistically not significant, however. Socio-economic 
heterogeneity is more important in explaining donation behaviour in our game. Especially 
the young, wealthy, and those interested in environmental issues, donate substantially 
higher amounts, and large proportions of the observed variation can be explained by 
personal characteristics.  
It is interesting that people who care about environmental issues in their daily lives donate 
less in the game. One may interpret this as the possibility to substitute monetary donations 
for pro-environmental behaviour in daily decision-making. Another interpretation would be 
that participants are aware of the crowding-out problem of intrinsic motivation (Cardenas 
et al. 2000; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Vollan 2008). Conceptual work differentiates at 
least four types of environmentally significant behaviour (Stern 2000), including activism, 
non-activist behaviour in the public sphere, private-sphere environmentalism, and other 
environmentally significant behaviours. It will be important to distinguish these in future 
research. This would also mean to pay greater attention to inter-relationships of the various 
dimensions. Ultimately, this points towards a drawback of our approach. In our 
experiment, we observe only a small fraction of the large spectrum of possible pro-
environmental actions – a fairly simple donation decision or “non-activist behaviour in the 
public sphere” as (Stern 2000) would put it. It would, of course, be overly optimistic to 
expect a lasting effect of participating in a small experiment on decision-making beyond 
the immediate context (cf. Huang et al. 2014 and Bernedo et al. 2014 for recent studies 
focusing on the duration of effects due to experimental manipulation). For investigating 
this question in greater detail, one would have to extend the experimental design 
substantially and observe participants’ behaviour over a longer period, as some scholars are 
already doing (Lopez 2008). Our intention however was to test short-term effects in the 
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absence of interventions other than game playing. The fairly large effect of income on 
donations could stem from a “warm glow effect” (Andreoni 1990), that is relatively cheap 
to buy for wealthier participants. In a replication, stake size as an additional factor that is 
manipulated as part of the experiment would help to study such effects.  
A key difference of our game to the large-scale “water management games” currently 
conducted in the field (Meinzen-Dick 2013, Meinzen-Dick et al. 2014), is the level of 
interaction among participants. In our game, paired players, students and visitors, do not 
know each other and our outcome variable is limited to the amount donated to an 
environmental foundation. In practice, people gaming with each other may also interact in 
resource management. Gaming effects on water use may have lasting consequences for 
livelihoods and eco-systems in the actual world. One should, thus, not easily conclude that 
games as ours can contribute to an improved understanding of conflicts in all contexts and 
at all times.  
More importantly, the “do no harm principle” of experimental ethics should be carefully 
evaluated in any field setting. If experimental research is directed at politically and 
economically vulnerable subjects, it is ethically advisable to start with a less vulnerable 
group in order to explore treatment effects and unforeseen harm (cf. Teele 2014). This is 
what we have tried to do in this paper. Although we find some support for a positive effect 
of game participation even if this experience is negative, we cannot rule out that repeated 
negative interaction undermines pro-environmental behaviour in actual field settings. We 
can also not rule out the interaction of assigned treatment with observed or unobserved 
socio-demographic heterogeneity. If we would find, for instance, that in spite of an average 
positive effect, specific sub-groups are harmed by particular treatments, such groups could 
be excluded from participation or at least from random assignment to treatment. Future 
research should pay more attention to identify such heterogeneity in treatment effects.  
6.5. Summary and Conclusions 
Framed field experiments have become a common method to study behaviour in common 
pool resource dilemmas in specific field contexts. As experimentalists we often hear and 
experience that, beyond generating interesting scientific insights, the method has a lasting 
positive effect on participants’ understanding of resource dilemmas encountered in the 
field.   In this paper, we have developed a field experiment to investigate how participation 
in a simple two person prisoner’s dilemma experiment affects subsequent donations to an 
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environmental foundation. We find that donations increase when participants play the 
game. This effect is larger for those who have a positive cooperation experience. However, 
total effects are relatively small, and socio-demographic heterogeneity explains a much 
greater proportion of variation in donations. 
In future research, our approach could be extended to other samples and contexts. 
Repeated gaming and questionnaire data on environmental behaviour could yield further 
interesting insights. The topic could also be explored for environmental education more 
generally. Ultimately, in field contexts, one would also have to study how interaction in the 
game affects interaction in the field. In other words, the group interacting in the game sees 
each other again in actual life, and will have to “deal with” what happened in the game. 
Many of us can cite personal examples where – after playing a card or parlor game – 
friend- and relationships were put to a hard test or even ended. People can become quite 
emotional in gaming – for the good and for the bad. 
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. Key results and contributions 
Experiments are employed to construct a proper counterfactual for the study of causal 
effects in Economics, and the method has been used to investigate the impact of 
institutions and norms on behavior. More recently, experimental economists have tried to 
analyze processes of institutional change by endogenizing institutions. Participants in the 
experiment have a certain say in the design of the rules of the game. Different types of 
experiments are based on different definitions of institutions and institutional change. 
Aside from explicating the different viewpoints and links to empirical work, the 
dissertation aimed at the empirical study of behavior under different institutions, the 
interaction of institutions with contextual variables, and an identification of factors that are 
important in the experimental investigation of institutional change in field settings. 
The first paper has laid the foundation for the dissertation by showing that different 
schools of thought in Institutional Economics find a representation in the empirical practice 
of Experimental Economics. These links are implicit, and experimental economists rarely 
refer to theoretical work on institutions and institutional change, even if the direct 
empirical focus is on such change. A key contribution of this dissertation is to highlight 
these links, emphasizing theoretical consistency in empirical work. Furthermore, the paper 
has also identified a number of issues faced in the study of institutional change. For 
instance, the role of constitutional rules – deeper level rules on how to change existing 
rules – requires more attention in empirical work. Additional factors have emerged from 
the empirical applications. From different perspectives, the four empirical papers of this 
dissertation have investigated how institutions interact with the payoffs rules of an 
experiment (Material Payoffs Game Layer), social variables (Group-Context Layer), and 
individual variables (Identity Layer).  
The second paper and third paper investigated the impact of exogenous institutions on 
behavior. The second paper studied traffic policies and the impact of socio-economic 
backgrounds. It found that payoffs had a large impact on decision-making. Making the bus 
more attractive or making the car less attractive by modifying payoffs changed subjects’ 
choices (Material Payoffs Game Layer). Furthermore, subjects frequently switched 
between the bus and the car, indicating that their decisions also depend on what others do 
(Group-Context Layer). In concordance with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), at the individual level, framing the policy intervention as a loss has led to a larger 
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drop in the use of cars in the game than framing the intervention as a gain. Moreover, self-
image of using a particular transportation mode and personal experience were important 
(Identify Layer).  
The third paper expanded on this idea as it moved more explicitly to the Group-Context 
Layer. Heterogeneity in wealth was manipulated, and participants also knew whether or not 
wealth was distributed unequally in the game. In addition, institutions were modified. In 
one version of the game, players contributed in parallel; in another version, leading by 
example was introduced. It was found that there are small negative impacts of wealth 
heterogeneity and leading by example with strong heterogeneity in the effect of the latter. 
In a situation where leadership does not matter, real-life leaders do not behave differently 
from others. However, in a situation where setting a positive example is important, leaders 
contribute substantially more than those who are not used to this role. Significantly more 
than in the benchmark case, decisions of the inexperienced were guided by the history of 
play, namely what others contributed in the previous round. 
In the last two papers, the perspective became more agent-centered, and for the most part, 
structural aspects were neglected. In the fourth paper, it was shown that status quo 
matters for individual decision-making. As a default, if landlords push tenants to use “no 
junk mail” stickers, these are used more. It was demonstrated that by means of a small 
“nudge,” deliberate decisions are encouraged, and the use of stickers can be increased.  
In the fifth paper, a simple prisoner’s dilemma game was embedded into a field 
experiment. It was shown that experience in the game had a positive impact on the 
donation to an environmental foundation. In this way, the role of cognition and context was 
highlighted. At least in the short run, experience with the game – even if it was negative – 
had a positive effect on pro-environmental behavior. The contributions of the empirical 
papers are summarized in the table. 
Table 28: Summary of empirical papers 
Paper 
Number 
Material Payoffs Game 
Layer 
Group-Context Layer Identity Layer 
II Different institutions 
effective to achieve 
behavioral change; 
Dynamically changing 
behavior; people adjust 
and switch between car 
Self-image as a car 
driver (upper middle 
class) or bus user 
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improvements are 
possible by implementing 
demand side policies 
and bus often; 
expectation by assisting 
in coordination helps 
(lower middle class); 
real-life experience 
Loss aversion 
III Leadership treatment 
negative; strong 
interaction with social 
positions 




in the game 
IV Status quo rule matters; 
anecdotal evidence on  






V Main interest in altruism 
(other-regarding 
preferences) by means of 
a dictator game 





behavior; learning and 
experience 
Source: own design 
The third guiding question of the dissertation sought to investigate how useful economic 
experiments are for the study of institutional change and which contextual factors must be 
considered. The framework of Cárdenas & Ostrom (2004) assumes that the rules of the 
game are static. It was shown that this must not necessarily be the case and that – at least in 
the long run – institutions change. Such institutional change is subject to a set of deeper-
level rules:   
All rules are nested in another set of rules that define how the first set of rules can 
be changed. […] What can be done at a higher level will depend on the capabilities 
and limits of the rules at that level and at a deeper level. Whenever one addresses 
questions about institutional change, as contrasted to ongoing actions within 
institutional constraints, it is necessary to recognize that: 
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1. Changes in the rules used to order action at one level occur within a currently
“fixed” set of rules at a deeper level. 
2. Changes in deeper-level rules usually are more difficult and more costly to
accomplish, thus increasing the stability of mutual expectations among individuals 
interacting according to the deeper set of rules. (Ostrom, 2005, p. 58; emphasis in 
the original) 
These deeper level rules can be both at the agent and structural levels. For instance, in a 
parliament, a formally devised (constitutional) rule exists on how to change laws. In more 
informal settings, a shared norm or shared expectations may form the constitutional basis 
for altering an existing rule. In both instances, it is methodically challenging to address the 
quickly unfolding complexity that is involved in dynamic processes of institutional change. 
One way to deal with such complexity lies in the careful and transparent decomposition of 
the empirical setting at hand. Experiments then allow the singling out of particular aspects, 
holding other aspects constant. 
The commonality of the papers in this dissertation is that they investigate a broader range 
of context-specific aspects in the study of institutions and behavior by examining the 
interaction of institutions with individual or social variables. Although institutions are not 
endogenous in any of the empirical papers in the sense that they can be changed by 
participants, the empirical papers can jointly contribute to an improved understanding not 
only of static institutional analysis but also of institutional change. In particular, each of the 
papers highlights a set of more specific aspects that could be considered in the study of 
institutional change. A research framework which synthesizes the findings of all five 
papers is presented on this basis.39 
7.2. The dynamic view on institutions: A framework for conducting 
economic experiments 
In the development of empirically grounded economic experiments, researchers face 
decisions on how to translate on-the-ground realities into models. Ideally, the basis of these 
decisions should be carefully documented, and such documentation can build upon the 
existing culture of openness and transparency in the methodical community. The following 
39 Parts of the sub-chapter are based on a paper that I am writing with Christian Kimmich, and a preliminary 
version has been presented at a conference (Rommel & Kimmich, 2014). 
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list of questions aims to assist empirically-working scholars. The first two questions are 
more fundamental as they generally address the role of deliberate human action in altering 
existing institutions. Subsequent questions specifically explore the variables to be 
considered when modeling institutional change: 
(1) How do institutions change in a specific empirical context? Institutions may emerge 
and change spontaneously and are not necessarily the result of deliberate human action (cf. 
Vatn, 2005, Chapter 8; Kingston & Caballero, 2009). In such cases, there is no role for 
experimental subjects in the design or change of an institution. Furthermore, if the 
timeframe under investigation is short, decisions are made in a high frequency, and if 
institutions change only at slow pace, it may be reasonable to assume exogenous 
institutions. 
(2) Who changes a particular institution? Is it the parties affected or are institutions 
imposed by someone who is an outsider? Perceived legitimacy of a new rule can differ 
substantially depending on the way it is implemented. In particular, exogenously imposed 
rules typically perform worse than endogenously chosen rules (cf. Dal Bó et al., 2010). If 
institutions are imposed on the affected parties, experiments may be useful to evaluate 
institutional performance of alternative institutional options as it has been done in much of 
the classic work in the field. Studied participants then do not have a role in institutional 
change. For instance, in the second paper, subjects are exposed to traffic policies that are 
devised in a political process in which the individual may have only a limited say. 
Allowing subjects to change the rules of the game in the context of traffic policy is perhaps 
an interesting exercise but usually will have limited empirical grounding. Similarly, in the 
fourth paper, landlords are the ones who decide on the status quo institution whereas 
tenants are the ones who make the choices. 
(3) What are viable institutional alternatives? What are the alternatives considered by those 
who intend to develop a new rule or change an existing rule? Where do these alternatives 
come from, and how many are there? For instance, in the third paper, it was demonstrated 
that in a new situation and in the absence of a behavioral model, some participants rely on 
their experiences and strongly condition their behaviors on what others have done in the 
past. 
(4) What are the costs and benefits of institutional change, who bears the costs, and who 
benefits? If a new institution is established, this may entail costs of changing existing rules. 
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There may be initial costs for establishing a new institution; fixed and variable costs of 
running the new institution may also change. For instance, a new system may be needed to 
monitor and enforce a new rule. It is also important to know who has to bear how much of 
this cost and who may benefit from the new institution. In the second paper, the 
distributional consequences of institutional change became obvious. In the mode choice 
coordination problem, it was demonstrated that different demand side policy measures can 
have quite different outcomes in terms of the distribution of benefits. A bus price subsidy 
must be carried by the taxpayer to the benefit of those using the bus. In contrast, 
introducing parking costs creates revenues for everyone at the expense of those using the 
car. 
(5) What is the mechanism of change? If only one person is involved in changing a rule, 
are there limits within which this person operates? Is this person known to everyone, and 
do reputational concerns play a role? If more than one person is involved, how is the 
decision reached? Is there open communication an anonymous vote or some other type of 
mechanism? Which majorities are needed? For instance, is a unanimous agreement needed 
or does the simple majority suffice to alter an existing institution? These questions all 
concern deeper level rules that are decisive for the change of existing rules. In some 
settings (e.g., in the legislative process in many parliaments), formal rules guide processes 
of legislative change. In more informal settings, such constitutional rules may also stem 
from culturally determined fairness norms. In the third paper, it has been demonstrated 
that people in their decision-making refer much more to what others have done when they 
have no experience with the task. Likewise, when a specific institution is at stake, in the 
absence of rules that guide the process of change, people may look for orientation by 
remembering or referring to situations that are similar in structure. They may also be 
influenced by their current mood or recent experiences as demonstrated in the fifth paper.  
(6) What is the point of departure for institutional change? If a particular institution is 
already in place, the status quo is likely to determine people’s perception of what is 
legitimate (cf. Kingston & Caballero, 2009). For instance, in the fourth paper, it is shown 
that the status quo rule affects perceptions of what is or what is not a socially accepted 
behavior. Under different status quo rules, not only behavior is likely to differ; also the 
willingness to accept new rules may be driven by the institutional status quo. 
Consequently, systems may evolve quite differently and may follow different paths, 
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depending on the institutional setup at the start. The following figure summarizes this 
framework:  
Figure 7: A framework for developing economic experiments on institutional change (own design)
The figure displays how the formulated questions fit into the workflow of developing an 
economic experiment addressing institutional change. The first question is the most basic. 
If humans have no role in changing an institution, it is apparent that a behavioral 
experiment cannot help in answering the question of how an institution changes. If the 
institution under investigation is imposed upon the affected people, it might make sense to 
test their behaviors under different institutions. If rules are self-crafted, an experiment 
featuring endogenous institutions might be viable. As described above, various properties 
should then be regarded. The first two – alternatives and costs and benefits – are also 
relevant for experiments with exogenous institutions. Constitutional rules and status quo 
matter for experiments with endogenous institutional choice. 
The framework developed here aims at the design phase of an empirical project. However, 
like the framework of Cárdenas and Ostrom (2004), it might also be used after the 
empirical part to structure and communicate results and decisions. Both frameworks might 
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even be combined, and questions (3) to (6) could be seen as an extension of the Material 
Payoffs Game Layer that is endogenous to considerations of the participant. Eventually, 
both frameworks complement each other, and their application has been demonstrated 
here. 
7.3. Methodical limitations and future research 
Laboratory experiments in Economics are commonly criticized for being artificial. Even if 
some phenomena are well-established in the lab and have been replicated repeatedly, it is 
still difficult to accurately predict behavior outside the controlled setting. In the actual 
world, a great number of factors affect behavior, and for the experimenter, it is usually 
difficult to identify and control all of them. Furthermore, these factors unfold differently 
with different people in different contexts. Framed field experiments take up this critique 
by investigating more narrowly defined empirical questions and examining behavior of 
non-student subjects in specific field settings. Certainly, this is an improvement over the 
sole application of lab experiments, and moving back and forth between the lab and the 
field has been a productive way of knowledge generation in Economics (Harrison & List, 
2004; Levitt & List, 2007; Levitt, List, & Reiley, 2010). Similarly, using non-student 
subject pools has been an important response to the critique of limited external validity 
(Henrich et al., 2004). However, framed field experiments also remain artificial, and they 
abstract from important aspects of a more complex reality.  
Sometimes, it may be advisable to introduce specific aspects of such complexity into an 
experiment. For instance, Janssen et al. (2008) or Cárdenas, Janssen, & Bousquet (2013) 
are concerned with studying the interaction of institutions and behavior with non-linear 
eco-system dynamics. Kimmich (2013) points out that a farmer’s decision whether or not 
to use energy-efficient equipment for an electric irrigation pump does not depend on cost-
benefit considerations alone. The decision is linked to other farmers’ decisions and 
embedded in village-level politics as well as the wider political economy of agricultural 
support. Much of the experimental work on endogenous institutions that has been reviewed 
in the dissertation (e.g., Sutter, Haigner, & Kocher, 2010) succeeds in accounting for at 
least some of this complexity in abstract laboratory experiments. However, much more 
remains to be done in this field. Ultimately, research boundaries must be defined and 
delineated, and the heuristic sketched in the previous chapter may help in doing so. 
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To address the issue of artificiality and external validity, experimental results must 
confront evidence from other methods, and combining multiple methods is more likely to 
produce the robust evidence needed for a better understanding of complex realities 
(Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010; Prediger et al., 2010; Werthmann, 2011). With respect 
to static institutional analysis and the study of institutional change, qualitative methods will 
especially have to play an important role (Schlüter, 2010), and many aspects of institutions 
and their gradual change cannot be measured, or too little is known about how to measure 
them (Voigt, 2013; Rocco & Thurston, 2014). 
The strand of empirical literature on the endogenous formation of institutions stems from 
the tradition of Experimental Economics that has always been much aware of economic 
theory. However, some of the more recent experimental applications are fairly limited in 
their theoretical underpinnings. Although mainstream economics has become increasingly 
aware of the role institutions play in the economic process both empirically (e.g., 
Acemoglu, Robinson, & Woren, 2012) and theoretically (e.g., North, 1990), Institutional 
Economics as a sub-field is still not well-established in the curricula. In the years to come, 
it will be important to bridge the gaps between theorists and empirically-working scholars. 
The framework developed above has made it apparent that constitutional rules and the 
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The fundamental traffic flow parameters, vehicle speed, traffic flow (the number of vehicles 
expressed in terms of passenger car units passing a specified point during a stated period of 
time), and density, determine road capacity. Figure 8 displays the non-linear relationship 
between flow and density. 
Figure 8: Fundamental traffic flow diagram 
 
Source: own design 
In the model traffic flow and increase until reaching a saturation point qmax. After this point 
the flow decreases until kj, the point where traffic breaks down completely. This relationship 
is captured by the equation: 
𝑓𝑓(𝑄𝑄) = 𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓(Σ𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖) + �
𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓
𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚
� (∑𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖)2 (1) 
where 
Q  =  Traffic flow (PCUs40/hour) 
ki  =  Space required by vehicle i measured in PCU 
∑ki =  Sum of space across all vehicles measured in PCU 
km  =  Maximum road capacity in PCU 
Vf  =  Vehicle speed under free flow conditions 
 
A commuter’s payoff in the game depends on the vehicle speed and its operating costs. Travel 
speed is dependent also on the choice of other players. A problem of interdependence and 
coordination emerges. In a particular round of the game, the payoff π – which we assume to 
include all costs and benefits of the particular mode choice – can be expressed as follows41 






� 𝑓𝑓(𝑄𝑄) (2) 
40 When the traffic consists of different vehicle types, they are transformed into Passenger Car Units (PCU). For 
example, a private car could be calculated with 1PCU, motor bikes with 0.5 PCU, and a bus with 2 PCU. 
41 This equation stems from the standard common pool resource literature, assuming that road space is 
“appropriated.” See for example Walker, J. M., R. Gardner, and E. Ostrom (1990). Rent Dissipation in a Limited-
Access Common-Pool Resource: Experimental Evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 19(3): 203–211. 
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Substituting Eq. (1) into Eq. (2) yields: 
 






� [𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓(Σ𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖) + �
𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓
𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚
� (∑𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖)2] (3) 
 
where 
π  = Participant’s payoff in a particular round in tokens 
e  =  Participant’s income/endowment of the round (set to 10 in our case) 
c  =  Vehicle operating cost in units 
ki  =  Space required by vehicle i measured in PCU 
∑ki =  Sum of space across all vehicles measured in PCU 
km  =  Maximum road capacity in PCU 
Vf  =  Vehicle speed under free flow conditions 
 
The following table presents the parameter specifications used for arriving at the payoffs used 
in the game. 
Table 29: Specifications of transport mode used in payoff equation 









Private car 19 1 1 
Public bus 10 3 6 
Source: own design 
 
Substituting the parameters from the table payoffs for private car πc and payoffs for public bus 
πb are calculated as follows 
𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐 = 10 − 1(1) + �
1
∑𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐)
� [19(∑𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐))  − 4.75(∑𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐))2] (4) 
 
𝜋𝜋𝑏𝑏 = 10 − 3(6) + �
3
∑𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖(𝑏𝑏)
� [10(∑𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖(𝑏𝑏))  − 2.75(∑𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖(𝑏𝑏))2] (5) 
Calculated payoffs were then rounded (for simplification) to produce the payoff tables 










Welcome! My name is Bhuvanachithra Chidambaram and I am a researcher at Humboldt 
University in Berlin Germany. These are my research assistants Rajiv Reddy and Ravi Teja. 
In the following one and a half hours, I will ask you to complete a series of written exercises 
in form of a small game. All the data gathered in these games will treated with confidence 
and they will be used anonymously and solely for research.  
After the game, you will be rewarded with earnings based on the decisions you and other 
people have made. Additionally, you will receive a show-up fee of 200 INR independent of 
your decisions in the game. 
Before we begin, I would ask you to please turn off your mobile phones and other devices, 
so that there will be no disturbances during the experiment. Please also do not speak to 
other participants during the game. If you have a question, raise your hand and I will assist 
you. 
In total, three exercises are distributed to you, one at a time. When you are handed an 
exercise, read the instructions carefully and complete the information that is requested. You 
may begin each exercise as soon as you have received it. Each exercise has six rounds. You 
will also receive an ID that will be used throughout the experiment.  
Each round, you will have to write your decision. Once you are done, please place your form 
closed on the desk. Then, I will collect the forms and note down your earnings based on your 
decision. After each round, the total number of cars and buses will be announced. When all 
six rounds are completed, please handover the sheets to me and I will distribute the next 
exercise. 
[DO FIRST, SECOND and THIRD EXERCISE] 
We will now distribute a survey. It will take you approximately 10 minutes to complete the 
survey. Please answer all the questions. Meanwhile we will prepare your earnings. Once 
everyone has completed the survey and we have calculated your payment, we will call you 
to the front of the room, where you have signed in. We will pay each of you in cash and in 
private. Please gather your belongings and bring them with you. After you have received 




Instructions Exercise 1                                                      
Your Participant Id is_____    
 
Note: 
Please do not talk with anyone while we are doing this exercise! 
Please raise your hand if you have a question! 
 
Before you start playing, imagine the following situation: 
You are working in an office and every day you may go to your office by vehicle using the (city) roads 
and you got your own car. There is also a public bus leaving in front of your house going directly to 
your office. Accordingly, you can chose between public bus or your own car to travel to your office. 
Your car is faster than bus but if everyone takes cars then the road gets congested and so your car is 
not faster than the bus.   
Let’s start the game! 
• You are one among six players in this exercise and this exercise consists of six rounds (i.e. 
each round is one month). 
• You have two options: namely Car and Public Bus and you have earnings for both the options 
in each round which are given in the payoff table on page 2. In each round, your earnings 
also depend on the other people’s choices. 
• Now please make your choice in the table on Page 3 by writing either car or bus into column 
4 of the table on page 3! 
• Once you are finished writing, place your form closed on the desk, as a signal to me. I 
will make a note of your decision and announce the total number of cars and buses 
on the road (column 5). 
• Then using the given payoff table, I will calculate the earnings and write them on 
your sheet, based on your decision (column 6). 
• Then the next round starts.  
 




Instructions Exercise 2        
Your Participant Id is_____
Note: 
Please do not talk with anyone while we are doing this exercise! 
Please raise your hand if you have a question! 
Before you start playing, imagine the following situation: 
You are working in an office and every day you may go to your office by vehicle using the (city) roads 
and you got your own car. There is also a public bus leaving in front of your house going directly to 
your office. Accordingly, you can chose between public bus or your own car to travel to your office. 
Your car is faster than bus but if everyone takes cars then the road gets congested and so your car is 
not faster than the bus.  
The government has decided to subsidize the bus ticket which results in an increase of three 
tokens for taking the bus. 
Let’s start the game! 
• You are one among six players in this exercise and this exercise consists of six rounds (i.e.
each round is one month).
• You have two options: namely Car and Public Bus and you have earnings for both the options
in each round which are given in the payoff table on page 2. In each round, your earnings
also depend on the other people’s choices.
• In this exercise, if you take Public Bus, you can add three points (+3) to your earnings as
displayed in the following payoff table.
• Now please make your choice in the table on Page 3 by writing either car or bus into column
4 of the table on page 3!
• Once you are finished writing, place your form closed on the desk, as a signal to me. I
will make a note of your decision and announce the total number of cars and buses
on the road (column 5).
• Then using the given payoff table, I will calculate the earnings and write them on
your sheet, based on your decision (column 6).
• Then the next round starts.
The above steps are repeated for 6 rounds in this exercise. 
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Instructions Exercise 2                                                      
Your Participant Id is_____    
 
Note: 
Please do not talk with anyone while we are doing this exercise! 
Please raise your hand if you have a question! 
 
Before you start playing, imagine the following situation: 
You are working in an office and every day you may go to your office by vehicle using the (city) roads 
and you got your own car. There is also a public bus leaving in front of your house going directly to 
your office. Accordingly, you can chose between public bus or your own car to travel to your office. 
Your car is faster than bus but if everyone takes cars then the road gets congested and so your car is 
not faster than the bus.  
The government has decided to impose a parking cost of three additional tokens for people 
choosing the car.  
Let’s start the game! 
• You are one among six players in this exercise and this exercise consists of six rounds (i.e. 
each round is one month). 
• You have two options: namely Car and Public Bus and you have earnings for both the options 
in each round which are given in the payoff table on page 2. In each round, your earnings 
also depend on the other people’s choices. 
• In this exercise, if you take your car, you have to subtract three points (-3) from your 
earnings as displayed in the following payoff table. 
• Now please make your choice in the table on Page 3 by writing either car or bus into column 
4 of the table on page 3! 
• Once you are finished writing, place your form closed on the desk, as a signal to me. I 
will make a note of your decision and announce the total number of cars and buses 
on the road (column 5). 
• Then using the given payoff table, I will calculate the earnings and write them on 
your sheet, based on your decision (column 6). 
• Then the next round starts.  
 





Instructions Exercise 3                                                     
Your Participant Id is_____    
 
Note: 
Please do not talk with anyone while we are doing this exercise! 
Please raise your hand if you have a question! 
 
Before you start playing, imagine the following situation: 
You are working in an office and every day you may go to your office by vehicle using the (city) roads 
and you got your own car. There is also a public bus leaving in front of your house going directly to 
your office. Accordingly, you can chose between public bus or your own car to travel to your office. 
Your car is faster than bus but if everyone takes cars then the road gets congested and so your car is 
not faster than the bus.  
The government has decided to implement a car rotation system. This means that each participant 
will have the chance to take the car once in the next six rounds. Each round a player ID which is not 
known to the others will be announced and each ID will be announced exactly once. However, 
there is no enforcement or change in payoffs and you are free to choose either the bus or the car.  
Let’s start the game 
• You are one among six players in this exercise and this exercise consists of six rounds (i.e. 
each round is one month). 
• You have two options: namely Car and Public Bus and you have earnings for both the options 
in each round which are given in the payoff table on page 2. In each round, your earnings 
also depend on the other people’s choices. 
• At the beginning of each round one player ID will be announced and this player is allowed 
to take the car in the following round. Everybody will be chosen exactly once. 
• Once you are finished writing, place your form closed on the desk, as a signal to me. I will 
make a note of your decision and announce the total number of cars and buses on the road 
(column 5). 
• Then using the given payoff table, I will calculate the earnings and write them on 
your sheet, based on your decision (column 6). 
• Then the next round starts.  
 










Payoff-Table (Exercise 1) 
Out of all six 
players 








 If you take ‘car’  If you take ‘bus’ 










0 6  0 ---  6 15 
1 5  1 23               5 14 
2 4  2 18 
 
 4 13 
3 3  3 14 
 
 3 12 
4 2  4 9 
 
 2 9 
5 1  5 4 
 
 1 0 
6 0  6 0  0 --- 
 
  





Payoff-Table (Exercise 2) 
Out of all six 
players 








 If you take ‘car’  If you take ‘bus’ 










0 6  0 ---  6 18 
1 5  1 23               5 17 
2 4  2 18 
 
 4 16 
3 3  3 14 
 
 3 15 
4 2  4 9 
 
 2 12 
5 1  5 4 
 
 1 3 
6 0  6 0  0 --- 
 
  






Payoff-Table (Exercise 2) 
Out of all six 
players 








 If you take ‘car’  If you take ‘bus’ 










0 6  0 ---  6 15 
1 5  1 20               5 14 
2 4  2 15 
 
 4 13 
3 3  3 11 
 
 3 12 
4 2  4 6 
 
 2 9 
5 1  5 1 
 
 1 0 
6 0  6 -3  0 --- 
 
  





Payoff-Table (Exercise 3) 
Out of all six 
players 








 If you take ‘car’  If you take ‘bus’ 










0 6  0 ---  6 15 
1 5  1 23               5 14 
2 4  2 18 
 
 4 13 
3 3  3 14 
 
 3 12 
4 2  4 9 
 
 2 9 
5 1  5 4 
 
 1 0 
6 0  6 0  0 --- 
 
  





























I chose the car in the 
exercise, because I 
could earn more money 














I chose the car in the 
exercise, because in 
everyday life, I am used 













I chose the public bus in 
the exercise, because I 
could earn more money 













I chose the public bus in 
the exercise because in 
everyday life, I am used 













I was considering the 
other players’ earnings 













My decisions were 














My decision in each 
round was affected by 
























 Player ID_________                              
 
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about your 
decisions in the first six rounds of the exercise? 
Please indicate your selection by crossing a box in each row below ( ) 
 
2. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement about the effect of 
the parking cost in rounds 7 – 12? 














I opted for the bus 















2. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement about the effect of 
the bus subsidy in rounds 7 – 12? 
Please indicate your selection by crossing a box in each row below ( ) 
 


















I opted for the bus 
because of the subsidy. 
3. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the
rotation in the rounds 13 – 18?













The rotation system 
changed my decision 
compared to rounds 1 – 6. 
4. The following table shows potential causes of the traffic jams in Hyderabad. What
do you think is the impact of the listed factors on traffic jams?   
Please indicate your selection by crossing a box in each row below ( ) 
Causes for  traffic jam 










































































Construction works on roads  
























5. Do you think if there are other potential causes of traffic jams in Hyderabad which 






6. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the public 
bus system in Hyderabad? 















The public buses 












The frequency of 
public buses in 













The comfort of 
public buses in 













The ticket prices 














The public buses 
in Hyderabad 












The public buses 














The public buses 
in Hyderabad 












The public buses 




















7. How useful or useless do you think are the following traffic measures when 
implemented in Hyderabad for reducing traffic congestion? 
Please indicate your selection by crossing a box in each row below ( ) 
 













High parking fee for 
private vehicles 
(motorised two-










































































Reduced ticket fare 











Providing  separate 














Increasing fuel (Petrol 












8. Do you think there are other traffic measures that could be useful for reducing the 










9.  Please specify your gender (Male/Female): ___________ 
 
10. Please specify your age _________ 
 
11.   What is your marital status? (Please circle!) 
a. Single 
b. Married 
c. Other  
 
12. How many years of education do you have? _____________ and  what  is your 
level of education? (Please circle!) 
a. Literate, Pls. circle your education level below: 
Primary / Secondary / Higher secondary / Diploma / Graduate                  / Post 
graduate  







13. What is your job status? (Please circle!) 
a.   Self-employed 
b.   Employer 
c.   Employee 
d.   Seeking Job 
e.   Student 




14. What is your average monthly income? (Please circle!) 
a.   Below Rs.5000 
b.   Rs. 6,000  – Rs. 15,000   
c.   Rs. 15,000 – Rs.50,000  
d.   Rs. 50,000 – Rs.1,00,000   
e.   Above Rs.1,00,000 (>1 lakh) 
f.   I do not know 
g.  I do not want  to answer 
 
15.  Do you own any vehicle? (Please circle!) 
a. Yes  
Pls. circle your vehicle type:  
Car / Motor-bike or Two-wheeler / Auto- rickshaw / Cycle.  





16.  If “Yes” in question 15, then what is your average monthly vehicle operating cost 
(i.e. the fuel and maintenance cost)? (Please circle!)                        
a. Less than Rs. 50 
b. Rs. 50 - Rs. 100 
c. Rs.100 - Rs. 500 
d. Rs. 500 - Rs. 1,000 
e. Rs. 1,000 - Rs. 5,000 
f. Rs. 5,000 - Rs.10,000 
g.  Above Rs. 10,000 
h. I do not know 
 
17. How often do you use the following means of transportation? 
Please indicate your selection by crossing a box in each row below ( ) 
 
 Never (1 to 10 
times per 
month) 
(11 to 20 
times  per 
month) 
(more than 





























































18. If you use public bus, then what is your average monthly expenditure for the travel
cost by public bus? (Please circle!) 
a. Less than Rs.50
b. Rs.50 - Rs.100
c. Rs.100 - Rs. 500
d. Rs. 500  - Rs. 1,000
e. Rs. 1,000 - Rs. 5,000
f. Above Rs. 5,000
g. I do not know
19. How often do you get stuck in traffic jam in Hyderabad?
Please indicate your selection by crossing a box in each row below ( ) 
Always Often Sometimes Rare Never 
20. Your household details in Hyderabad:
Please indicate your selection by crossing a box in each row below ( ) 
Household details 0 1 2 3 >3 
How many people are there in your 
household in Hyderabad (including you)? 
How many cars are there in your household 
in Hyderabad (including your vehicle)? 
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How many motor-bikes are there in your 

















21. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about this 
exercise? 














I could understand the 











I could understand the 











I could understand the 




























Figure 9: Mean individual earnings by round; within subject treatments are introduced in 








Figure 10: Mean individual earnings by round for treatment 1 (= bus subsidy) (half the 
sample) 
 




Figure 11: Mean individual earnings by round for treatment 2 (=parking cost) (half the 
sample)
 















































































































Table 30: Linear Probability Models and Variance Inflation Factors 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  













































































































































N 2988  2988  2988  
Adjusted R² 0.0297  0.0266  0.0254  
Standard errors (clustered for participants) in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 30 presents three different specifications of a linear probability model on mode choice 
using the OLS estimator. Next to each column of coefficients we have added the variance 
181 
 
inflation factors (VIFs) for the variables by models. It can be seen that including both the 
round and the treatment dummy variables causes multicollinearity as indicated by the high 
VIFs for the PUBCOORD and ROUND variables in the first estimated model.  
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Table 31: Additional Specifications of Binary Logistic Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
























































































































































































































N 2490 2490 2490 2490 2490 
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.054 0.056 0.053 0.055 
Log likelihood -1599.3429 -1605.3575 -1601.2620 -1607.3897 -1604.2007 
χ² 195.5815*** 183.5523*** 191.7433*** 179.4879*** 185.8660*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 31 shows four additional specifications of the logistic regression model from the paper. 
Using the same sample as in model 1, models 2, 3, 4, and 5 remove the sets of dummy 
variables for INCOME, CARFREQ, BUSFREQ, and the treatment dummies, respectively. 
This allows us to perform likelihood ratio tests to test for the increase in explanatory power of 
the respective nested model.  
Adding INCOME dummies to the models significantly increases they explanatory power (LR 
test; χ² (4) = 12.03; p = 0.0171) on the five percent level. Adding CARFREQ does not lead to 
a significant increase (LR test; χ² (3) = 3.84; p = 0.2795). Adding BUSFREQ improves the 
model significantly (LR test; χ² (3) = 16.09; p = 0.0011). Likewise, adding the treatment 




Appendix 2: Protocols and Materials “Shared Toilets as a Collective 
Action Problem: A Framed Field Experiment on Sanitation in 









Sanitation Game Instructions and Specifications 
Number of participants: always recruit 20 people. Then, we will separate them randomly into 
four groups.  
Start: Everyone gathers. Once everyone sits down, Bharath starts with welcoming participants 
and some background on the game: 
1. Namaste! Welcome everybody!  
2. Language: Does everybody understand Telugu? If not, which languages do you speak? 
Ensure translation into Hindi/Urdu.  
3. Introduction: 
We are a group of researchers from Germany interested in water and sanitation issues. We are 
also interested in collective action in the community more generally. Today, we would like to 
play a small game with you. It is only a game and we cannot promise you any action beyond 
this. We are researchers and we will write a study, we cannot come up with any practical 
action, and we cannot promise you any immediate help or money for your community.  
All of today’s data will be used in anonymous form and for research purposes only. We will 
not share any information with government agencies or anyone else in your community.  
During the game, it is important that you do not talk. Also do not use mobile phones! Please 
listen carefully when we explain the game! If there are any questions/doubts please raise 
your hand and we will answer your question.  
For participating in the game, everyone will receive 100 Rupees. All of you will get these 
100 Rupees no matter what happens in the game. During the game you can earn additional 
money depending on your decisions in the game and the decisions of others. Please 
remember, all your decisions are made in private and will not be known by the other 
players! It is thus very important that you understand the rules of the game. After the game, 
each of you will be asked to fill a questionnaire to provide us with some background on you 
and your household. In total this will not take more than three hours of your time. 
If you do not feel comfortable to play the game, you can leave now. Of course, you can also 
leave at any other time if you do not feel comfortable.  
Did everybody understand this? Are there any doubts/questions so far?  
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[Answer questions if any, else start explaining the game] 
4. Bharath explains the scenario and the game:
Scenario: Please picture the following scenario. You do not have a private toilet and rely on a 
public toilet shared by the community. The municipality or NGOs do not provide maintenance 
and cleaning for this toilet and you as a community have to organize these things yourselves.  
To organize this collective task you would like to collect money. For doing so you put a 
plastic bottle next to the toilet where all members of your community can put money. You can 
organize the collection of this money in two different ways. For collecting this money you 
could either use transparent of opaque bottles.  
[Show both bottles] 
One bottle is opaque. You cannot see how much others have put. Contributions are 
anonymous.  
[Show opaque bottle and place money] 
The other bottle is transparent. In this case you can see how much others have contributed 
before you.   
[Show transparent bottle and place money] 
The game we will play works in a similar way. Sometimes you can see what others have 
contributed, sometimes you can’t.   
The game will be played in groups of five people and we will play the game for eight 
rounds. In each round, each of you will get five, ten, or fifteen Rupees. One Rupee in the 
game is also one Rupee of your payment afterwards. We have organized the game in a way 
that everyone will get a total of 80 Rupees over the course of all eight rounds. In each round 
you see how much money you have and you also know how much the others in your group 
have. You do not know who these people are however. After each round the results will be 
announced on a white board [show white boards]. 
[Distribute decision sheets and explain how to decide] 
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In each round of the game, you have the possibility to put some or all money in the bottle or 
to keep all the money for yourself. The money which is put in the bottle will be used for the 
community. The benefit from this is exactly twice the amount you have contributed as a 
group. This benefit will be distributed evenly among all group members, independent of your 
individual contributions. You can also picture a scenario where an organization has promised 
to double all the funds you have collected.  
In each round, all five players will make a decision using the provided sheets [hold up sheets 
again]. In some rounds, you make a first move. Then, one randomly selected person from 
your group is selected and the decision in announced [show transparent bottle again; show 
sequential game sheets]. For the player who has been selected to be the first mover, we will 
cross out the second column of the decision sheets. Please behave as if you would decide 
again to ensure no one will notice that you are the one selected [demonstrate in group play]. 
Let’s have some small examples [use sheets and circles decisions for visualization]: 
Five participants:  
Example 1: everybody has 10 Rupees. Everybody contributes 4 Rupees – in total 20 Rupees. 
This will be doubled which makes 40 Rupees in total. Everybody gets 8 Rupees and ends up 
with 14 [show on white board].  
Example 2: two participants have 5 Rupees, one has 10, and two have 15. The two with 5 put 
everything and nobody else puts anything. In total there are 10 Rupees in the bottle. This will 
be used for cleaning and the benefit is 20. Everybody gets 4 Rupees and what has remained 
from the endowments [show on white board]. 
Example 3: Nobody puts anything in the bottle. Everybody keeps his starting money [show 
on white board].   
Did you understand everything? Any doubts/questions? 
[Answer questions if any, else continue] 
Ask some participants test questions: What happens if everybody has ten Rupees and 
everybody gives 4 Rupees? How much does everybody have in the end? What happens if 




[Explain and show again the two different bottles. Show the two different types of sheets. 
Explain again how choices are made on paper by circling the amount. Show on sheets. 
Explain again that this has real monetary consequences. One Rupee in the game is one 
real Rupee afterwards. We will pay you after the game! Questions? Remind that people 
should not talk. Remind that all decisions are private and cannot be known by anybody 
else in the group.] 
5. Start the game: Bharath announces that now groups are formed and everyone draws a lot 
from the box. Bharath announced how everyone finds their group. Group leaders find 
their participants by ID code.  
6. Participants get their ID codes (keep it!).  
7. Participants go to their table and receive their folders. 
8. Game starts, afterwards questionnaire and payment.
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2. Protocol Sheets for Data Collection
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Group Sheet Sanitation Game 




Starting Time (Hour/Min):__________________________________________ 
Ending Time (Hour/Min):___________________________________________ 
Color Code (Circle!):     A   B   C   D   E   
What is first (Circle!): Parallel (everybody same time)    Sequential (First Mover) 
Player IDs (Copy to the other two sheets): 
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5 
Player ID 
Group Conductor (Your Name):______________________________________ 
Assistant (Your Assistant’s/Translator’s Name):__________________________ 
Did some people talk/communicate during the game?42  YES 
 NO 




















Player Number Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5 
Public Good (Sum 
of Contributions) 
Public Good  * 
2 (Doubled 
Sum) 
Each Player Gets 
(doubled divided 
by 5) 
Player ID (write down!) 
Contributes in Round 1 
Keeps in Round 1 
Total in Round 1 
Contributes in Round 2 
Keeps in Round 2 
Total in Round 2 
Contributes in Round 3 
Keeps in Round 3 
Total in Round 3 
Contributes in Round 4 
Keeps in Round 4 
Total in Round 4 
KEPT IN TOTAL 
(40 – Sum (Contributions)) 
Sum all rounds 
Sum all rounds 
x 2 




(Kept plus what everybody 
gets) 
Don’t write in the shaded area! 
Sequential Moves (First Mover) 
Player Number Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5 
ID of the First 
Mover 
Public Good (Sum 
of Contributions) 
Public Good  * 
2 (Doubled 
Sum) 
Each Player Gets 
(doubled divided 
by 5) 
Player ID (write down!) 
First Mover (Tick if yes!) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Contributes in Round 1 
Keeps in Round 1 
Total in Round 1 
First Mover (Tick if yes!) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Contributes in Round 2 
Keeps in Round 2 
Total in Round 2 
First Mover (Tick if yes!) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Contributes in Round 3 
Keeps in Round 3 
Total in Round 3 
First Mover (Tick if yes!) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Contributes in Round 4 
Keeps in Round 4 
Total in Round 4 
KEPT IN TOTAL 
(40 – Sum 
(Contributions)) 
Sum all rounds 
Sum all 
rounds x 2 
Everybody gets 
in total from 
sequential 
PAYOFF PARALLEL 
(Kept plus what 
everybody gets) 
TOTAL PAYOFF 
Don’t write in the shaded area!
3. Questionnaire
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Post-Experimental Questionnaire Sanitation Game 
(Please write readable!!) 
Panel Identification and Personal Details  
1. Participant ID (Copy from sheet!):____________
2. Gender:  Male ☐       Female ☐ 
3. Age: _____________________years
4. Are you married?   Yes ☐         No ☐ 
5. What is your current occupation? __________________________
6. Daily wage in INR: ___________________________
7. Daily wage of spouse in INR: ___________________________
8. Can you read and write?   Yes ☐     No ☐
9. How many years did you spend in school? ___________
10. Up to what level have you studied (degree)? ______________________________
11. What is your religion?   Hindu ☐       Muslim ☐        Christian ☐        Other: ___________
12. What is your caste?
Scheduled Tribe ☐       Scheduled Caste ☐        Other Backward Caste ☐      Minorities ☐      Not applicable ☐   
Other:__________________ 
13. What is your mother tongue?  Telugu ☐     Urdu ☐      Hindi ☐      Other: ___________
14. How many years have you lived in this area? ___________years
15. Are you member of a Self-help Group (SHG)?  Yes ☐         No ☐ 
15.a. If yes, what is the name SHG? ___________________________ 
15.b. What is your role in the SHG?        Member ☐       Leader ☐  
Household Details 
16. Please tell me, taking all people who live in your
household (including men, women and children), how many 
members are there in your household? 
(By household I mean all the people who usually live in this 
house and eat from the same kitchen as you do.) 
Number 
a. Men (14 years old and above)
b. Women (14 years old and above)
c. Children (below 14 years) 
Boys 
Girls 
17. Are you the head of this household?   Yes ☐        No ☐
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17.c. W
hat is the occupation of the head of the household? ___________________________ 
18. In what kind of house do you live?
18.d. Type of house:  Pucca ☐  Kutcha ☐ 
18.e. Tenure:  Own ☐  Rent ☐ 
18.f. Size of house in square yards: ___________square yards 
18.g. How old is the house (in years)? ___________________years 
19. Which of the following things do you own (tick whatever is owned by household!)?
Colour-TV ☐ Mobile Phone ☐       Motorbike ☐       Electric fan ☐       Water filter ☐        Bicycle ☐ 
20. What do you typically use for cooking meals (tick only one option!)?
Biomass (Wood/dung/coal) ☐ Kerosine ☐  LPG ☐ Other: ___________________________ 
Sanitation and Water Situation 
21. Where do you typically get your water from (tick only one option!)?
Private water tap ☐´ Private bore well ☐        Public bore well ☐   Water tanker delivery ☐ 
Other:___________________________ 
22. What do you typically use for drinking (tick only one option!)?
Untreated water ☐           Boiled water ☐   Water which has been filtered through cloth ☐ 
Purified with water filter ☐  Purchase drinking water ☐ Other:__________________________ 
23. What do you typically use for sanitation (tick only one option!)?
Private toilet ☐      Public pay toilet ☐    Community toilet ☐      No toilet/"open space" ☐        
Other:__________________________ 
23.h. If you pay for the toilet, what are the monthly costs (per person)? ___________Rs. per month for 
one person 
23.i. If you have private toilet, how much did it cost to construct it? ____________________Rs. 
23.j. If you have a private toilet, how old is it (years)? ______________________years 
24. In the last four weeks, did you suffer from vomiting or loose motion?  Yes ☐ No ☐





26. Would you like to play the game again? Yes ☐ No ☐ 
27. How easy or difficult was it for you to understand the game? 
Very easy ☐         Easy ☐         Neither easy nor difficult ☐         Difficult ☐         Very difficult ☐ 
28. How much do you agree or disagree with the statement “In the game, those who have more money in the game 
should also contribute more to the common fund.”? 
Strongly agree ☐         Agree ☐         Neither agree nor disagree ☐         Disagree ☐         Strongly disagree ☐ 
29. How much do you agree or disagree with the statement “In the game, I followed the action of the first mover.”? 










Implementation of Leadership Treatment 
The leadership treatment was implemented anonymously. In a first step, every player had 
to decide on a contribution if randomly selected as a leader (cf. FIRST MOVE and 
SECOND MOVE columns on player sheets above). Then, all folders were handed in to 
field assistants. Hidden from participants, one folder was picked and the contribution of the 
player was noted down. The second column was marked by a large cross so that the 
respective person knew she was selected as a leader and did not have to make another 
move. All folders were handed back to participants and four out of five participants had to 
make their second choice. To avoid identification of the “leader,” first movers where also 
asked to write something on the player sheet.  
Additional Information on Design and Order Effects 
The order of within-subject treatments was randomized using four variations of the 
sequence of play. In two versions, subjects started to play the first four rounds in the 
leadership/sequential game condition and then moved to the other condition in rounds 5 to 
8 (Order 3 and Order 4 in Table 32 below). In two other versions of the game, subjects 
started with parallel contributions (rounds 1 to 4) and then moved to the sequential game in 
rounds 5 to 8 (Order 1 and Order 2 in Table 32 below).  
In alternate rounds, subjects were either equally endowed (uneven rounds for Order 1 and 
Order 3, even rounds for Order 2 and Order 4) or endowment heterogeneity was introduced 
(even rounds for Order 1 and Order 3, uneven rounds for Order 2 and Order 4). In order to 
avoid confounding of sequence of play with communities, each order was prepared one 
time per session resulting in a total of four versions for twenty subjects. Subjects drew lots 
for groups and, thus, also for the order of play. Teams of group assistants that organized the 
session were also randomly assigned to one of the groups per session. 
Table 32: The Four Possible Sequences of the Game 
Treatment in Round 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Order 1 Baseline HetNoLead Baseline HetNoLead HomoLead HetLead HomoLead HetLead 




Order 3 HomoLead HetLead HomoLead HetLead Baseline HetNoLead Baseline HetNoLead 
Order 4 HetLead HomoLead HetLead HomoLead HetNoLead Baseline HetNoLead Baseline 
 
It can be seen that, by design, the number of observations per treatment was equal for each 
of the rounds. The only exception is the first session, in which only one order was played. 
In all sessions, each treatment was played two times by every player. Table 33 displays 
contributions by treatments for all rounds and for round 1. It can be seen that, on average, 
contributions are lower in the first round – although not substantially in treatment 2 – and 
that the order of treatment effects – again with the exception of treatment 2 – is the same in 
round 1 and in all rounds.  
Table 33: Contributions by Treatments 
 Mean contribution 




in INR round 1 
Standard deviation 
round 1 
Treatment 1 (Baseline) 5.458 2.855     4.84 2.608959 
Treatment 2 (HetNoLead) 5.275 3.587   5.16    3.036994 
Treatment 3 (HomoLead) 5.004 2.730     4.44  1.916594 
Treatment 4 (HetLead) 4.863 3.311          4.2  2.614065 
 
There seems to be no strong effect of sequence of play on contributions and average 
contributions are relatively stable over time (cf. Figure 16; note that the frequency of 








5. Statistical Model Selection
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Table 34: Model Comparison 







































































































































































HINDU -0.4344 -0.6290 -0.8171 -0.3804 
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(0.5340) (0.4980) (0.5028) (0.2397) 
SESSIONDUMMY1 1.7722 
(1.2312) 
SESSIONDUMMY 2 1.4855 
(1.1874) 
SESSIONDUMMY 3 0.3075 
(1.1848) 
SESSIONDUMMY 4 0.4803 
(1.1833) 









































N 798 798 798 798 798 
R2 0.273 
F 31.7783 
AIC 3747.8779 3750.4386 3759.4756 3334.4105 
BIC 3878.9769 3858.1271 3862.4820 3376.5495 
χ² 261.8256 258.2344 261.2513 436.0738 
χ² Comparison Model 119.7898 110.1240  99.0870 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 34 displays five different specifications of the econometric model. The first two 
columns are multi-level models with decisions (level 3) nested in players (level 2) nested 
in groups of five subjects (level 1). The third column uses two levels with decisions (level 
2) nested in players (level3). Models (4) and (5) present estimates of a random and a fixed
effects model for a dynamic balanced panel. The first round is dropped because lagged 
variables for t + 1 are part of the independent variable list.  
A Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of equal coefficients (χ² = 2897.90; df = 7; p = 
0.0000). Thus, the random effects model, with a very high likeliness, produces inconsistent 
estimates. Coefficients of the multilevel models are close to the consistent (but inefficient) 
fixed effects model.  
If we compare model (2) against a linear OLS regression, the null hypothesis of a zero 
variance component of the player is rejected (χ² = 99.09; df = 1; p = 0.0000). If we 
compare the three-level model (2) with the two-level model (3), a likelihood ratio test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the variance component of groups is zero (χ² = 11.04; df = 
1; p = 0.0004). The three-level model is, thus, preferred over the two-level model.  
In addition we control for fixed effects of sessions by adding a set of dummy variables to 
model (1). A likelihood ratio test shows that the additional explanatory value is rather small 
(χ² = 3.59; df = 5; p = 0. 6095).We, thus, decide for model (2). 
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Appendix 3: Supplementary Material “Game Participation and 




Original Instructions and Material for the Paper  
„Game Participation and Preservation of the Commons: An 
experimental approach” 
1. Introduction 
2. Rules of the Game/Instructions 
3. Feedback on Outcome of Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 









Herzlich willkommen zu unserer Befragung!  
 
WissenschaftlerInnen setzen zu Forschungszwecken vermehrt ökonomische Experimente ein. Dabei werden in der Regel 
Entscheidungen getroffen, die Konsequenzen für eine tatsächliche monetäre Auszahlung haben. Wir möchten Ihnen 
heute Abend die Möglichkeit geben, an solch einem Spiel teilzunehmen. 
Insgesamt gibt es 45 Umschläge (=TeilnehmerInnen)! 
 Jede(r) TeilnehmerIn erhält unabhängig vom Ausgang eine Aufwandsentschädigung in Höhe von fünf Euro.  
Sollte Ihnen dies unangenehm sein, haben Sie die Möglichkeit das gesamte Geld oder einen Teil des Geldes zu spenden. 
Natürlich können Sie das Geld auch behalten. Alle hier gewonnenen Daten werden nur anonymisiert und nur zu 
Forschungszwecken verwendet. 
Zufallsauswahl eines Umschlags 
 
 
29 Umschläge mit Spiel – Paarung mit Studierenden der 
HU 
(insgesamt ca. 15 min) 
 
16 Umschläge nur Befragung  
(insgesamt ca. 8 min) 
 
Erklärung der Spielregeln - 
Spiel - 
Ergebnis des Spiels - 
Erhalt der Aufwandsentschädigung mit Möglichkeit der 
Spende 
Erhalt der Aufwandsentschädigung mit Möglichkeit der 
Spende 
Quittierung des Erhalts Quittierung des Erhalts 




2. Rules of the Game/Instructions
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Herzlich willkommen bei der Langen Nacht der Wissenschaften, 
vielen Dank für Ihre Bereitschaft an unserer Befragung teilzunehmen! 
Wir wollen heute ein ökonomisches Spiel mit Ihnen durchführen, in dem Sie eine Entscheidung 
treffen müssen. Die Höhe der Auszahlung in diesem Spiel hängt von Ihrer eigenen Entscheidung 
und der Entscheidung eines Mitspielers/einer Mitspielerin ab. Die Kosten hierfür trägt die 
Universität. 
Das Spiel wird insgesamt nicht mehr als 15 Minuten dauern. Zunächst erhalten Sie eine kleine 
Einführung in die Regeln. Alle Daten werden anonymisiert und nur zu Forschungszwecken 
verwendet. Niemand wird Ihre Entscheidung und Ihre Auszahlung Ihnen persönlich zuordnen 
können. 
Bitte lesen Sie sich die Regeln aufmerksam durch. Wenn Sie etwas nicht verstanden haben, so 
stehen wir Ihnen für Fragen jederzeit zur Verfügung.  
Einführung und Regeln des heutigen Spiels 
Sie erhalten einen Euro. Diesen Euro können Sie in ein gemeinsames Projekt mit Ihrem 
Mitspieler/Ihrer Mitspielerin investieren. Sie können das Geld auch behalten. Ihr Mitspieler/Ihre 
Mitspielerin ist Studierender der Humboldt-Universität, der die Entscheidung für dieses Spiel in 
einer Vorlesung vor einigen Tagen getroffen hat und nächste Woche eine Auszahlung erhalten 
wird, die auch von Ihrer Entscheidung abhängt. Sie werden zufällig mit einem dieser 
Studierenden gepaart. Ihre Auszahlung aus dem Spiel hängt somit sowohl von der Entscheidung 
des Studierenden, als auch von Ihrer eigenen Entscheidung ab. Sie erhalten Ihr Geld nach dem 
Spiel. Es gibt vier Möglichkeiten:  
• Beide Spieler investieren in das gemeinsame Projekt.
• Nur Sie investieren in das gemeinsame Projekt.
• Nur Ihr Mitspieler investiert in das gemeinsame Projekt.
• Keiner der Spieler investiert in das gemeinsame Projekt.
Entsprechend Ihrer Entscheidung und der Entscheidung Ihres Mitspielers entstehen folgende 
Auszahlungen. Das Geld erhalten Sie bar nach dem Spiel. 







Ich investiere. Jeder Spieler erhält 2 
Euro. 
Ich erhalte nichts, 
mein(e) MitspielerIn 
erhält 3 Euro. 
Ich investiere nicht. Ich erhalte 3 Euro, 
mein(e) MitspielerIn 
erhält nichts. 
Jeder Spieler erhält 1 
Euro. 
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Gibt es bis hierher Fragen? 
Nun erklären wir Ihnen, wie Sie uns Ihre Entscheidung mitteilen. Durch Ankreuzen auf der 
nächsten Seite wählen Sie bitte eine der beiden Optionen (investieren/nicht investieren)!  
Danach stecken Sie das Blatt bitte in den dafür vorgesehenen Umschlag. Ich werde den 
geschlossenen Umschlag dann einem Kollegen übergeben, der Sie nicht sieht und Ihre 
Entscheidung nicht Ihnen persönlich zuordnen kann. Dieser Kollege bereitet dann auch die 
Auszahlung vor, welche ich Ihnen in wenigen Minuten übergeben werde. So kann niemand Ihre 
persönliche Entscheidung nachvollziehen – sie ist vollkommen anonym. 
Nachdem Sie den Ausgang des Spiels erfahren haben und ihre Auszahlung eingesteckt haben, 
erhalten Sie außerdem Ihre Aufwandsentschädigung mit der Möglichkeit der Spende. Hierzu 
erhalten Sie nach erfolgtem Spiel eine gesonderte Anleitung. 
In einem letzten Schritt möchten wir Sie bitten, einen kurzen Fragebogen auszufüllen. 






Bitte entscheiden Sie sich, trennen Sie diesen Zettel ab und stecken Sie ihn 




Bitte wählen Sie eine der folgenden Möglichkeiten! 
 
Ich investiere in das gemeinsame Projekt.    ☐ 
Ich investiere nicht in das gemeinsame Projekt.   ☐ 
  
 
Zur Erinnerung hier noch einmal die Auszahlungsmatrix: 
 







Ich investiere. Jeder Spieler erhält 2 
Euro. 
Ich erhalte nichts, 
mein Mitspieler 
erhält 3 Euro. 
Ich investiere nicht. Ich erhalte 3 Euro, 
mein Mitspieler erhält 
nichts. 








3. Feedback on Outcome of Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
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Das Ergebnis des Spiels: 
Ihre Entscheidung: 
Sie investieren ☐ 
Sie investieren nicht ☐


































Sie erhalten:___________________ Euro 




Liebe Teilnehmerin, lieber Teilnehmer, 
wie angekündigt erhalten Sie fünf Euro für die Teilnahme an unserer Befragung. Die fünf Euro 
finden Sie im beiliegenden Umschlag. Sie haben die Möglichkeit, einen Teil des Geldes oder die 
gesamte Summe der „Deutschen Bundesstiftung Umwelt“ (DBU) zu spenden. Natürlich können 
Sie das Geld auch behalten. Die Staffelung der Münzen gestattet es Ihnen, jeden beliebigen 
Betrag von 0,00 bis 5,00 Euro in 10-Cent-Schritten zu spenden. 
Zur Information: Die DBU ist eine der größten Stiftungen in Europa. Sie fördert innovative 
beispielhafte Projekte zum Umweltschutz aus den Bereichen Umwelttechnik, 
Umweltforschung/Naturschutz und Umweltkommunikation. 
Durch eine Spende an die DBU unterstützen Sie Projekte, von denen alle in der Gesellschaft 
profitieren können. 
Bitte nehmen Sie so viel Geld aus dem Umschlag wie Sie behalten möchten, und stecken 
anschließend den Umschlag in die dafür vorgesehene Box. Bitte stecken Sie Ihren Umschlag in 
jedem Fall in die Box, auch wenn der Umschlag leer ist. Eine Zuordnung Ihrer Spende zu Ihrem 
Namen erfolgt nicht. 
Wir möchten Sie außerdem bitten, uns den Erhalt der fünf Euro auf diesem Zettel zu quittieren. 
Dies dient allein der Abrechnung der bewilligten Mittel. 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme! 
Hiermit bestätige ich, dass ich fünf Euro für die Teilnahme an der Studie zum Spendenverhalten 
bei der „Langen Nacht der Wissenschaften“ an der Landwirtschaftlich-Gärtnerischen Fakultät 
erhalten habe.  
Vorname:___________________________________ 
Familienname:_______________________________ 








Fragebogen für TeilnehmerInnen 
1. TeilnehmerInnennummer:____________ 
2. Ihr Geschlecht: 
Männlich  ☐  Weiblich ☐   
3. Ihr Geburtsjahr: _____________________ 
4. Wieviele Personen leben derzeit dauerhaft in Ihrem Haushalt?____________________ 
5. Über welches Nettoeinkommen verfügt Ihr Haushalt monatlich? 
Weniger als 1.000 Euro ☐ 1.000 Euro bis weniger als 2.000 Euro ☐   
2.000 Euro bis weniger als 3.500 Euro ☐   3.500 Euro und mehr ☐ 
6. Was ist ihr höchster erzielter Schulabschluss? 
Kein Schulabschluss  ☐ Haupt-/Realschule/Polytechnische 
Oberschule 
☐   Gymnasium/Gesamtschule/Erweiterte 
Oberschule 
☐   
7. Haben Sie eine Ausbildung oder ein Hochschulstudium (mit Abschluss) absolviert? 
8.  
Wie sehr stimmen Sie folgenden Aussagen zu oder lehnen diese ab? 
 Stimme voll zu Stimme eher zu Weder noch Lehne eher ab Lehne voll ab 
I. Ich interessiere 
mich sehr für 
Umweltfragen. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
II. Ich achte bei 
meinen 
Alltagsentscheidun
gen auf mögliche 
Konsequenzen für 
die Umwelt.  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 




☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
9. Waren Sie mit der Arbeit der „Deutschen Bundesstiftung Umwelt“ vor der Teilnahme an dieser Befragung 
vertraut? 
Ja ☐ Nein  ☐   
Wenn ja: Wie bewerten Sie die Arbeit der Deutschen Bundesstiftung Umwelt?  
Sehr positiv Eher positiv Weder noch  Eher negativ Sehr negativ 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Hochschulstudium ☐ Berufsausbildung ☐   Weder noch ☐    
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10. In welcher der folgenden Situationen erwarten Sie am ehesten, dass egoistisches Verhalten zu einem
gesellschaftlichen Schaden führen kann (soziales Dilemma)? 
11. Glauben Sie, dass die Teilnahme am Spiel Ihr Spendenverhalten beeinflusst hat?
Ja, ich habe mehr gespendet, als ich es ohne das Spiel getan hätte. ☐
Ja, ich habe weniger gespendet, als ich es ohne das Spiel getan hätte. ☐
Nein, das Spiel hat mein Spendenverhalten nicht beeinflusst. ☐
12. Wenn Sie nur die Höhe ihrer eigenen Auszahlung berücksichtigen, was wäre die beste Strategie im Spiel 
gewesen?  
Investieren Nicht investieren Abhängig von der Entscheidung 
des anderen Spielers 
Weiß nicht 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Angeln am eigenen 
Teich 
Angeln in internationalen 
Gewässern 
Angeln mit Angelschein am 
See 
Weiß nicht 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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